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Abstract 
 
The period between 1944 and 1956, also known as the “Stalinist period”, is one of 
the most controversial and turbulent in Polish history. The Polish communist party 
launched the project of restructuring Polish society, whose historically well- 
established national identity seemed incompatible with the communist project. 
Firstly, the communists effected a demographic change that resulted in a near mono- 
ethnic state. Simultaneously, they introduced a centrally planned economy, 
transformed state symbolism, initiated a national education system, attempted to re- 
shape popular attitudes to religion, and launched a massive propaganda campaign to 
reinforce and popularize their objectives. 
This study seeks to investigate the communists’ attempts to accommodate 
Polish nationalism, the impact these attempts had on the success of the communist 
project in Poland and, by implication, the governments’ relationship with Poles and 
the USSR. By exploring these aspects of the debate, the author discovered that 
Polish communists, Poles themselves in most cases, struggled to find a balance 
between their national identity and the communist ideology. In fact, the thesis argues 
that leaders of the Polish communist government developed a dual identity in their 
approach to governing Poland: that is, they were primarily nationalists rather than 
Stalinist communists, but retained some key elements of the ideological and 
totalitarian framework. As a result, the Polish communist project deviated from the 
Soviet model and ultimately failed to produce a new and coherent narrative. 
Crucially, the spread of literacy and education throughout Polish society served to 
reinforce historic national identity. In 1956, due to popular unrest, the quasi- 
totalitarian Polish state had to abandon Stalinist style rule and effectively the 
nationalist component from thereon dominated the narrative of the regime. 
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“What sort of communists are you?” asked Joseph Stalin of the delegation of Polish 
communists in Moscow in 1944 (Esiler, as cited in Leszczyński, 2013) in regard to their 
moderate attitude concerning land reform and redistribution, Stalin ultimately questioned the 
revolutionary zeal of Polish communists and their attachment to the very ideology of 
communism. Indeed, the Polish communist regime, even at the height of Stalinism, was much 
more moderate than communist regimes in Czechoslovakia or Hungary with regard to 
oppression or even forcing the communist ideology, attempting “to succeed at a minimal 
cost, before resorting to more brutal methods, they wanted to exhaust other possibilities” 
(Esiler, as cited in Leszczyński, 2013). Furthermore, as one Polish communist claimed, they 
“knew the Soviet Union” and told themselves “we could do it differently, we could do it 
better” (as cited in Torańska, 1985, p. 457). Such a statement highlights a tension between the 
Soviet model and Polish approach. Therefore, it is crucial to ask why Polish communists 
attempted a more moderate and less ideological approach. Such questions can be answered in 
terms of a sentiment shared by the entire Polish nation, especially after the World War II – 
nationalism. It is impossible to critically engage with Poland’s post war history without 
reference to the strong forces of nationalism that have driven Polish history. However, 
nationalism is not easily compatible with the internationally based ideology of communism 
that Poland was subjected to between the end of World War Two and the fall of communism 
in the late eighties. The tension between these two forces and the tension they placed on the 
Polish communist party between 1944 and 1956 are the focus of this thesis. 
The significant role that nationalism played in post-war Polish politics is highlighted 
by the demographic statistics.  Post-1945 Poland is a state where, according to the most 
recent censuses, 94% of citizens identify themselves as ethnically Polish (Cordell and 
Dybczynski, 2005, p. 81), while her predecessor – the Second Polish Republic – had only 
69% of ethnic Poles as citizens, with the other 31% consisting of mainly of Ukrainians, Jews 
and other minorities (Prażmowska, 2010, p. 102). By modern standards, Poland, with her 
almost complete ethnic homogeneity, can be counted among those few polities where a 
nation is congruent with the state – a nation-state (Connor, 2004). The process of 
homogenization of the Polish state was launched immediately after the World War II 
(Mironowicz, 2000) and had a tremendous impact on the Poles and their self-perception as a 
nation (Czubiński, 2001). These policies, however, were launched and conducted by the new, 
Soviet-backed, communist government. Indeed, between 1945 and 1989 Poland, alongside 
other countries in Eastern Europe, was subject to Soviet political, economic and military 
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domination (Prażmowska, 2010). Soviet-backed regimes, by default mimicking the Soviet 
model, were quasi-totalitarian, containing elements of a totalitarian regime such as secret 
police, prisons and labour camps, control of media and press, and oppression and, for most 
Poles, this period was a traumatic one. These particular historical experiences, 
understandably, created the perception of that period as a “black hole” in Polish history - a 
period that most Poles would sooner forget - although it was also a period of modernization 
and important social changes (Czubiński, 2001, p. 4). 
Consequently, the literature critically engaging with the Polish communist experience 
is still rather scarce, especially in terms of its impact on Poles’ national identity. As Conversi 
argues, socialist regimes were engaged in social engineering more than any other form of 
government in history (2008, p. 1287). In this light, the policies pursued by the communist 
government focused on ethnic cleansing and expulsions of ethnic minorities, a national 
educational curriculum, national unification through religious affiliation, significant 
nationalisation of the economy, propaganda, and attempts to form a new modern Polish 
historiography to justify the new borders and political system. These policies aimed to shape 
the new Polish nation. Therefore, this project investigates these policies to assess the degree 
of their success and impact they had on Poles as a nation and, specifically, to highlight the 
internal tension between ideology and nationalism in their formation and execution by the 
Polish regime. The period this project will focus on is between 1945 and 1956, the formative 
years for the new Polish state where all policies were launched and ethnic homogenization 
completed (Mironowicz, 2000). Other policies were shaped and implemented in that period 
and endured with only slight modifications, until the communist regime collapsed in 1989. 
Furthermore, by 1956 the Soviet leadership acknowledged that the Soviet Model was 
inherently incompatible with Polish nationalism and it effectively allowed dominant 
nationalist narrative as long as Poland officially remained within the Eastern Bloc (Esiler, 
2015). 
Critical engagement with the communist past has been largely absent in post-1989 
Polish society, where two main narratives emerged – one aiming to completely discredit the 
period between 1944 and 1989, known as People’s Poland (pol. Polska Rzeczpospolita 
Ludowa – PRL) and another discrediting most aspects of it (Ochman, 2013). Therefore, the 
period of almost five decades of Polish history is analysed through the context of internal 
oppression and foreign domination (Czubiński, 2000). Nevertheless, the People’s Poland, 
with all its shortcomings, was the milieu for millions of Poles, since there was no alternative 
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(Czubiński, 2000). The current Polish historiography only began to re-evaluate the PRL as a 
period of Polish history, with more balanced accounts by Czubiński (2000), Ochman (2013) 
and Prażmowska (2010, 2011). However, in the main, these important works focus on the 
general history of Poland, without detailed analysis of specific communist policies and 
approaches. 
The significance of this dissertation, therefore, is its attempt to revise the current 
historical narrative concerning the formative period for the communist regime between 1945 
and 1956, specifically the role that both ideology and nationalism played in this formative 
period.  Within the scholarly debate it is possible to identify two main approaches displayed 
by two different sides the historical discourse – Polish and Western. Polish historians like 
Gontarczyk (2013) and Eisler (2015) claim that Polish communists betrayed the national 
cause and served as a proxy for the Soviets, while Western historians like Curp (2005), 
Douglas (2012) or Fleming (2010) argue that nationalism dominated the Polish communist 
regime. Porter-Szucs goes as far to argue that some members of the regime, especially 
Gomułka, were “deeply grounded in nationalist far right” politics (2014, p. 231). However, 
this does not mean that there is consensus among western historians on the nature and extent 
of nationalism among Polish communist leaders. Norman Davies, for example, acknowledges 
the incompatibility of the regime and Polish nationalism and argues this was the root of its 
rejection (2001, p. 2-3). Polish historians working in the West also present differing opinions 
about the role of nationalism and ideology. Adam Zamoyski claims that “although fashioning 
itself like a socialist version of the medieval Piast kingdom,” the regime “failed to create “a 
new Polish society, but transformed it into a repressed group of individuals” (2011, pp. 249- 
250). The analysis of Polish nationalism under communism (in reference to members of the 
regime or the nation itself) is acknowledged in both generalist and specialist literature. 
However, these analyses focus predominantly on the most apparent manifestation of 
nationalism – the ethnic cleansing effected after the WWII. Only Zarermba (2002) explicitly 
discusses the use of nationalist rhetoric for propaganda purposes. Esiler alludes to nationalist 
responses within the regime (2008, 2014), yet he does not provide a detailed analysis. 
Overall, an argument for the dual identity of the regime, and the tensions and contradictions it 
created, is absent from a broader historical debate. This project will argue that Polish 
communists struggled to find a balance between the communist ideology and nationalism, 
especially in the formative period between 1944 and 1956. At this point, it is important to 
emphasize that the nationalist responses and actions of the communist regime can be divided 
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into two distinct groups – the open endorsement of nationalist sentiments and subtler and less 
open nationalist responses that manifested themselves in more moderate approaches in terms 
of policies such as nationalisation of industry, collectivisation, or terror. The former was used 
as a tactic and a tool of popularising the regime (Zaremba, 2002), while the latter 
demonstrates the tensions between nationalism and communism within the Polish communist 
party. Such tensions are most sharply demonstrated by an account of Józef Światło (high 
ranking official of the repression apparatus) who claimed that Gomułka believed that the 
regime would follow the officially endorsed and more moderate version of socialism that was 
advocated to popularize the regime, while other members of the Politburo (Minc, Berman and 
Bierut) knew it was only a propaganda move. Such tension is aptly illustrated in most recent 
scholarly publication concerning the period in question – Anita Prażmowska’s biography of 
Gomułka (2016). She analyses Gomułka’s rejection of the Societ model and push for 
moderation; nevertheless, such moderation would be still implemented within the framework 
of a socialist model. When the official stage of endorsing nationalism was over, Gomułka 
was imprisoned and replaced by Bierut. (HIA, DSM, sygn. 158, scan 420). These tensions 
within the politburo itself reflect more general tensions between the regime and Polish 
nationalism. 
Światło’s revealing comment also draws attention to the existence of two periods 
within the timeframe of this project – the first phase between 1944 and 1948, when 
nationalism dominated the regime’s narrative, and the second between 1948 and 1956, when 
the communist regime attempted to replace nationalism with their modified version of Soviet 
communist ideology. Thus, the main argument of this thesis is that Polish communists in the 
formative years between 1944 and 1956 struggled to find a balance between their national 
identity and the communist ideology. By the end of that period, however, the ideological 
approach resulted in a deep crisis of the regime. The crisis on its own was caused by the 
ongoing erosion of the regime’s power following Stalin’s death. The attempt to suppress 
nationalism post-1948 resulted in an eruption of nationalist sentiment that nearly toppled the 
regime when it was at its weakest and exposed Poland to the threat of Soviet intervention. 
The transformation of the regime post-1956, instigated to avoid the collapse, introduced 
nationalism as the dominant narrative within the communist party. This dissertation will not 
deny the trauma of past generations, nor will it attempt to provide any moral assessment of 
the People’s Poland. It aims to investigate, explain and assess the extent to which the 
communist party and its policies of ethnic cleansing (Mironowicz, 2000), interference with 
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religion, the economy, education curriculum, “polityka historyczna” (politics of history) and 
propaganda (Ochman, 2013, p. 22) responded to the Polish national sentiments and, in fact, 
helped shape and strengthen modern Polish national identity. The author acknowledges that 
such a view sits at considerable odds with the prevailing cultural view of contemporary Poles 
and the historiography of the period. 
In order to explore these issues and ideological tensions, this dissertation will aim to 
establish a theoretical perspective through which the shape of the development and shape of 
Polish nationalism prior to 1945 will be analysed. Then it will move to analyse the tensions 
between the Soviet model and the Polish approach and its impact on the policies launched by 
the regime. Next, the specific aspects and policies will be analysed, the first and most 
important of them being the physical expulsion of ethnic minorities and Germans from the 
newly acquired territories. The mass ethnic cleansing created a state almost completely 
devoid of ethnic minorities, thus approximating the model of a nation-state (Prażmowska, 
2004). Such action, and its resulting cultural, linguistic and ethnic homogeneity, had very 
significant implications for Polish identity, which this dissertation will aim to analyse. 
Another set of ground-breaking policies, aimed at re-shaping Polish national identity, 
was the introduction of new set of symbols and national celebrations, which the regime 
combined with a new nation-wide education scheme and the new curriculum, especially in 
the teaching of history. However, as Mironowicz (2000) notes, the majority of primary, 
secondary and tertiary education institutions were established by the communist government. 
Assuring free education at all levels, the communist government not only eliminated 
illiteracy, but achieved a tool to disseminate its ideological values, through schools. However, 
the curriculum was never entirely free of nationalist components. Compulsory attendance at 
the primary level (Mironowicz, 2000) assured that all born between 1945 and 1989 were 
educated along the lines of the established communist curriculum. Since millions of Poles 
who live in the new, democratic, Poland were educated by the communist regime, it would be 
hard to argue that some values instilled by the communist education system were lost when 
the regime collapsed in 1989. Then this project will move to analyse the regime’s 
propaganda, which aimed to promote its ideological values in the society and equip it with 
the popularity and legitimacy it lacked. Finally, this project will analyse the religious politics 
of the communist government, which oppressed all religious forms within its boundaries, 
following the secular doctrine of communism. However, the communist government, while 
repressing the Orthodox and Protestant Christians, as well as Muslims, allowed the Catholic 
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Church to operate relatively freely (Prażmowska, 2011). Thus, as the oppressed religious 
minorities waned, Catholicism emerged as the dominant religious denomination in the PRL, 
which, coupled with ethnic cleansing, assured that Poland became not only a mono-ethnic 
state, but also a mono-religious one. Given the historical connection between Catholicism and 
national identity in Poland, the dominant position granted to the Church was a reflection of 
regime’s acknowledgement of this relationship and, as a consequence, strengthened the 
growth of post-war nationalism. 
Having investigated all aforementioned aspects and policies, this dissertation will then 
attempt to synthesise the information collected in order to critically engage with the 
communist attempt to create a new Polish identity and assess the degree of success it 
achieved in this endeavour between 1944 and 1956, the formative period of the regime. The 
constraints of this project will warrant that certain aspects, like the post-war reconstruction 
and the architectural landscape as well as the change in the class structure of the population, 
will not be included in this argument, and might be the subject of further research if such 
opportunity should present itself. Other issues, like collectivisation, the use of terror, and 
persecution, will be analysed briefly and only in respect of the underlying tensions between 
nationalism and ideology within the Polish communist party. Nevertheless, the author of this 
dissertation is aware that issues discussed here are selected to reflect the underlying argument. 
This thesis attempts to fill a gap in the literature, as well as to provide a revised approach to 
Polish post-war history. The current literature exposes in very few cases (Torańska, 1985) of 
the dual identity among Polish communists, and an analysis of that identity cannot be found 
in scholarly debate. Some historians, like Esiler (2008; 2014), point to some nationalist 
responses of the regime (especially in 1956); nevertheless, the uneasy relationship between 
the communist ideology and nationalism does not appear in the scholarly debate. The 
argument of the dual identity proposed here can assist in explaining why Poland attempted to 
develop its own “Polish road to socialism” and, furthermore, why the very members of the 
regime contributed to “erosion of the communist dogma” (Taras, 1998, p. 81). Understanding 
and acknowledging the dual identity of Polish communists can broaden the historical debate 
concerning the post-war Polish history or, as Esiler framed it, “the Polish way through 
socialism” (2004, p. x). Such broadened understanding has the potential to provide new 
perspectives regarding the communist project in Poland – its domestic and foreign policies. It 
can also provide a deeper understanding of regime’s almost perpetual political crisis (turmoil 
occurred in 1956, 1968, 1970, 1976 and 1981-3, leading to 
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the non-violent transformation of 1989). Additionally, this revised perspective offers an 
exhaustive explanation as to why the Polish variant of socialism deviated so significantly from the 
Soviet. Furthermore, this approach assists in understanding why Poland was the most successful in 
asserting its own “way to socialism” while other Soviet Bloc regimes fell victim of a Soviet (or Soviet -
ed) invasion for attempting to alter the Soviet model (like Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 
1968). This study will examine Polish nationalism and its impact on the communist project in Poland 
between 1944 and 1956, arguing that the ultimate failure of communism was not only caused by its 
oppressive nature and popular rejection, but also because the very regime that launched the communist 
project struggled to reconcile the communist ideology and Polish national identity. Thus, the very people 
charged with implementing the communist project also played a part in its failure. It is important to 
emphasize that the tension between nationalism and ideology was not the only dynamic that 
occurred and shaped more than forty years of the communist rule in Poland – there have been 
ideological tensions within the party as well as tensions within the Eastern Bloc. however, this 
dissertation will solely focus on the tensions between nationalism and ideology and their impact 
on post-war Poland in the first twelve years after communist takeover in 1944. 
 
Research Questions: 
 
The investigation will be guided by an overarching question regarding the extent to 
which the Polish communist party sought to accommodate Polish nationalism and the 
tensions this created with its ideological foundations in communism. From this general 
question arose the issue of the dual identity of Polish communists, a result of their attempts to 
reconcile nationalism and the communist ideology. This idea of a dual identity through which 
to explore the regime’s policies and impact is not represented in the current literature which, 
as mentioned above, is highly polarized. As the thesis argues, this dual identity influenced the 
regime’s policies to re-shape post-war Poland and impacted its relations with both the Soviet 
Union and Polish society. Finally, the question of the overall impact of their dual identity on 
the communist project will be addressed. As I argue in the thesis, the existence of the dual 
identity at the heart of the communist regime helped to unravel the communist project 
through its lack of internal consistency. Each chapter aims to explore the issue of communist 
dual identity that manifested itself in various policies and projects the regime launched during 
the first twelve years of its existence. The specific research questions guiding the discussion 
are: 
1) To what extent did the Polish communist party seek accommodation with Polish 
nationalism? This question will be investigated through the entire project as all areas 
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of the regime activity contained or allowed space for nationalist discourse. 
2) In what ways did that accommodation produce the dual identity in the Polish 
communist party? This issue is analysed in Chapter II; however, elements of dual 
identity underpin all areas covered by this project. 
3) In what ways did the Polish communist party members use their dual identity to shape 
post-war Poland? This issue will be explored through the chapters concerning specific 
policies launched by the regime; namely ethnic cleansing, changing national symbols, 
new education system, propaganda and struggle with the Church 
4) How did the dual identity impact relations with the USSR and Poles? All chapters 
include an attempt to answer this question through investigating individual responses 
to communist policies; the relation with the USSR is analysed in Chapter II and the 
Conclusion. 
5) How did that dual identity impact the communist project in Poland? Assessment of 
that issue is provided in the general conclusion of this project. 
 
 
Methodological Approach 
 
The aim of this study is to examine the construction of both Polish identity and Polish 
nation state as a socio-political process in the period of 1945-1956. For this purpose, a 
qualitative rather than a quantitative method has been chosen. In this case, as Cook and Crang 
point out, knowledge needs to be contextualized and set against particular and individual 
backgrounds; therefore, it can be seen as a construct rather than a set of undeniable facts 
(2007, p. 70) 
The qualitative approach demands use of interdisciplinary methods of analysing both 
“talk” and “text” (Parakyla & Ruusuvuori, 2013) and an expressed acknowledgment that the 
researcher cannot be fully separated from or unbiased towards his or her research, being 
subject to varying backgrounds and influences (Atkinson & Hammersley, 1983). Therefore, 
the broad methodological framework of this study is interpretivist, and predominantly 
concerned with “social reality” (Harrison, Hill and Leitch, 2010, p. 68). Furthermore, this 
epistemological perspective accepts that knowledge is both a construct and “a product of 
human action and interactions and of the meanings that social actors attach to their 
experiences” (Wignall, 1998, p. 305). Hence the project includes inductive analysis of Polish 
ethnic nationalism and its appropriation by the communists, which will be rendered from the 
perspective of ethno-symbolism as outlined by Smith (1988, 1991) – the ethno-symbolist 
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perspective being one that emphasizes “cultural material of the past” (Ozkirimli, 2000, p. 
187) as well as obstinacy of previously existing “myths, symbols, values and meanings” 
(Ozkirimli, 2000, p. 167) in the historical process of nation formation. 
 
 
Primary, archival and secondary research 
 
This exploratory study adopts a mix of qualitative research approaches. Being 
concerned with socio-political events that occurred between 1945 and 1956 and their impacts 
of later developments, this research project also adopts a historical approach. After reading 
appropriate literature concerning the topic and formulating research questions it moves 
towards selection of appropriate primary historical sources found in archives (both in digital 
and hard copy form) and national libraries (accessed through the Federation of Digital 
Libraries – pol. Federacja Bibliotek Cyfrowych). The primary research can be divided into 
two categories – hard copy in situ resources found in archives and, secondly, their digitalised 
form. The in situ archival resources were accessed during a research trip to Poland between 
November 2015 and February 2016. These resources had to be analysed and processed on 
site; thus, actual analysis of data came from the researcher’s detailed notes. Other sources 
have been accessed online – these include Polish Film Chronicle (newsreels), Workers’ 
Tribune (pro-regime newspaper), propaganda posters and additional archival material 
available online. The different forms of archival material can be distinguished by the form of 
internal referencing, which deserves explanation on its own. The style of referencing of 
archival material adopted by this thesis in not compatible with the APA style, as adherence to 
APA guidelines in case of Polish archives would only obscure the direct sources; instead a 
style commonly used by Polish historians had been adopted. The difference between the 
onsite and online material is distinguishable in a following way – the onsite materials are 
indicated by their page number and online materials provide scan numbers (See Appendix 
A); other online material is referenced in accordance with APA guidelines. Analysis of data 
obtained from both academic and primary sources concerned analysis of fragmentary (as the 
issue of dual identity is non-existent in literature) and evidence of the dichotomous behaviour 
of Polish communists in primary and archival sources. The data was then combined and 
synthesised to form an argument that confirmed and emphasized the dual identity argument 
stipulated in this thesis. 
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Ethnographic component 
 
Another approach was ethnographic. As there are many Poles who were subject to the 
communist policies of 1945-1956, the researcher engaged with them through interviews. 
Interviews were conducted in retirement houses and aged-care facilities across Poland. These 
interviews were conducted in groups of people who were born between 1933 and 1949. In 
total, 30 people were interviewed for this project. Participants were drawn from 4 different 
retirement homes and aged-care facilities (two in Lower Silesia, one in Szczecin and one in 
Warsaw); three other interviewees that I knew could provide a valuable insight to this project 
were approached directly; other participants, however, were enlisted through the institutions 
they resided at. I informed the institution about my research, providing the information letter 
and consent forms (see Appendix B), which was followed by a phone call to arrange the 
details. Questions regarded interviewees’ personal experiences and responses to policies 
launched by the regime, as well as questions regarding their self-identification as Poles (see 
Appendix C); these, however, served only as a guide. Nevertheless, the semi-structured 
questions aimed to obtain information about particular areas – like education, propaganda and 
rituals of the state – thus in these cases the analysis of data was reduced to comparing initial 
assumptions with results as well as obtaining data regarding personal experiences and 
responses in the aforementioned areas. In this manner I discovered that only 2 out of 30 
interviewees were members, at some point, of the Polish communist party. One did it to 
advance his career and the other from conviction; however, she only alluded to it, without 
expressing it directly. Addtitionally, I have used a collection of interviews with top 
communist officials conducted by Teresa Torańska and published in two volumes (Oni – 
Them and Byli – Bygones), which expose the characters of the most important Polish 
communists as well as providing another perspective regarding the events that unfolded 
between 1948 and 1956. 
The interviews in most cases occurred in small groups of up to 3-4 people with the 
exception of three interviewees whom I knew beforehand. In all cases, participants chose to 
remain anonymous; thus, this thesis did not at any point disclose their identity. Each 
participant was assigned a pseudonym, which in its abbreviated form was used for internal 
referencing. Some patterns and responses were observable in all interviews, and some 
personal experiences and responses (although bearing similarity to all responses provided by 
participants) were used directly as they best exemplified aspects investigated by this project. 
Furthermore, twelve participants directly alluded to or mentioned the dual identity they could 
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observe among members of the regime apparatus, thus strengthening the argument that I 
propose in this project. 
 Chapter II: 
Theoretical 
perspectives 
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As previously mentioned, the Polish communist regime struggled to find a balance 
between nationalism and ideology, which caused significant tensions within the regime and 
impacted upon the approach and methods used by Polish communists. Since nationalism was 
such a significant element influencing actions of the regime, and because it has been a key 
component of Poland’s long history, understanding nationalism, its forms and theories 
explaining its development are at the centre of this project. Nationalism itself is an elusive 
concept and/or theory to define. However, if we are to understand why Poland’s post-war 
communist leaders retained strong links to Polish nationalism – in defiance of their Soviet 
patrons – an attempt must be made to grapple with the force of nationalism as a shaper of 
nations and states. 
Theories of nationalism and forms of nationalism 
 
The literature on nationalism is abundant and there are different theories and 
approaches. The issue is certainly complex and multifaceted. Particular nationalisms and their 
development heavily depend on historical, geographical, political and social contexts. Thus, a 
generic analysis of nationalism can prove difficult and will almost always omit certain 
aspects and particular developments. In order to better understand nationalism, it is essential 
to introduce the five main schools that aim to define nationalism and most common forms 
that nationalism assumes: primodialism, modernism, ethno-symbolism and ethno-nationalism 
and constructivism. Primodialism asserts that national bonds are primary and innate bonds 
that unite populations that nations developed with the birth of civilization and remain 
unchanged (Özkirimli, 2000). Modernism stipulates that nations are a result of modern 
processes initiated by the First Industrial Revolution (Özkirimli, 2000), therefore arguing that 
nations could not exist prior to modern thechnological developments, which allowed the state 
to unifiy its population.  The third school, developed by Anthony D. Smith – ethno- 
symbolism –treats national ties as a result of a long historical process (Özkirimli, 2000; 
Smith, 1987). Ethno-nationalism places ethnicity at the centre of national formation and 
idetification. Ethnic criteria of nationality were scruitinised by many academics, such as 
Connor (1994), who coined the term ethnonationalism, and subsequently argued that 
nationalism is predominantly ethnic in its nature (2004). The constructivist theory of 
nationalism argues that nations are fabricated or “constructed” by ethnic or non-ethnic groups 
to assert their power (Taras, 1998, p. 80). 
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These main schools identify two main strains of nationalism – ethnic and civic 
(Shulman, 2002). Ethnic nationalism, argued to be confined to the East, defines nationality 
through cultural, linguistic and religious attributes of ethnicity (Deutsch, 1969). Adding to 
complexity of the nationalist phenomenon, ethno-nationalism can both be viewed as a theory 
of nationalism and one of the strains of nationalism,that uses ethnic criteria to define 
nationality (Shulman, 2002). The other form of nationalism – civic – defines nationality in 
purely political terms. Community of rights, common laws and government are the main 
criteria in defining nationality, as arguably it occurs in the West (Deutsch, 1969); ethnicity is 
not a differentiating factor and citizenship rights belog to all ethnic groups within a given 
state and can be even extended to foreigners (Shulman, 2002). This thesis is not theoretical in 
its purpose; it does not aim to support or contest any school of thought concerning 
nationalism. The Polish case is so complicated that I chose a synthesis of arguments. The 
complexities and disagreements within these schools of thought, as well as disagreements 
between them, will not be the major focus of this dissertation. These schools and selectively 
chosen arguments they propose, will therefore be used as a tool assisting in understanding the 
processes that occurred in Poland between 1944 and 1956. 
Significance of ethno-symbolism to Poland 
 
Having discussed the main schools and forms of nationalism, this chapter can 
now proceed to discuss the social and political processes that occurred in Poland after 1945 in 
relevance to Polish national identity and nationalism, as well as to justify the choice of the 
theoretical framework guiding the argument. The aim of this chapter is, therefore, to name 
and justify the chosen elements of theories of nationalism that relate to Poland. These 
theories best explain the ethnic form of nationalism that developed in Poland across the 
centuries. If ethno-nationalism places ethnicity as the main criterion of national affiliation, 
ethno-symbolism highlights the need to investigate the history of a given nationality through 
its ethnic and historical perspective. As it will be demonstrated, Poland’s often turbulent, 
history produced three main components of Polish nationalism – language, religion and 
resistance to foreign domination. All these elements and traditions became embedded in 
ethnicity, which served as the ultimate identifying factor. Thus, theories that explicitly focus 
on ethnicity and its relation with historical developments most can most efficiently explain 
the form of national identity developed in Poland by the 20th century. Other approaches, like 
primodialism or perennialism, which argue that nationality and thus nationalism and nations 
are natural to human nature and as old as humanity itself; on the other side there is the 
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modernist approach, which treats nations and nationalism as a purely modern product of 
technological and civilizational developments (Ö   zkłrłmlł, 2000). All other approaches 
treat 
nations and nationalism as an occurrence – ancient or recent – while ethno-symbolism 
acknowledges that nation formation is a “long process” (Horch, as cited in Hutchinson and 
Smith, 2000, p. 608). Anthony D. Smith (1986; 1991; 1995; 2003), the most prominent 
ethno-symbolist, alongside Benedict Anderson (1983), consistently argue that the nation in its 
current form is to a large extent a product of modern circumstances. However, past 
experiences, myths, culture, customs and languages – the main tools and features of 
nationalism – have been developed throughout centuries and need to be taken into account, as 
nations are not suspended in a vacuum. Although Smith does not focus on modern 
technological developments in the nation-forming process, he openly acknowledges that 
“mass citizen states can only emerge in the era of industrialism and democracy” (1991, p. 44) 
and Anderson focuses on the role of “print-capitalism” and the rise of vernacular languages 
(1983, p. 77). Both authors allow their main argument to be supplemented by other 
developments and aspects of discussion, which concern the rise of nation modernity, 
capitalism, bureaucracy (Gellner, 1983), through modern political (mainly post-Versailles) 
settlements (Hobsbawm, 1992) and intellectual developments (Kedourie, 1966). 
Consequently, this project will primarily rely on the main aspect and assumption of ethno- 
symbolism – the nation and nationalism being a result of a long historical and social process. 
Furthermore, this dissertation needs to address the terminological confusion in 
relevance to nationalism and the state (Connor, 1994). Next. this chapter will move towards 
identifying processes that allow nationalism to develop, in order to provide a working 
definition of a nation that will inform the argument of this project. The relation between 
ethno-symbolism and ethnonationalism can be explained from the historical perspective. As 
Smith (1987; 1991; 1995) argues, almost all nations contain ethnic cores and different 
circumstances and processes create different strains of nationalism, which create different 
identifications and attitudes. In this respect, some historical processes and circumstances 
might result in a civic version of nationalism – where the nation is perceived as a community 
of citizens (Smith, 1995) or a community of political freedoms and duties (Tazbir, 1982), 
thus defined largely in political terms; different circumstances might result in ethnicity being 
a criterion of nationality (Connor, 1994, 2004). Although most nations and nationalisms 
contain an ethnic element (Smith, 1987, 1991), the intensity of the ethnic criterion allows the 
identification of nationalism as either civic or ethnic. Finally, this chapter will move towards 
17  
applying all concepts and features of nationalism to Poland’s historical experience in order to 
analyse how and in what circumstances it developed and what form it assumed prior to the 
communist takeover in 1945. 
Towards a synthesis 
 
Bearing in mind the complexity of the Polish case, this dissertation will attempt to 
synthesise the ethno-symbolist and modernist perspectives. This synthesis will be facilitated 
by arguments and claims of a theorist and ideologue who so far has been greatly 
underestimated as a voice in the discussion concerning nationalism. Polish nationalism, its 
features and objectives, cannot be fully understood without engaging with works of the chief 
ideologue (Czubiński, 2000) of Polish nationalism – Roman Dmowski. This dissertation will 
accordingly use his teachings in order to provide a specific context and better understanding 
of Polish nationalism. Dmowski was not only the eye-witness to the processes that shaped 
Polish nationalism at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, but also a theorist of nationalism. 
His early works (Dmowski, 1893/2007; 1904/2007) provide an intellectual bridge between 
ethno-symbolist and modernist perspective, and his later works (Dmowski, 1925/2007; 
1927/2007) not only illustrate the Polish desire for an ethnically homogenous nation, but also 
perfectly summarise and even anticipate policies implemented after 1945. Our Patriotism 
(Dmowski, 1893/2007) and Thinking of a modern Pole (Dmowski, 1904/2007) openly argued 
about the importance of technological and industrial advancements and their direct relation to 
the spread of national consciousness. However, in these publications Dmowski also argues 
that human beings are born into a certain set of values and social organisations, which are a 
result of a long historical process (Dmowski, 1904/2007). Through these arguments, 
Dmowski provides an intellectual bridge between ethno-symbolist and modernist perspective. 
He analysed the unique situation that Poles found themselves in after 1795 (Dmowski, 
1983/2007). In many cases, his arguments predate the claims made by contemporary 
scholars. A phrase “living the life of the nation” through literature and press (Dmowski, 
1904/2007, p. 22) anticipates the arguments of Anderson and his “imagined communities” 
(1983). Arguments made about oppression of Poles by partitioning power, which ironically 
resulted in strengthening of Polish identity, are equivalent to failures that Connor (1994, 
2004) attributes to any modern assimilation policies. 
Importantly, by analysing the process of industrialization (1983/2007; 1904/2007) Dmowski 
emphasizes that before that process the nobility (szlachta) – a small portion of the entire 
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population – was the sole carrier of Polish identity. However, the process of industrialization, 
the economic interconnectedness with other states, caused the influence of nobility to fade 
and the national consciousness to spread across Polish society (Dmowski, 1904/2007). The 
process described by Smith (1987, 1991) as transition from lateral to vertical ethnie. In his 
analysis of the Polish case, Dmowski uses both modernist and ethno-symbolist perspective, 
although not consciously, as these had not yet been developed in his times. In his later 
publications (1925/2007; 1927/2007), he frames the political objectives of Polish nationalism 
– an ethnic state. He does seem to foreshadow Prażmowska’s (2011) argument that the 
Polish-Lithuanian state was no longer a desired model, nor was it a feasible one. To a large 
extent, the notion of the new state with Polish majority was advocated and largely achieved 
by him –as the head of Polish delegation – at the Paris Peace Conference (Dmowski, 
1927/2007). As such, Dmowski cannot be only viewed as a far-right nationalist ideologue 
(Curp, 2005), but also as an eye-witness, analyst and theorist who employed many processes 
to develop a specific analysis of Polish nationalism, while at the same time being a product of 
the circumstances that shaped Poles as a nation. His publications provide a useful insight and 
provide a specific, rather than a generic, analysis of nationalism. By bridging both ethno- 
symbolist and modernist approaches, Dmowski provides a broader perspective and justifies 
the analysis of the modern industrial and technological developments in the same vein as 
modernists do, while rejecting their main line of argument – the modernity of the nation and 
nationalism. The intellectual bridge provided by Dmowski will serve as the basis, in this 
dissertation, for the synthesis of ethno-symbolist and modernist arguments, which should 
provide a deeper understanding of the Polish experience and the form of nationalism that 
resulted from it. 
Other literature 
 
Domwski’s works provide an intellectual bridge between ethno-symbolism and 
modernism and its key argument of industrialisation as a trigger for the development of 
nationalism. This dissertation, following Dmowski’s synthesis, will attempt to incorporate 
other elements of the modernist theory of nationalism and analyse processes in Poland, not 
only processes triggered in the late 18th century by the the intellectual movement of the 
Enlightenment (Kedourie, 1966), but also by the first industrial revolution (Gellner, 1983). 
Thus the ethno-symbolist perspective stands in contrast to the proponents of modernism as an 
overarching explanation for the cause of nationalism. While ethno-symbolism is better suited 
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to the Polish case and in keeping with Dmowski’s perspective, the thesis acknowledges the 
insights arising from modernism, thus providing a synthesis between two major schools of 
nationalism – modernism and ethno-symbolism. Such analysis should provide a better 
understanding of the historical process of nation-formation. While acknowledging the 
applicability of ethno-symbolism this thesis acknowledges Weber’s argument that the 
“concept” of nation cannot in fact be defined in “empirical terms” (1948, as cited in 
Hutchinson and Smith, 2000, p. 5). Hans Kohn provides a definition of nationalism as “a 
state of mind, in which the supreme loyalty is felt to be due to the nation-state” (1965, p. 9). 
This definition appears difficult to justify in the light of Connor’s argument that there in fact 
is a “remarkable lack of coincidence that exists between ethnic and political borders” (as 
cited in Hutchinson & Smith, 2000); opinion that is confirmed by other scholars such as 
Smith (1997; 1991; 1995), Anderson (1983), Hobsbawm (1992) and Seaton-Watson (1977). 
Therefore, this dissertation will follow and adopt Connor’s (1994; 2004) argument that 
nationalism is to a large extent a psychological phenomenon, as Kohn (1965) argues, but it 
cannot be defined as a sense of loyalty to a nation-state, simply because such polity is a rare 
occurrence. Instead, in similar sense to Connor, this dissertation will identify nationalism as 
one’s loyalty to a nation, while loyalty to the state should be identified as patriotism (Connor, 
1994). For the sake of clarity, it is useful to emphasize that nationalism is synonymous with 
patriotism only if the political borders are congruent with ethnic ones. Furthermore, in order 
to identify the presence of nationalism, it must be “a mass – not an elite – phenomenon” 
(Connor, 2004, p. 36), when a particular group (most often ethnic) identifies itself as a nation 
(Connor, 1994). The ethno-symbolist framework and Connor’s (1994, 2004) terminological 
clarifications provide a working definition of a nation, which will be utilized for the purposes 
of this dissertation in order to guide and facilitate the argument. Connor defines the nation as 
“the largest group that can be influenced/aroused/ motivated/mobilized by appeals to 
common kinship” (2004, p. 37). This chapter will augment the above definition and identify 
“the nation as the largest group that”, as a result of historical, cultural, social (Horch, 1993; 
Smith, 1986, 1991, 1995) and economic processes (Gellner, 1983) “can be mobilized by 
appeals to common kinship” (Connor, 2004, p. 37) and that has, or aspires to acquire, some 
degree of political agency (Suzman, 1997). 
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Components of nationalism 
Having clarified the appropriate terminology and provided a working definition of a 
nation, this chapter will now move towards identifying the key components of nationalism 
and the processes that facilitated its spread in order to later apply these to Polish history. This 
will result in identifying the historical development and the ultimate form of Polish 
nationalism itself. Modern scholars have categorized nationalism into two main groups – 
ethnic and civic. The latter is based on political rights and citizenship and largely confined to 
most developed nations of Western Europe, the United States, Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand. By contrast, ethnic nationalism is rather xenophobic and focused on ethnic ties 
(Lecours, 2000). The prevailing argument is that the more developed West created a more 
open, political, version of nationalism, while the more backward East (including Germany) 
remained with more traditional, thus backward, ethnic version (Deutsch, 1969). Such an 
approach is criticised by Shulman, who argues that “Western civic nations are more ethnic 
than is usually recognized, and Eastern ethnic nations are more civic” (2002, pp. 555-556). 
Calhoun (1993, as cited in Hutchinson & Smith, 2000) goes even further, claiming that 
ethnicity and nationalism can never be fully separated. Ethnically neutral nationalism exists 
only in states Connor identifies as “nonhomeland”, which are a product of the migration that 
overwhelmed certain indigenous populations – most notably the United States and Australia 
(1994, p. 91). Furthermore, Connor (1994), alongside Smith (1986; 1991; 1995), cites the 
ethnic tensions within Great Britain (mainly in terms of Scotland but also Wales), tensions 
between Bretons and French, the rise of Catalan and Basque consciousness in Spain and 
finally the tensions between the Flemish and Walloons within Belgium. These examples 
effectively prove that, apart from migrant states like the U.S, nationalism is almost never 
devoid of ethnicity; however, the strength of ethno-national bonds and their political goals 
may vary considerably (Suzman, 1997). 
 
Thus a nation most often possesses an ethnic core. Smith (1986; 1991; 1995) 
consequently argues that nations are more developed and organized forms of ethnies that in 
historical processes assimilated less populous or developed ethnic groups. The French term 
ethnie is defined as “human grouping, which possesses homogenous familial, economic and 
social structure, thus its unity lies in community of language, culture and group conscience” 
(Larousse.fr), or more simply an ethnic culture. Consequently, then, traits and characteristics 
of ethnies will be manifested by nations as they develop. Indeed, Smith emphasizes that 
ethnicity is “mythic” and “symbolic” (1986, p. 16), and rests on “cultural rather than 
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biological or kinship differences” (1986, p. 21). Hence culture, or ethnic culture to be precise, 
constitutes one of the components of both nation and nationalism. Following Smith’s 
argument, each ethnic culture, subject to different historical circumstances, will develop 
different historical memories, myths of origin and symbols (1986, 1991). Each ethnie 
develops in different circumstances; therefore, each ethnic culture will produce myths, heroes 
and symbols that will have an idiosyncratic meaning (Smith, 1986; 1991). National emblems 
are the most obvious examples of such idiosyncrasy – a crowned white eagle on a red 
background will immediately be recognized by a Pole as Polish national emblem, while other 
nationals might identify this symbol with difficulty or not at all. 
 
Alterity 
The idiosyncratic nature of ethnic cultures means that respective members will easily 
identify individuals similar to them and those who differ. Indeed, Smith argues that 
“distinctiveness remains a sine qua non of the nation” (1991, p. 70). His argument is 
supported by Schleisinger, who argues that nationalism is “always situating <<us>> in 
relation to <<them>>” (1987, as cited in Hutchinson & Smith, 2000, p. 84). This argument is 
strengthened by Musial and Wolniewicz (2010), who highlight that a certain degree of 
xenophobia is crucial in creating and maintaining ethnic or national bonds. The formation of 
dichotomous national pairs such Poles and Russians (Smith, 1987, p. 39) is probably the best 
proof that nations or ethnic groups in most cases “define themselves in terms of the other” 
(Howard, as cited in Hutchinson & Smith, 2000, p. 1634). For such a differentiation, and 
resulting identity, to occur, some individuals need to be excluded from an ethnic or national 
community, as in the case of creoles being excluded by Spaniards (Anderson, 1983) or two 
distinct cultures must come in direct contact with each other, be it through trade, migration or 
military conflict (Smith, 1986; Connor, 1994). Taras further argues that there is a “symbiotic 
relationship between national identity and alterity” (as cited in Taras 1998, p. 86). While 
exclusion, differentiation and xenophobia can be identified as the most dangerous features of 
nationalism, they are the most powerful factors in uniting ethnic groups and forming nations. 
 
Means of differentiation 
One of the most immediate and obvious tools of differentiation is language, a 
differentiation which has its roots in antiquity and early middle ages – ancient Greeks had 
their barbarians, peoples whose speech they could not understand (Smith, 1986) and medieval 
Slavs had their nemtsi, a term analogous to the ancient one (Horch, as cited in Hutchinson & 
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Smith, 2000). Smith (1986; 1991) dismisses the importance of language, as linguistic barriers 
are relatively easy to overcome. Anderson (1983) focuses on the rise of vernaculars as a 
medium of widespread communication, although he argues that it fails to be a significant 
differentiating factor, using the case of Latin America and the U.S, which both use European 
languages – English and Spanish – yet have formed polities different and independent from 
their respective colonial metropolises. Indeed, outside Europe, language might not act as a 
differentiating factor, while in Europe, and especially in Eastern Europe, language is closely 
connected to ethnicity. According to Anderson (1983), the Reformation and the invention of 
the printing press were the crucial starting points for the ascendancy of respective vernacular 
languages. The former emphasized the translation of the sacred Christian scripture into 
respective vernaculars, thus showing the way for these vernaculars to become the medium of 
intellectual exchange, while the latter allowed for greater efficiency of reproduction, assuring 
that ideas would be more widely and easily disseminated. Furthermore, as Anderson argues, 
printed and easily disseminated vernaculars created “languages of power” (1983, p. 45), 
which were used by state apparatus in everyday life; these indeed served as a unifying factor, 
since effective administration requires effective communication, which in turn demands a 
coherent medium for such communication to occur, thus binding and unifying the various 
administrative centres of a given state with its centre. This thesis will later attempt to 
demonstrate that language is one of the key components of Polish nationalism. 
 
Another tool for ethnic differentiation is religion, due to its universal appeals (Smith 
1987; Anderson, 1983). The links between religion and ethnicity or nation are often ignored. 
However, Smith points out that “nationalism takes its colour from its context” (1991, p. 79) 
and in certain contexts, religion is closely linked to ethnicity and nationality, though most 
often as a result of an historical process. Jews, Poles and Irishmen are probably the best 
examples. The latter two lost their statehood, in varying circumstances, and have been subject 
to foreign domination, which in both cases followed a different strain of Christianity 
(Prażmowska, 2010). While the Irish fell under Protestant English control, the Poles have 
been divided between Protestant Germans and Orthodox Russians (Czubiński, 2001). Their 
experience of foreign domination, coupled with religious differences, resulted in strict 
adherence to the Catholic Church, which subsequently became an important part of national 
identification. Jews have always been perceived to be an alien element in Christian Europe, 
and their very identification as a nation that has a special covenant with God lies at the very 
foundations of Jewish identity (Smith, 2003). It is justifiable to disregard religion as an 
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overall indicator of nationality; however, in certain circumstances, religion becomes one of 
the most prominent identifying factors, as this thesis will later demonstrate in relation to 
Poland. 
 
Hitherto, the argument has focused on an analysis of different aspects and arguments 
in scholarly debate concerning nationalism and its key components. The ethno-symbolist 
theory of nationalism allowed through the process of analysis to identify the main 
components of nationalism as a historical phenomenon. The most prevalent is ethnicity, 
which provides a basis for nation formation (Smith, 1986; 1991; 1995) with only few 
exceptions of migrant states (Connor, 1994; 2004); thus, nationalism almost always contains 
an ethnic element; however, through the processes of globalisation it also contains a civic 
element as almost all countries, through appropriate legislation, allow citizens of other states 
to acquire their citizenship (Shulman, 2002). These ethnic cores in the process of 
transforming into nations developed their distinct and peculiar cultures with idiosyncratic 
myths, symbols and values (Smith, 1986). Arising from different paths of cultural 
development is self-identification (Connor, 1994) through differentiation, exclusion (Smith, 
1986, 1991; Schleisinger, 1987; Howard, 1995) or xenophobia (Musial and Wolniewicz, 
2010). This cultural differentiation, depending on context, can be connected to language or 
religion. Although these are secondary products of national/ethnic culture, they constitute a 
powerful unifying tool – in terms of administration and power, as it is in case of language 
(Anderson, 1983) – and should never be entirely dismissed when investigating particular 
nationalisms. It is also important to note that these nationalities in their current form are 
finite; as Kohn argues, they are “products of the living forces of history, and therefore 
fluctuating and never rigid” (1965, p. 9) - elements evolved in changing circumstances as did 
the groups that created them. Therefore, nations constantly change and reinvent themselves, 
when faced with new circumstances, and elements of their identity and culture may vary 
significantly (Smith, 1991). 
 
Analysis of modern developments through the ethno-symbolist perspective 
Although ethno-symbolism is the main theory guiding this argument this dissertation 
aims to synthesise ethno-symbolist perspective, with other – namely modernist – arguments 
in order to understand the process of nation formation. Indeed, one of the main proponents of 
ethno-symbolism, although dismissing the main claims of modernist approach (modernity of 
nationalism, nation and state) provides a justification for the processes it describes by 
24  
pointing out that “modernisation and communications have increased the intensity of ethnic 
group” (Smith, 2004, p. 58). Consequently, as mentioned before, this chapter will move to 
analyse claims of modernist theorists of nationalism and the ways in which they offer 
additional insights to fuse with ethno-symbolism. Ernest Gellner (1983) argues, alongside 
Daniele Conversi (1998; 2008), that the industrial revolution of the 18th century changed the 
mode of production and the challenges that arose from that change were at the roots of 
nationalism. 
 
Industrialisation 
 
Gellner’s synthesized argument is provided by Conversi in the form of a simple 
diagram: “modernity->industrialism->mass dislocation->homogenization>nationalism” to 
which he further adds universal military conscription (2008, p. 1303). As the result of 
modernity, industrialism arose; industrialism in turn caused mass dislocation, resulting in 
homogenization; homogeneity in turn produced nationalism. Gellner’s and Conversi’s 
argument disregards any historical processes and experiences that shaped populations of 
particular states. Additionally, one Gellner’s first arguments in his major work on nationalism 
is that “the circumstances in which nationalism has generally arisen have not been normally 
those in which the state, as such, was lacking, or when its reality was in serious doubt” (1983, 
p. 4). Such an argument dismisses, by the term “generally”, the nationalisms of most Eastern 
European, Asian and African countries, as these have often been a part of the political and 
economic systems of other nations, limiting the formative process of nationalism to a few 
Western industrialized states. In the same vein, Conversi argues that industrialization 
destroyed the social bonds of the agricultural society and nationalism replaced those as a new 
form of “social cohesion” (2008, p. 1289). 
 
The new mode of production demanded social mobility, as crucial for the formation 
of a nation, as it replaced previous universal religious pilgrimages with secular ones within 
the framework of the state (Anderson 1983). Displacement created the need for “generic 
training” (Gellner, 1983, p. 27), which in turn caused states to launch mass, standardised 
education programs (Conversi, 1998). As a result of that previously elite high cultures 
became standardised national ones (Gellner, 1983) with the assistance of mass-reproduced 
print language (Anderson, 1983). Indeed, such a view is confirmed Roman Dmowski, who in 
many cases predates Gellner’s, Smith’s and Anderson’s ideas. Dmowski argued that 
industrialization and developments in communication triggered an enormous change in Polish 
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society (1904/2007), in the exact manner that Gellner, Anderson and Conversi describe. 
However, Dmowski argued that “entering one’s life, one comes to its developed form, to a 
developed organization, these forms and that organisation are, however a result of effort of 
many generations” (Dmowski, 1904/2007, p. x). As an eye-witness of these changes, 
Dmowski was clearly aware of the importance past experiences and developments to nations. 
 
What Anderson (1983) understands by imagined communities, Dmowski expressed as 
“living the life of the nation” (1904/2007, p. 22). Homogenization, as viewed by Gellner 
(1983) and Conversi (1998, 2008), is for Dmowski a “recent development” and a result of the 
“democratization of the political regime and democratization of culture, or its spread to all 
segments of the society” (1904/2007, p.22). The process of standardization of high culture is 
not “inventing new” or “obliterating pre-existing” cultures, as Gellner argues (1983, p. 49). It 
is a process which Smith describes as transformation of a “lateral ethnie,” where only the 
elites have access to high culture and possess national consciousness, to a “vertical ethnie” – 
one in which the elite culture and national consciousness penetrate every segment of the 
society (1991, p. 53). Such an argument is strengthened by Hayes who asserts that only 
peoples sharing “a community of language and historic traditions would have the means and 
inclination” (1931, pp. 23-24) to undergo such processes. Nations cannot be created ex nihilo: 
the elites developed cultures, industrialization provided the technological means, previously 
lacking, to disseminate culture and to replace the elites as the bearers of national 
consciousness with the masses. 
 
Post-Versailles political settlement 
 
Hobsbawm, like Gellner and Conversi, stipulates that “the basic characteristic of a 
modern nation … is its modernity” (1992, p. 14); while repeating the industrialisation 
argument, he also provides a new perspective. According to him, nationalism was given its 
ideological framework by the Wilsonian principle of national self-determination, and a 
political one by the Treaty of Versailles. Indeed, the post-World War I political settlement 
divided the world into a collection of national states. Wilsonian principles of self- 
determination assume that each nation deserves its own state – they did encourage the 
formation of nation-states by a presumption that nation should be congruent with its state, 
which is identical to the modern definition of nation-state (Connor, 1994). Hobsbawm 
therefore aptly analyses the consequences of such an ideological assumption, elevated to an 
international political order after 1918. He claims that “the logical implication of trying to 
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create a continent neatly divided into coherent territorial states inhabited by … homogenous 
population, was mass expulsion and extermination of minorities” (1992, p. 133). Indeed, 
mass expulsions and exterminations occurred during and immediately after World War II. It 
is impossible to argue that the post-Versailles political settlement did not greatly facilitate 
nationalist struggle and reveale all its dangers (Nairn, 1977), although ethno-national claims, 
supported by military actions, were achieved before, in the case of Belgium, in 1830, and 
theBalkan states in 1878 (Smith, 1995, p. 104). 
 
Another contribution to the understanding of nationalism is provided by Elie 
Kedourie, who describes nationalism as “a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of 
the nineteenth century” (1966, p. 9) and which “divides humanity into separate and distinct 
nations” and “claims that such nations must constitute sovereign states” (1966, p. 73). It is 
apparent that Kedourie’s argument reflects quite accurately the international regime in its 
current form. It also allows us to understand the origins of the Wilsonian principles, 
mentioned by Hobsbawm (1992). However, what Kedourie’s argument fails to acknowledge 
is the fact that, prior to the development of the doctrine, there existed a large number of 
sovereign polities, both in and outside Europe. This division was not yet formalized and 
completed; nevertheless, it was a result of a long lasting process (Smith, 1987; 1991; Horch, 
1993). Late 18th and 19th century philosophers saw the beginning of the industrial revolution 
and were the first to observe and analyse the consequences of the changed mode of 
production (Gellner, 1983). Kant and Fichte, cited by Kedourie (1966), were most likely 
developing their ideas as eyewitnesses to the occurring changes, like Dmowski in Poland 
(1893/2007; 1094/2007). Furthermore, without the technological means provided by the 
industrial revolution, “the doctrine” would not have the means to be so widely disseminated. 
Nationalism is not the product of philosophers, nor is it the product of modernization. As 
Smith emphasizes it is a “process, not an event” (2004, p. 57). This process occurred in 
changing circumstances, where industrialization and the Enlightenment with its philosophy 
were among many other variables. 
 
The previous part aimed to outline and analyse the main features and characteristic of 
nationalism. It also looked at the processes that allowed it to gain such an important role in 
the modern world. A variety of approaches, theories and concepts (only but a few most 
prominent, due to the limits of this dissertation) demonstrate that concepts of nationalism and 
nation are extremely complex ones. They developed across centuries (Smith, 1987; 1991; 
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1995; 2003; 2004), although technological advances initiated in the 18th century (Gellner, 
1983) greatly accelerated their development, spread and importance, to the degree that the 
current international regime favours and aspires to nation-states (Hobsbawm, 1992). The 
identified features of nationalism, combined with technological, economic and political 
developments, will now be applied in the case of Poland and its historical developments, in 
order to analyse and demonstrate the development of Polish nationalism, its context and its 
characteristics, all resulting from Poles’ historical experience. 
 
Polish “ethno-history” 
 
In accordance with the ethno-symbolic perspective understanding, an analysis of 
Polish nationalism would be severely limited without knowledge of nation’s historical 
experience, what Smith calls “ethno-history” (1995, p. 62). It is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation to provide a detailed summary of Polish history. This chapter will now utilize 
previously outlined concepts to identify crucial events and processes that shaped the national 
consciousness of Poles; consequently, this summary will be selective, focusing only on 
relevant aspects, events and processes. 
 
The first official document identifying the Polish state is known as Dagome 
iudex, in which a Prince “Misca” offers a polity identified as “Schinesghe state” under the 
protection of the Holy See circa 991 (Labuda, 1999, pp. 160-161). Various Polish historians 
agree that the identity of the prince is, at least in the document alone, obscure, but sufficient 
to identify him as the first historical (Christian) ruler of Poland (Jasienica, 1960/2007; 
Stomma, 1993) and emphasize that from the very beginning, territories of present day Poland 
had strong ties with the church. Schinesghe, however, as Jasienica (1960/2007; 1963/2008) 
argues, appears on the political stage as a centralised, feudal monarchy. The process of 
unifying the state prior to the Christianisation is not historically documented; thus any 
detailed analysis of that process would by default be speculative. Labuda (1999) identifies six 
major tribes occupying the lands between Oder and Bug prior to 991: Polans (Polanie) in 
nowadays Greater Poland; Pomeranians (Pomorzanie) in Pomerania; Masovians 
(Mazowszanie) in Masovia; Silesians (Slezanie) in Silesia; Vistulans (Wislanie) in Lesser 
Poland; and Landians (Ledzianie) east of Lesser Poland. The unification of these tribes into 
one state resembles the process outlined by Smith (1986): just as Franks expanded their 
influence over other tribes and eventually created a polity, which derived its name from their 
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tribal one – France – Polans united their neighbouring tribes and created their polity – Poland 
in the 10th century. 
 
Throughout the 10th and 11th  centuries, the new polity was engaged in military 
struggles to maintain its territorial integrity (Prażmowska, 2011). These wars were mainly 
fought against Poland’s western neighbour, the Holy Roman Empire, which was constituted 
mainly of Germanic tribes (Jasienica, 1960/2008). At that period Poland drew heavily from 
Western Christian civilization and was definitely a part of the universalistic Church; 
therefore, a peculiar, national culture, with its vernacular language, was largely absent, as in 
the rest of Europe at that time (Smith, 1986). However, according to Connor (1994, 2004) and 
Horch (1993), differentiation began to shape the feudal elites of Poland from the very 
beginning of its Christian history. In the west, the polity of Polans bordered with Germanic 
tribes of the Holy Roman Empire; although both were part of the universal Catholic world, 
the linguistic difference was blatantly apparent. Horch (1993) speaks of nemtsi, a group that 
cannot be understood by Slavs; nemtsi, or in Polish case niemcy was a word literally derived 
from “niemy” meaning “mute”, thus signifying linguistic differences that made 
communication impossible (Borys, 2005, pp. 361-362). In this region and context, language 
became a differentiating factor form early 10th  and 11th  century and was strongly equated 
with ethnicity, which was further deepened by military clashes (Smith, 1986, 1991). Ethnic 
differences, as Howard (1995) argues, are created when one group is confronted with another. 
Such a situation occurred gradually in Poland from 13th century, with an influx of German 
migrants encouraged by Polish rulers in order to modernise and strengthen urban centres 
(Jasienica, 1960/2007; Prażmowska, 2011). The inhabitants of Poland were exposed to 
German colonisers, who eventually became a dominant urban element (Jasienica, 1960/2007). 
 
During the period of turmoil in the early 14th century, German patricians decided to 
rebel against a Piast prince, Ladislaus the Elbow-high, whose ambition was to unify the 
politically fragmented state. This rebellion, known as the Mutiny of Mayor Albert of 1312 
(bunt wójta Alberta), aimed to unite Lesser Poland with the Crown of Bohemia (Stomma, 
1993). The mutiny failed to achieve its objective and Ladislaus recaptured the city. The 
entering Polish troops in search of German patricians, who were branded as traitors, were 
identified by a shibboleth, according to Krasinski Chronicle, consisting of four words – 
lentils, wheel, grind, mill (soczewica, koło, miele, młyn), Stomma argues that this was a 
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blatant equation of language with ethnicity (1993, p. 57). As demonstrated, ethnic 
differentiation, although not yet national, occurred along linguistic lines. Unique conditions 
and prolonged exposure to others, coupled with conflict, sharpened the ethnic divide, even if 
only among the Polish elite. 
 
In the east, Poland bordered the Kievan Rus, which although culturally, linguistically 
and ethnically similar, followed the Eastern rite of Christianity (Jasienica, 1960/2007). In this 
case religion coupled with military clashes, mainly conducted by Boleslaw Chrobry 
(Prażmowska, 2011), combined to serve as a differentiating factor, although the severity of 
military clashes, at least in the Middle Ages was not as apparent (Jasienica, 1960/2007). The 
initial clashes most likely left an imprint on Poles as an ethnic group; however, during that 
period of history those encounters with the “others” (Howard, 1995), were not always 
frequent and significant enough to create a sharp divide. Such a sharp ethnic division might, 
especially in the context of ethno-symbolism, evoke national identification; however, as 
Stomma argues, Piast princes “could not anticipate future developments of centuries to come. 
Thus they fought not for a Polish nation state, or even ethnic-Slavic one, but for a strong 
politico-administrative organism, whose ruler could influence events in civilised, Christian 
Europe” (1993, p. 16). It would be indeed hard to justify the notion that medieval Polish 
rulers thought in national categories, as these had not been fully developed at that time. 
Nevertheless, ethnic differentiation along linguistic and religious lines occurred rather early 
in Polish history and as such cannot be underestimated as a force contributing to Poland’s 
later nationalism. 
 
It is sufficient to state that Poland, until the late-14th  century, followed a similar path 
to other European states in terms of its political and cultural developments (Jasienica, 
1963/2007). The polity was faced with an unusual challenge in 1386 when Polish monarch 
Jadwiga married the Grand Duke of Lithuania, Jogaila, who at his christening took the name 
Ladislaus (Jasienica, 1963/2007). This marriage initiated a long lasting union between Poland 
and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, finalised by the Union of Lublin in 1569, which created a 
multicultural, multiethnic and multi-religious state (Tazbir, 1982, p. 50): a state that 
recognized its own diversity, by assuming the name of the Republic of Both Nations 
(Rzeczpospolita Obojga Narodow or simply Rzeczpospolita – recognizing initially the two – 
and commonly, although imprecisely, called a Commonwealth). Zernato (1944, as cited in 
Hutchinson & Smith, 2000) re-traces the use of the very word nation and argues that in the 
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early modern period, it was used to signify people subject to polity; thus, even though there 
were more groups within the federation, there were only two polities, the Kingdom of Poland 
and Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which provides an adequate explanation of the very limited 
national recognition at that stage. 
 
These developments were coupled with the period of Renaissance and Reformation 
(Tazbir, 1982) during which the vernacular languages became a medium of thought exchange 
and dissemination of ideas on a large scale by the printing press (Anderson, 1983). Thus, 
initially such factors inspired an unprecedented cultural development (Tazbir, 1982), 
although as the moreadvanced, Polish culture dominated and the nobility constituting the 
political elite in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania became rapidly and almost completely 
Polonized (Jasienica, 1963/2007). The unique dynastic situation, caused by the extinction of 
the Jagiellonian dynasty, which led to the elective monarchy (Jasienica 1963/2007) allowed 
the nobility to acquire unprecedented political freedoms and privileges. The high culture and 
the “community of privileges” (Tazbir, 1982, p. 61) warranted that the nobility became the 
carrier of “national consciousness” (Tazbir, 1982, p. 53). In terms of Smith’s argument, it is 
possible to observe that by that stage, a lateral ethnie (1991, p. 53) was formed. It created 
aunified set of values, that had not yet spread across all the segments of the society and one 
that “could accommodate, without slightest difficulty” (Hobsbawm, 1992, p.74) the religious, 
ethnic and linguistic diversity. Yet it is important to mention that such a model was 
commonplace in still-agricultural and feudal Europe (Smith, 1986). As the momentum of the 
Reformation waned, the counter-Reformation managed to become the dominant religious 
movement. Jasienica (1967/2007; 1967/2007a) identifies these developments as damaging 
and ultimately weakening the state, overlooking the important fact that, by the very nature of 
its diversity, the Republic was susceptible to calls of unification provided by counter- 
Reformation (Tazbir, 1982, p. 50; Seaton-Watson, as cited in Hutchinson & Smith, 2000), 
thus again elevating Catholicism to a dominant force within the state. 
 
Although increasingly Catholic in nature, the Republic was still to a large extent a 
political and cultural community rather than a collection of different ethnicities. The concept 
of the “political Pole” (Tazbir, 1982, p. 57) was prevalent among groups of the federation, as 
in Royal Prussia, which, German in culture and speech, was always politically loyal to the 
institutions of the state (Tazbir, 1982; Jasienica, 1967/2007a). The rather abrupt erosion of 
the political community and the “community of privilege” had its beginning in early 1650s. 
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Historically, the period between 1648 and 1670s was a period of almost constant war for the 
Republic (Prażmowska, 2011): first a civil war with Orthodox Cossacks (1648-1654), then 
wars with Orthodox Russia (1654-1655 and 1660-1667); Protestant Sweden (1655-1660), 
Cossacks supported by Muslim Crimean Khanate (1661-1671), and finally with the Ottoman 
Empire between 1672 and 1676 (Jasienica, 1967/2007a). Those conflicts, as Tazbir argues, 
“incited a feeling of solidarity in a nation surrounded by aliens” (1982, p. 67); therefore, just 
as the Irish were surrounded by Protestants, Poles came to identify themselves in terms of 
their Catholicism (Hobsbawm, 1992). As previously mentioned, military clashes with other 
groups inspire division along ethnic lines (Smith, 1986) and if such clashes are combined 
with religious differences, the ethnic divide occurs along religious lines as well, reinforcing 
the role of religion within a given group:  hence the ever-growing significance of 
Catholicism. The importance of Catholicism to Polish self-identity is probably best illustrated 
by the siege of Jasna Gora, a Catholic monastery, by Protestant Swedish army in 1655, which 
according to Jasienica (1967/2007a), was of very little strategic importance, but an attack on 
a place of religious importance and its successful defence assumed a mythical quality within 
Poland, representing the struggle of “us” Catholics against “those” Protestants. Jasna Gora 
provided not only a compelling unifying myth, but also a locus, tangible proof, of struggle 
(Smith, 1986). According to Smith (1986, 1991), Polish nationalism cannot be understood 
without understanding the significance of that myth. 
 
The exposure to the “other,” moreover, was embedded in the state’s very political 
system. As an elective monarchy, the Republic, drew its monarchs from abroad (Jasienica, 
1963/2007; 1967/2007; 1967/2007a). Out of its 11 rulers between 1572 and 1795, the 
Republic of Both Nations was ruled by a Frenchman, a Magyar, three Swedes and two 
Germans (Prażmowska, 2011). Less than half were elected from within the state, counting 
among them three Poles and one Polonized Ukrainian (Jasienica, 1967/2007a). The foreign 
monarchs, their foreign consorts and courtiers can also be counted among “others” (Howard, 
1995). They did not have the same scale and power of the wars that occurred in the 17th and 
the 18th centuries: nevertheless, they served as the constant reminder of “otherness” to the 
nobility – a carrier of national consciousness (Tazbir, 1982). 
 
Another period, vital to the development of Polish nationalism, occurred just before 
the Republic of Both Nations ceased to exist and was divided among neighbouring powers – 
Russia, Prussia and Habsburg Empire – in 1795 (Prażmowska, 2011). The philosophy of the 
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Enlightenment heavily influenced Polish nationalism. In 1740, a school called Collegium 
Nobilium was founded. Its aims were to educate sons of wealthy nobles in accordance with 
new philosophical trends developing across Europe, but mainly in France and British Isles 
(Jasienica, 1972). Therefore, the development of the Enlightenment philosophy with its 
emphasis on education and political powers of masses (Kedourie, 1966) has its Polish 
equivalent. Moreover, the 18th century emphasis on education was adopted in Poland much 
earlier than other states and the Committee for National Education – a first ministerial body 
dealing with state-wide education – is probably the most obvious example (Jasienica, 
1972/2007). The administrative centralization (Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1992) culminated 
in the 3rd May Constitution of 1791 – which transformed the former federation into a unitary 
state (Jasienica, 1972) and aimed to create a national army, which Conversi (1998, 2008) 
idenitfies as one of the important homogenizing tools of the state. These events and processes 
that occurred in the Polish-Lithuanian state are worthy of notice, if only to prove that in most 
cases political, social and philosophical developments in the Republic reflected processes 
commonplace in the West. However, due to its political and military weakness, the Republic 
of Both Nations, failed to defend its sovereignty against its neighbouring powers and 
consequently ceased to exist with the third partition of 1795 (Prażmowska, 2011). It would be 
purely speculative to discuss the pattern of development, bearing in mind the unifying 
reforms of the 18th century, how the state would integrate and unify its diverse population had 
the Polish-Lithuanian statehood not been extinguished. Instead, Poles previously occupying 
the most important role became minorities on the territories of respective partitioning powers, 
being subject to their administrative, educational and economic unification. The example of 
Polish Enlightenment can be seen as an intersection between ethno-symbolism’s historical 
perspective and modernist claim of Kedourie (1969), who emphasized the importance of the 
development of nationalist philosophy originating from the Enlightenment. In this case, 
historical development, from the ethno-symbolist perspective, can by synthesised with a 
modernist claim. 
 
Loss of statehood is probably one of the most important factors that shaped Polish 
national identity and consequently, its nationalism. Paradoxically, the loss of statehood 
exposed all Poles to encounters with others differing in language, religion and political 
system (Howard, 1995). The almost immediate struggle to regain statehood, firstly alongside 
Napoleon, then in consecutive national uprisings of 1830, 1846 and 1863 (Prażmowska, 
2010) served as a strong unifying force – becoming a national endeavour (Dmowski, 
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1893/2007). It would suffice that these, coinciding with loss of statehood and absorption into 
other political entities (Protestant Prussia and Orthodox Russia), sharpened the ethno- 
religious and linguistic identity and already a strong one as a result of the turbulent Polish 
history. 
 
For Gellner (1983) and Hobsbawm (1992), three factors are responsible for the rise of 
nationalism: industrialization, which demands mobility and uniform training, education that 
provides it and causes homogenization, which in turn produces nationalism; Conversi (2008) 
adds the expanding military apparatus. In the Polish case, as of the period 1795-1918, there is 
only one of those prerequisites – industrialization (Prażmowska, 2010). Since the state did  
not exist, it could not create education systems or raise an army, as these prerogatives laid 
with the partitioning powers. Although both Prażmowska (2010) and Hobsbawm (1992) point 
out that Polish industrialists did not identify themselves as Polish, but rather Jewish or 
German, their nationality in this case is inconsequential: the nationality of the masses of the 
workers is of consequence, and these were predominantly Polish. Thus, industrialization 
provided the need for mobility and generic training. Mobility undermined localism (Mann, 
1993, in Hutchinson & Smith, 2000) through “secular pilgrimages” (Anderson, 1983, p. 56) 
and the generic technical training provided by education systems of the partitioning powers. 
In this instance, it is possible to see where the ethno-symbolist and modernist theory intersect 
– industrialisation was a historical process affecting an ethnic group, namely Poles, while 
industrialisation, by undermining localism and demanding mobility, allowed the 
standardisation and dissemination of an historically based national identity. In case of the 
Polish experience, the national education system and the national was provided by 
assimilation policies – Russification and Germanization; as Connor argues, “assimilation 
always sharpens ethnic divisions”; Dmowski had already noticed this response, stating that 
“by attempts to exterminate us [Poles], they [partitioning powers] did us a favour of historic 
significance” (1904/2007, p. 79). The “national education” was provided, especially after the 
failure of the 1863 national uprising, by Polish mothers (Prażmowska, 2010). After the failure 
of the uprising, many men were either exiled to Siberia, as repression, or chose voluntary 
exile in the West, while women were left in the country and charged with the “sacred 
responsibility to maintain Polishness” (Prażmowska, 2010, p. 20), teaching language, history 
and customs. This, in turn, elevated women to a mythical status of “Mother Pole” 
(Prażmowska, 2011, p. 149) – a repository of national values and knowledge, who allowed 
the national identity not only to prevail, but to strengthen (Prażmowska, 2011, p. 159) 
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Among the several further issues that arose from the fall of the Polish-Lithuanian state 
was the fact that other ethnic groups (mainly in territories taken by Russia) responded 
identically as Poles to the unifying policies of the Tsarist empire; Ukrainian national 
consciousness was strengthened and the ethno-religious divide warranted that Ukrainians had 
their own national aspirations (Prażmowska, 2011); Lithuanian consciousness was also 
sharpened by Russian occupation. Thus all former groups that inhabited the Republic of Both 
Nations followed the same path as other minorities of the Russian empire – they developed 
their own national aspirations (Bilenky, 2012), which Poles were not always willing to 
recognize (Prażmowska, 2010; 2011). National efforts to resurrect the state were somewhat 
torn between aspirations to recreate the state in its pre-partition borders and the need for an 
ethnically Polish state (Bilenky, 2012). Bilenky argues that the lack of the idea od Polish 
borders was the main issue of the 19th century Polish national movement, and while ethnic 
borders were advocated in the West, the Eastern border was hard to define and often 
overlapped with other national aspirations (2012). Bilenky does neglect the fact that the 
settlement pattern of Poles and Germans was complicated; it did not, however, even remotely 
reflect the complexity the eastern border would cause. Dmowski (1904/2007) argues that 
ethnic settlement in the east was one of the biggest challenges of the Polish national 
movement, as there were large Polish communities as far east as the Dnieper river, encircled 
by Ukrainians and Byelorussians, and large Ukrainian settlements within historical 
boundaries of medieval Poland – the Lesser Poland, that led him to conclude that “ethnic 
border of the state was impossible” (1925/2007, p. 17). 
 
With that strong sense of identity influenced by ethnicity, language, faith, and foreign 
domination, Poland entered the 20th century, still divided among the Russian, German and 
Austro-Hungarian empires. The collapse of Russia and Austria-Hungary and the defeat of 
Germany in 1918 allowed Poles to regain their independence, which was proclaimed on 11 
November 1918 (Prażmowska, 2010). The most urgent issue for the Poles was new state 
borders, since in the course of 19th century the pre-partition polity “ceased to be a model for a 
future state” (Prażmowska, 2010, p. 3), mainly because of other national aspirations (Bilenky, 
2012). Dmowski argued for the largest possible extent of Polish borders, in the East, that 
would allow the new state to maintain internal stability (1925/2007, p. 22). It is important to 
notice that the Polish eastern border was finalised by the Riga Treaty of 1921 (Prażmowska, 
2010); thus, Polish leaders operated within the international system created by peace 
conference at Versailles, which promoted the idea of a nation-state and self-determination 
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(Hobsbawm, 1992). The underlying logic of the Wilsonian principles was the creation of 
political borders coinciding with ethnic ones (Kedourie, 1966). With that principle in mind, 
political leaders of ethnically diverse regions had two options – either to conquer all 
territories containing settlements of a given national/ethnic group, or to engage in ethnic 
cleansing and resettlement schemes, to expel foreign groups and bring in their fellow 
nationals within the given territory (Hobsbawm, 1992). Polish leadership engaged with a 
somewhat moderated, as Dmowski (1925/2007) argues, version of the former. This warranted 
that one third of the inhabitants of the new Polish state were ethnic minorities (Prażmowska, 
2010, p. 102). The long awaited and fought for independence, when finally achieved and 
asserted, further intensified “national sentiment” to an extent where the rights of ethnic 
minorities were entirely disregarded in favour of political objectives of Poles and their new 
state (Prażmowska, 2010, p. 106). The re-creation of the Polish state post-1918 presents an 
example of the political aspect of the modernist theory. It complements the ethno-symbolist 
perspective and allows an understanding of the strength of ethic nationalism experienced by 
Poles who voiced their aspirations to create a nation-state – an ethnically pure and 
homogenous Poland. This desire was best demonstrated by Dmowski’s claim: 
 
Polish state is a catholic state. It is so not only because the overwhelming majority of 
its population is catholic, and is not catholic in that or other per cent. From our 
perspective, it is catholic, in full meaning of that term, since our state is a nation-state, 
and our nation is a catholic nation, (1925/2007, p. 37) 
This claim articulates the Polish eagerness to create an ethnically homogenous state – a 
nation-state, by all modern standards and definitions (Connor, 2004). This claim was made, 
however, when ethnic Poles constituted 69% of citizens of the II Republic of Poland and 
served more as an expression of ambition and aspiration; such a claim made ten years after 
the interwar Polish state fell victim to Nazi and Soviet aggression would just be a 
confirmation of the existing order of things. 
By examining features of nationalism and the processes that allowed it to spread and 
acquire a dominant role in the modern world and then applying them to Polish historical 
experience, this chapter is now able to identify the main elements that shaped Polish national 
identity prior to 1939: Catholic faith, language and foreign domination. The sharp ethnic 
consciousness resulting from a tumultuous history highlights Polish nationalism as centered 
around ethnicity, thus being effectively ethnonationalism in to a full extent of the definition 
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of that term (Connor, 1994). This provides the basis for the analysis of the actions of the post- 
1945 communist governments which, equipped with modern technologies (Schleisinger, 
1983, in Hutchinson & Smith, 2000) and political means (Deutsch, 1969) and with an 
international political regime favouring a nation-state (Hobsbawm, 1992) for the first time in 
Polish history actively, consciously and purposefully engaged in social engineering 
(Conversi, 2008) aimed at creating a unified, ethnically and culturally homogenous state. 
Policies of ethnic cleansing, industrialization, launching national education schemes, 
“polityka historyczna” – “politics of history” (Ochman, 2013, p. 22) and propaganda aimed to 
fashion a new Polish national identity, based on Polish ethnonationalism and a desire for a 
nation-state. 
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Chapter III: 
Rejection of the 
Soviet model 
 Introduction 
 
As shown in Chapter II, Polish national identity that developed throughout the 
centuries had proved extremely durable. It was further strengthened by the Soviet-German, 
and from 1941, solely German occupation of the country (Jankowiak, 2004). By early 1944, 
the new regime began establishing itself in Poland, with the formation of the National 
Council of the Homeland (KRN), which was dominated by communist activists (BS, 
KRN/1). The people who ruled the country for more than four decades were predominantly 
ethnic Poles (Szumiło, 2014, p. 298). Given the strength of Polish nationalism, the mind-set 
of the Polish communist leaders was crucial in shaping the post-war nation. As Zuzowski 
claims, “nationalism can express itself through democracy, fascism and communism” (2008, 
p. 453) and nationalistic elements can be found in most regimes (Kamusella, 2010). Even 
internationalist communist leaders, such as Georgi Dimitrov, the secretary of the Communist 
International, in his instruction to Comintern, stipulated that communism must be presented 
as “a national liberation movement” (in Gontarczyk, 2006, p. 352). The fusion of the 
communist and nationalist ideologies among the leadership was achieved in the USSR 
(Zuzowski, 2008, p. 460), but otherwise “whenever the internationalist ideology of the 
communist movement clashed with nationalism, it invariably suffered defeat” (Zuzowski, 
2008, p. 458) and the fall of communism in Poland illustrates this rule. Nevertheless, the 
communist leaders embarked on this ideological project all across the Eastern Europe. Polish 
communists used nationalism instrumentally (Zaremba, 2002), and consequently, they could 
never find a balance between ideology and nationalism. Thus, what proved successful in the 
Soviet Union was doomed to fail in Poland, with the nationalist element largely supressing 
the ideological one (Curp, 2006), but only after periods of tension, expressed in this thesis as 
the problem of dual identity. 
This chapter aims to analyse the tension between nationality and ideology that drove 
Polish communist to reject the full Soviet model of a totatlitarian state – based on their 
nationalist sentiment – while still implementing the some of the key elements of the 
ideological doctrine, such as a centrally planned economy and the use of a repressive 
apparatus in order to maintain power. By examining the actions and attitudes of the Polish 
communist leadership towards the Soviet Union and its economic and political model, this 
chapter will demonstrate that Polish communist government never fully fitted a description of 
communist, notably given by one of the Polish comrades – Stafan Staszewski, who claimed 
that a communist is “a man who unequivocally believes the party. Unequivocally, meaning 
 believing it [the party] indiscriminately (…. A man who has developed an adaptability of 
mind and conscience to accept the dogma that the party is newer wrong, although it’s wrong 
all the time, to which it admits at the beginning of every new stage” (as cited in Torańska, 
1985, p. 253-254). The relations and attitudes of Polish communists were, as this chapter will 
attempt to demonstrate, far more complex that the Polish historiography admits and although 
they “broke with the Polish political tradition” (Esiler, 2014, p. 47), they never fully 
embraced the Soviet model of communism and sought to establish a model of a socialist state 
that would reflect Polish circumstances. 
During the period investigated in this dissertation, the Polish Workers’ Party/Polish 
United Workers’ Party saw three different leaders: Władysław Gomułka (1943-1948); 
Bolesław Bierut (1948-1956) and Edward Ochab (20 March 1956 – 21 October 1956) and 
then Gomułka for the second time from 21 October 1956 (Eisler, 2014). In order to proceed, 
it is important to provide a biographical overview of these people, who laid the foundations 
of the communist regime in Poland. They were all born and grew up before Poland regained 
independence in 1918 and were all from quite early on in their life engaged in left wing 
movements (Esiler, 2014). Bierut was actively engaged with the Communist Party of Poland 
(KPP) right after its creation in 1918 (Eilser, 2014, p. 62), Gomułka and Ochab joined the 
KPP in the second half of the 1920s. Both Gomułka and Bierut attended the International 
Leninist School in Moscow, while Ochab, the only one with higher education and knowledge 
of the ideology, did not need any ideological or educational preparation (Szumiło, 2012). For 
their communist activities, they all were imprisoned by the interwar Polish government and 
spent the year of 1938 in Polish prisons. That proved crucial for the future cadres of the 
Polish communist party. In 1938, Stalin summoned the communist leadership to Moscow 
where he announced the dissolution of the Communist Party of Poland and executed or exiled 
most prominent members. Those serving terms in Polish prisons at that time would emerge as 
future leaders of the party (Eisler, 2014). Most Polish communists spent the war in the USSR, 
and only came to Poland in 1944 (Czubiński, 1995). Such summarised biographies are typical 
of most Polish communist activists and their origins caused significant distrust and even open 
hostility among the Polish society immediately after the war (Czubiński, 1995). 
 Relations and attitudes towards the Soviet Union 
 
Numerous Polish communist activists underwent ideological and practical training in 
the Soviet Union between the 1920s and 1940s (Eisler, 2014). There they became intimately 
familiar with the Soviet project. Many perished in the Great Purge and only small portion of 
the pre-war KPP returned to Poland after the war (Czubiński, 1992, p. 48). These experiences 
influenced the attitudes of the Polish communists, an attitude which can be characterized as 
an outward praise and secretive, sometimes even open, defiance of the Soviets. After 1945, 
many Polish communists, like long-term prime minister of People’s Poland Józef 
Cyrankiewicz, believed “that Soviet domination of Poland was a foregone conclusion and the 
issue was merely one of how extensive this would be” (Prażmowska, 2004, pp. 192-3) and 
they were fully aware that they would have to operate within the confines of Stalin’s 
instructions. Those few who survived the Great Purge carried the memories of the GULag 
and the everyday Soviet reality with them back to Poland. Celina Budzyńska (see Appendix 
F) remembered the shock caused by the blatant disparity between the propaganda and the 
reality, recalling that “from KPP press I knew of those or other achievements, of an enormous 
zeal, enthusiasm, but how it truly was in the Soviet Union, about the cruelty of the revolution, 
about misery and famine, no one has really talked about” (as cited in Torańska, 1985, p. 17). 
Many prominent Polish communist leaders, like Edward Ochab, were acutely aware of the 
conditions that surrounded their ascension to power and knew that in many cases they were 
powerless to stop the Soviets (as cited in Torańska, 1985, pp. 94-5). Nevertheless, Polish- 
Soviet tensions were visible from the very beginning of the communist rule in Poland and 
periods of tensions were frequent – 1947, 1948 and in 1956. However, other disagreements 
characterized the Polish-Soviet relations from the very beginning. By analysing these periods 
of tension, attitudes of both the Soviets and Poles this section will clarify the mindset of the 
Polish communist leaders. 
The first tensions concerned the very beginning of the communist system in Poland – 
the establishment of the National Council of the Homeland (Krajowa Rada Narodowa – 
KRN) which, according to Kersten, was received in Moscow with suspicion, since Stalin had 
plans to establish the Polish National Committee (Polski Komitet Narodowy – PKN) as the 
representative body of the Polish communists (1986, p. 40). The fait accompli on the part of 
Polish Workers’ Party in Poland caused Stalin to abandon the PKN concept and throw his 
support behind the KRN. However, this backdown added to his suspicions concerning the 
loyalty of Polish communists (Czubiński, 1992). Post-war Polish-Soviet relations were also 
 frequently concerned with the faith and return of the surviving Polish communists who fell 
victims to the Great Terror. Staszewski emphasizes that from 1945 onwards Bierut made 
frequent trips to Moscow asking for return of the surviving Polish communists, lost in the 
vast territories of the Soviet Union (as cited in Torańska, 1985). Budzyńska claims that Bierut 
was “naïve enough to think that they were still alive” (as cited in Torańska, 1985, p. 64); 
nevertheless, she claimed that “Bierut was guilty of many things, I do not want to diminish 
them … but still, from all the leaders of fraternal parties only he dared to intervene to Stalin 
for the release of ‘the enemies of the people’. And to him we owe our lives” (as cited in 
Torańska, 1985, p. 66). Staszewski pointed out that these trips lasted until the late 1940s and 
after one of them, Bierut came back concerned and frightened (as cited in Torańska, 1985). 
According to him, during his last intervention on behalf of imprisoned former KPP members, 
Bierut talked, as usual, with Stalin and Beria. Asking the routine question Bierut heard Stalin 
ask Beria “Lavrientiy Pavlovitsch, where are they?” and Beria was supposed to answer that 
he is still looking for “them”, apparently that was a “comedy he [Stalin] played every time”. 
However, on that occasion, after Bierut left Stalin’s office, Beria supposedly snapped at him: 
“Why are you such a pain in Josif Vissarionovich’s arse? Fuck off! I will show you that you 
can do much worse [than Polish communists in Siberia]” (as cited in Torańska, 1985, p. 283). 
That conversation alone demonstrates that the relations between were not as “cordial” and 
“fraternal” as Bierut claimed on one of his press conferences held on 27 May 1946 (AAN, 
Archiwum Bolesława Bieruta, sygn. 254/IV, t. 3, p. 3). 
The fate of Polish communists who fell victim to the Great Terror was not the only 
issue that put a strain Polish-Soviet relations; there were at least three other causes: 
deportations of Poles, plundering, dismantling and removal of factories from the Recovered 
Territories to the USSR and the question of borders. Edward Ochab claimed that post-1944 
the Soviets deported thousands of Poles to the USSR (as cited in Torańska, 1985, pp. 94-95). 
On top of that, the Soviets treated the territories taken over (at least officially) by Poland as 
their war booty and dismantled numerous factories and train lines and relocated them to the 
USSR. Asked if they could not protest, Ochab answered that Polish leaders “could not do 
much” (as cited in Torańska, 1985, p. 99). Gomułka was “furious” with such dealings (Eisler, 
2014, p. 350). Even Jakub Berman, the infamous supervisor of the security apparatus and a 
hard line communist, claimed that “our consent or protest had no meaning” (as cited in 
Torańska, 1985, p. 574). Berman confirmed that the political agency and real influence of 
Polish leaders was severely limited concerning all aspects of the post-war settlement. He 
 claimed that the Polish leadership could do nothing about the plunder of Poland’s economic 
resources and deportation of Polish citizens. 
Polish leaders added that even the question of Poland’s eastern border was rather 
difficult. They knew they could not count on any major alterations, only minor ones, like a 
part of Białowieża Forest, where Prime minister Osóbka-Morawski made miniscule gains by 
convincing Stalin that “wisents [European bisons] are neither Poles nor Belarussians” (as 
cited in Torańska, 1985, p. 565). On another occasion, as Leon Kasman recalls, during the 
“struggle with cosmopolitism”, which was a wave of anti-Semitic persecutions unleashed by 
Stalin, the Soviet ambassador – Popov - was insistent that Poland follow suit. After yet 
another visit, Bierut snapped: 
“You know what comrade Popov, I was not born to be the Secretary of CC [Central 
Committee of the party], I’m a typesetter by vocation and at any moment I can stand 
behind the type case.” Popov was frightened, informed Moscow and the next day they 
dismissed him” (as cited in Torańska, 1985, pp. 893-894) 
That clearly demonstrates that even Bierut, arguably one of the most “loyal executors of 
Stalin’s orders”, (Eisler, 2014, p. 132) was prepared to step down as a leader rather than 
mimic a Stalinist anti-Jewish purge in Poland. Yet another occasion in 1950s, recalled Stefan 
Staszewski, concerned agriculture. Khrushchev was going through a phase of “maize 
obsession” (as cited in Torańska, 1985, p. 296) and demanded that 2 million hectares should 
be allocated for its cultivation in Poland; “for peace and quiet they shoved in the plan not 2 
million but five hundred thousand hectares, form what approximately hundred thousand were 
cultivated” (as cited in Torańska, 1985, p. 299). As this example illustrates, Polish-Soviet 
relations often resembled a game of deception on the part of Polish communists; indeed, from 
Torańska’s interviews with Polish communist leaders (1985), it is possible to observe a 
significant dichotomy between the official fraternal relations with the USSR and the fear of it 
they display in their interviews, both during the Stalinist era and under Khrushchev. 
Moreover, it is possible to observe that these relations were a peculiar combination of 
horror and comedy; still they did not shake the modus operandi between the Soviet Union 
and Poland. In the period this dissertation covers, there were three instances where the rather 
fragile equilibrium was destroyed and it was re-established with considerable difficulty: in 
1947 during the conference of communist parties in Szklarska Poręba; in 1948 during the 
 leadership crisis within the PPR; and in 1956 during an internal struggle for power within 
PZPR, which almost resulted in Soviet military intervention (Eisler, 2014). 
The Szklarska Poręba conference was primarily called for the establishment of the 
Communist Bureau of Information to replace the Comintern dissolved during the war 
(Kersten, 1986). The conference coincided with criticism for “lack of internationalism” that 
Poland was receiving across the Soviet Bloc, for refusing to meet the quota of coal 
production, sold at significantly lowered prices to Soviet Union (Eisler, 2014, p. 216). 
Notwithstanding the criticism, the Poles proceeded as the hosts of the conference. Its 
proceedings were communicated by Stalin to Gomułka and Berman, who recalled: 
Its proceedings significantly deviated from the version given by Stalin to Gomułka 
and I, Gomułka began to get nervous. ‘Stalin has fooled me; we will vote against 
establishing of the Information Bureau’. I was terrified. I realized the consequences 
will follow if Poland votes against. We would have to either close or postpone the 
proceeding. I tried to reason with Gomułka: understand it is a blatant breach in the 
entire scheme and understand what it would mean for Poland to break away, 
undermine the unity of the bloc! That would mean that Poland betrays and jeopardises 
the Soviet Union… I don’t have to say what adversities would have fallen on us (…) 
Our team would have gone k’tschortu [to hell] naturally, replaced by a horrifying 
team, better not to think how horrifying (as cited in Torańska, 1985, p. 623). 
With great difficulty, Berman prevented Gomułka from an open confrontation with Stalin. He 
went back to Warsaw and convinced the Central Committee of the party to instruct their first 
secretary to vote in favour of establishing Cominform (as cited in Torańska, 1985). The issue 
of the location of the Cominform was then discussed and Warsaw proposed as the location. 
Gomułka feared that it would “limit the autonomy of the Polish [communist] party” (Berman 
as cited in Torańska, 1985, p. 629). In this instance, yet another game of deceptions and 
excuses followed on the Polish part. Gomułka out-manoeuvred the Soviets, using arguments 
that locating the Cominform in Warsaw would undermine Poland’s position in applying for 
foreign loans and would greatly undermine the progress of establishing better political 
relations with the West (Eisler, 2014; Berman, as cited in Torańska, 1985). This particular 
political manoeuvring by Gomułka illustrated his reluctant attitude towards Stalin. He saw 
the Cominform as yet another tool of Soviet domination in Poland. His reaction, initially 
impulsive, was tamed by his fellow party members and replaced by a strategy of excuses. His 
 initial reaction and the actions that followed illustrate his major objective – to prevent any 
further Soviet encroachment. The Cominform was initially located in Belgrade and, after 
Yugoslavia’s break with the Eastern Bloc, in Bucharest (Eisler, 2014). It is important to note 
that the most prominent party members were acutely aware of the consequences risked by 
outward defiance. In his interview with Torańska, Berman criticised Gomułka not for 
attempting to defy Stalin but because “he could not protect the Polish national interest 
without brutally provoking a conflict with the Soviet Union” (1985, p. 630); Berman 
criticised the method but not the objective. He believed Gomułka to be too open in his 
insubordination, while at the same time implying that Polish dealings with the Soviet Union, 
and Stalin in particular, warranted extreme caution. 
1947 was also the year of the parliamentary election that served as a propaganda tool 
for legitimising power of the party. The entire enterprise was rigged and the Democratic Bloc 
dominated by the Polish Workers’ Party won an overwhelming majority in the Polish Sejm 
(Czubiński, 1992). Subsequently, the democratic opposition like the Polish Peasant Alliance 
(PSL) was destroyed and the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) merged with the PPR  
(Prażmowska, 2004). This merger signalled the point where the Sovietisation of Poland 
entered a new stage and Poland began to replicate the Soviet mono-party regime. The speech 
Gomułka gave at the uniting congress of the Polish Workers Party and the Polish Socialist 
Party attracted controversy and criticism from across the Eastern Bloc and the Soviet Union 
in particular. It further triggered a struggle for power within the party leading to Gomułka’s 
fall from power and his subsequent imprisonment (Esiler, 2014). Contrary to similar events in 
cases of Laszlo Rajk in Hungary (1949) and Rudolf Slánsky in Czechoslovakia (1952), the 
political charges did not lead to execution (Eisler, 2014) and Gomułka was eventually cleared 
of any charges and returned to power in 1956. 
It is important to analyse the speech that Gomułka gave on 3 June 1948 at the Plenum 
of the Central Committee, prior to his fall from power; it does in some places strike openly 
nationalist and anti-Soviet tones. Gomułka began his speech by criticizing Rosa Luxemburg 
and SDKPiL (Social-Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania) and then 
continued to a very important passage, almost ethno-symbolist in its meaning: 
Poland, contrary to many oppressed nations, had a tradition of seven centuries of 
independent existence. That fact must have had shaped aspirations and the psyche of 
the Polish nation, and thus the Polish working class, different than the aspirations of 
 those nations, which were not independent across their history (in Koseski, Szaflik & 
Turkowski eds. 2003, p. 174) 
Gomułka recognised the specific circumstances that shaped Polish national identity and 
implied that the issue of independence was a very sensitive one in Polish society. In a 
subsequent passage, Gomułka openly praised nationalism and criticised attempts of the KPP 
to abandon from Polish independence in exchange for the revolution: 
Struggle for independence is one of the most beautiful traditions of the PPS, which we 
must lay at the foundations of the united party (…). The KPP, formed from uniting 
the SDKPiL and PPS-Left did not entirely divest of false attitude towards the national 
question represented by the SDKPiL. The KPP did not see any other way to solve the 
issue of the social liberation of the working class than the struggle for Polish Soviet 
Republic (…). The slogan on national self-determination, when used correctly, 
becomes the driving force for the struggle of national and social liberation (as cited in 
Koseski, Szaflik & Turkowski, 2003, p. 174). 
Thus, Gomułka did not want to abandon the Polish national question for the communist 
revolution; rather, he wanted to use the revolution to further advance the national cause and 
yet again he voiced his opposition to the Soviet encroachment of Poland. Other Polish 
communists reacted extremely negatively and swiftly to Gomułka’s stance. Berman, for 
example asked by Torańska what was so “horrible” in the First Secretary’s speech answered: 
“that we need to value the independence traditions of the PPS” (1985, p. 631). The reaction 
of the PPR’s Central Committee was almost immediate. On 4 June 1948 it passed an 
instruction obliging the First Secretary do get the CC’s approval for any future speeches and 
publications (as cited in Koseski, Szaflik & Turkowski, 2003, p. 177) and on 2 September a 
resolution concerning “the right-wing and nationalist deviation and means to combat it” (as 
cited in Koseski, Szaflik & Turkowski, 2003, p. 184). Gomułka was replaced by Bierut as the 
First Secretary in 1948; in 1949 the portfolio of Recovered Territories, held by Gomułka, was 
abolished and he and his wife were arrested on 2 August 1951 on Bierut’s personal order and 
imprisoned in the Ministry of Public Security villa in Miedzeszyn (Eisler, 2014, p. 142). Such 
tensions and disagreements among top regime officials illustrate not only an interpersonal 
struggle concerning the doctrine; they illustrate the struggle between nationalism and 
ideology, highlighting the dual identity of Polish communists. 
 The case of Gomułka, as Józef Światło, senior official in the security apparatus, 
claimed, was “the most important event in the post war history of the party” (HIA, DSM, 
sygn. 73, scan 419). Being an insider, he provides very important information explaining why 
Gomułka’s show trial failed. Its failure was closely connected with the past lives of 
communist leaders (namely Bierut and Berman), that Gomułka as a first secretary was 
acutely aware of, as well as the interpersonal relations of the high leadership. As Światło 
argued, “there is no trust among the members of the political bureau. They are held together 
by mutual blackmail. Everyone holds compromising documents on one another” (HIA, DSM, 
sygn. 73, scan 409). That was probably a very important reason that prevented the staging of 
Gomułka’s trial: Bierut and the Politburo were afraid that it could “turn into a scandal, 
Gomułka would not just be a defendant, but also a prosecutor” (HIA, DSM, sygn. 73, scan 
426). The pressure from Moscow, however, triggered an investigation, which failed; neither 
Gomułka nor his associates pleaded guilty to charges against them. The “rightist-nationalist” 
deviation was nothing else but “a drive to become independent from Moscow …. And 
Moscow had to destroy that deviation” (HIA, DSM, sygn. 73, scan 423 and 420). Even under 
the immense pressure from the Soviet Union, Polish communists were not ready to stage 
Gomułka’s show trial. They feared he could expose them and could not obtain any 
compromising testimony. Importantly, they did not resort to falsifying evidence or 
testimonies or to the use of torture, which was a common practice across the Soviet Bloc 
(HIA, DSM, sygn. 73, scan 422), which serves to illustrate their reluctance to Stalinist 
methods. The issue of Soviet pressure and “mutual blackmail” also serve as examples of dual 
identity – geopolitics and compromising pasts held Polish leaders in check, accentuating 
tensions within the party. 
The very fact that one of the most prominent party leaders fell victim to the apparatus 
of repression demonstrates that despite Polish opposition to Stalinist practices, strong 
pressure existed for sovietisation (Esiler, 2014, p. 143). The show trial, followed by 
execution, widely practiced under Stalin, failed in Poland (Eisler, 2014, p. 147). It is notable 
that the most prominent Polish communist leaders did not entirely believe in Gomułka’s guilt. 
Further highlighting the opposition of Polish communist leaders to the use of show trials was 
Ochab’s comment concerning the Soviet trials of Rajk and Slánsky, which he described as 
“shameful exaction of confessions form broken people, who in the spotlight testified that they 
took part in Tito’s conspiracy and all of them claimed to have conspired with Gomułka” (as 
cited in Torańska, 1985, p. 116). He then added that “in the case of Gomułka, probably both 
 Berman and Bierut were convinced that these were Beria’s provocations” (1985, p. 118). 
Gomułka’s restitution to power demonstrates that such trials were not treated seriously and he 
was not the only communist in Poland targeted by “the struggle with right-wing nationalist” 
deviation. The trial of Wacław Komar is best summarised by a short exchange between 
Ochab and Torańska: 
Ochab: Wacek was fitful sometimes. He could say that Soviet garrisons in Poland are 
unnecessary. 
Torańska: Are they not? 
 
Ochab: No, they are not, but one does not say such things (1985, p. 122-123). 
 
The repression apparatus targeted many other prominent Polish communists, apart from 
Komar and Gomułka, Marian Spychalski and Michał Rola-Żymierski (Minister of National 
Defence and Marshall of Poland) were removed from their posts but a show trial was staged 
only in case of Wacław Komar (Szwagrzyk, 2005, p. 23-24) and he escaped capital 
punishment (Eisler, 2014). 
 
Collectivisation and nationalisation of the industry 
 
Polish-Soviet tensions occurred not only on the political domain but also in the 
economy and the enforcement of communist ideology. In the USSR, collectivisation and 
nationalisation were ruthlessly enforced, leading to millions of casualties as a result of 
famine, executions and deportations (Courtois, 1999). Between 1927 and 1940, the 
percentage of collectivised farms grew from 0.8% to 96.9% and all arable land became state 
property (TSU, 1972, p. 240). Similarly, in Poland the communists advanced agrarian reform 
that was announced by the PKWN on 6 September 1944. That decree nationalised all private 
agricultural farms larger than 100 hectares (Dz. U. 1944 nr. 4 poz. 17, p. 8), instead of all 
arable land, as in the USSR. An interesting fact is that the decree left the question of land 
belonging to the Catholic Church as a matter for the Constitutional Sejm. Granting land to 
landless peasants was one of the most important communist policies and the new authorities 
almost immediately began to introduce the reform (Czubiński, 1992). However, the question 
of the “squirearchy” (wealthy landowners, members of the nobility) and attitudes towards 
them differed in Poland significantly from those that were dominant in the Soviet Union. On 
one occasion, Bierut summarised his meeting with the USSR leader: 
 Com[rade] Stalin told if our task is to eliminate the entire class, that then it is not a 
reform but an agrarian revolution and this sort of revolutions should not be done in 
full sanction of the law or handled with kid gloves. Such revolutions must be 
conducted using revolutionary methods. Com[rade] Stalin could not observe such 
revolutionary methods on our part and he criticized us for it (as cited in Esiler, 2014, 
p. 106) 
 
On other occasion, when Stalin found out that none of the “squirearchs” was imprisoned he 
told Bierut: “What sort of communists are you?” (as cited in Eisler, 2014, p. 107). The 
agrarian reform was implemented not without turbulence and resistance, yet the brutality of 
its implementation was a very moderate by Soviet or Eastern Bloc standards (Czubiński, 
1992). 
 
The nationalisation of industry also proceeded on different lines in Poland compared 
to the soviet model (Prażmowska, 2004). By 1946, attempts to mimic the Soviet model 
began. A Bill on nationalisation of the substantial branches of economy passed on 3 January 
1946 (Dz. U. 1946, nr. 3 poz. 17). In 1947, three bills were passed and they provided the 
legal basis for the subsequent nationalisation. The first was the Ordinance of the Council of 
Ministers in terms of the overtaking of enterprises by the state issued on 30 January, 
whichinstructed local authorities in terms of procedures associated with nationalisation (Dz. 
U. 1947 nr. 16 poz. 62). Then in June, the Bill on Combating Dearness and Excessive Profits 
in Trade was introduced; it set out the state controlled pricing modelled on the Soviet system 
(Dz. U. 1947 nr. 35 poz. 218). Finally, the Sejm passed the Bill on Citizen Tax Commissions 
and Social Inspectors on 2 June 1947, which aimed to establish strict fiscal control over the 
economy (Dz. U. 1947 nr. 43 poz. 219). 
 
The nationalisation of the industry began immediately after the Bill of Nationalisation 
of 1946 and gradually intensified. In 1946 there was only one list of nationalised enterprises 
(M.P. 1946); in 1947 there were 15 publications specifically dealing with nationalisation of 
enterprises (M.P. 1947); in 1948 the government published 30 such lists; the following year 
that number swelled to 46 (M.P 1949), falling to 39 in 1950 and to 24 in 1951 (M.P. 1950; 
1951). By the end of the first six-year plan, the nationalisation of the industry was largely 
completed, as the list of nationalised enterprises became sporadic and irregular. To envisage 
the scale, the author of this dissertation calculated how many private enterprises the 
government seized in the first year of the six-year plan and that numbered 412 various private 
 enterprises and 223 mining fields nationalised in just one year (M.P 1950 poz.8; 49; 50; 87; 
107; 111; 160; 170; 183; 223 225; 229; 230; 239; 241; 242; 332; 343; 359; 365; 420; 508; 
528; 583; 618; 620; 650; 696; 718; 901; 1072; 1151; 1253; 1394; 1556; 1594; 1595; 1596; 
1636; 1637; M.P. 1951 poz. 53; 54; 70; 71; 110; 331; 332). The scale of nationalisation was 
enormous; yet it was far from complete. There were still privately owned artisan shops, 
shoemakers and farms. During the ethnographic study, W.W recalled that in Wałbrzych “for 
hats and gloves we had Ms. Müller, there were few shoemakers in the central square and 
numerous seamstresses, if one could get his hands on some textiles, they would make 
anything you wanted” (08.02.2016). Tokarski (2015) argues that in 1947, 60% of Poland’s 
GDP was generated by the private sector; later on, that number decreased significantly, but 
throughout private artisan shops continued to make their contribution to a state controlled 
economy. Thus, the Polish government was not overly zealous in the process of 
nationalisation, nor were they enthusiastic about economic plans spanning particular number 
of years (in case of Poland, six). The first six-year plan was described by Berman as “neither 
particularly brilliant, nor implemented consistently” (as cited in Torańska, 1985, p. 598). 
 
The issue on which the Polish communists continued to differ most apparently from 
their Soviet counterparts was collectivisation; the attitudes varied from outright rejection in 
the case of Gomułka to a cautious scepticism in the case of Berman and Minc (Esiler, 2014; 
Czubiński, 1992). In this respect, Poles were unique in the Eastern Bloc. Stefan Staszewski 
recalled a conversation with a journalist from Prague concerning collectivisation, which is 
worth quoting in full as it demonstrates the Polish attitude towards the issue and its striking 
difference from the rest of the Soviet Bloc: 
 
Journalist [J]: What will you do with your kulaks after collectivisation? 
Staszewski [S]: I don’t understand the question – what collectivisation? 
J: But sooner or later you will have to implement collectivisation and the issue of 
kulaks will arise, what will you do with them then? 
 
S: You know comrade; I think no one here has deliberated on this. 
 
J: No one!? Poland is a country with a limited geographical area. How many peasant 
farms does she have? 
 S: Up to four million. 
 
J: Simple then, you have 400 thousand kulak farms. 
S: What sort of calculation is this? I don’t understand. 
J: We have concluded that 10% of peasant farms are kulak farms, you need to have 
approximately similar amount, so that amounts to 400 thousand kulak farms, so at 
least half-a-million to be resettled or arrested. Where will you resettle them? 
 
S: We have never discussed such a problem. Firstly, we have never wondered how 
many kulak farms we have, secondly – the definition of a kulak here is completely 
different and we don’t have kulaks that you defined as capitalist and thirdly – no one 
here has no intention of arresting or resettling half-a-million or a million people 
because that would be madness” (as cited in Torańska, 1985, p. 281 
 
This conversation encapsulates the mindset of a majority of Polish communists. They were 
reluctant to implement the Soviet-style collectivisation in Poland and, as Staszewski claimed, 
they had no intention of resettling or arresting such a large number of people – who were 
Poles. This nationalist response can be paralleled with the ethno-nationalist policies of ethnic 
cleansing, since the communist government had every intention to and in fact did resettle 
approximately 3 million Germans form Poland between 1945 and 1949 (Nitshcke, 2002). 
Nothing better illustrates the dual identity of Polish communists than Staszewski’s 
conversation. In the case of collectivisation, Berman claimed that only 10% of the farms were 
collectivised, but after 1956 all the “cooperatives” (notably Polish communists did not use the 
Soviet terminology in the matter) disbanded. This data is confirmed by Paczkowski, who 
gives a total value of 8% (2005, p. 126). He further argues that the Polish authorities did not 
unleash dekulakization on such as scale as the Soviet Union: they institutionalised chicanery 
against private farmers, but essentially they allowed them to operate relatively freely. 
 
The issue of power, terror and persecution 
 
Alongside the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries, Poland created its 
own security and repressive apparatus. USSR had its NKVD/KGB, the GDR – Stasi and 
Poland had the MBP (Ministry of Public Security) that administered the UB (Security 
Office). The MBP was incorporated within the PKWN, which meant that the repressive 
 apparatus grew and consolidated from the very beginning of the regime (Szwagrzyk, 2005). 
The initial number of security agents is estimated at 2.5 thousand, which swelled to 33 
thousand by 1953 (Szwagrzyk, 2005, p. 20). In the initial stages of the regime’s 
consolidation, it was directed at the anti-communist underground guerrilla formations such as 
Liberty and Independence (WiN), with the situation within Poland bearing marks of a civil 
war (Esiler, 2014; Prażmowska, 2004). However, the scale of terror was significantly smaller 
than in the Soviet Union or other countries of the Soviet Bloc (Kemp-Welch, 1999). 
Moreover, Poland saw the use of Soviet advisors on an unprecedented scale coupled with the 
penetration of all the party and army strata by NKVD and GRU (Eisler, 2014). Józef Światło 
claimed that there was a dual administration with the security apparatus, Soviet and Polish; 
thus, almost every department in the Ministry of Public Security had its Soviet administrator 
(HIA, DSM, sygn. 73, scan 408; see Appendix F). 
 
Between 1944 and 1948, the regime sought to consolidate its power but without 
alienating Polish society (Czubiński, 1992). Initially the terror and secret executions were 
directed only at the armed resistance, although two amnesty bills significantly reduced their 
number without bloodshed (Dz. U. 1945 nr. 28 poz. 172; Dz. U. 1947 nr. 20 poz. 78). The 
struggle with the so-called “cursed soldiers” was a bitter and bloody fight; it has been 
estimated that approximately 30-40 thousand men took arms against the new regime; 8-10 
thousand died in combat and 21 thousand died in UB prisons (Pietrzak, 2012). The terror and 
invigilation was also directed against the civilian population and Szwagrzyk estimates that 
there 5.2 million portfolios concerning the “suspicious elements”, meaning the potential 
enemies of the regime, which constituted one third of the adult population of Poland (2005, p. 
20). The new regime also created a vast network of prisons and labour camps consisting of 
179 different prisons. 9000 people served terms for political charges in 1953 (Szwagrzyk, 
2005, p. 25). This number, however horrific, is proportionally small when compared to the 
estimates given by Appelbaum, who estimates the total number of GULag victims to be 
approximately 28.7 million people (2003, p. 518). However, it is vital to emphasize that the 
regime and its leaders, however moderate in their use of terror, frequently asserted their claim 
to power and expressed willingness to stop at nothing in order to maintain it. This will to 
power is evident in a speech delivered by Gomułka on 18 June 1945, at the session of the 
Provisional Government of National Unity, in which he claimed that “once we have acquired 
power, we shall never hand it over.…. You can cry that the blood of the Polish nation is 
being spilled, that NKVD rules Poland and that shall not make us deviate from our path” (as 
 cited in Koseski, Szaflik and Turkowski, 2003, p. 11). The totalitarian character of the new 
regime could not have been outlined more clearly. As already mentioned in this section, the 
regime brutally thwarted any signs of armed resistance by 1948. Civilians were not also 
immune to the use of brutal force, as soon as they challenged the regime. A challenge erupted 
in June 1956 in Poznań and the regime responded violently, which resulted in many civilian 
casualties (Esiler, 2008, 2014). After a brutal assault on the revolting civilian population, the 
regime sent a clear message outlining the consequences that would follow any revolt against 
the regime. In a radio speech delivered on 29 June 1956 (three days after the revolt in 
Ponzań) Prime Minister Józef Cyrankiewicz announced that “[a]ny provocateur or a mad 
man, who dares to raise his hand on people’s government [władzę ludową] can be assured 
that the people’s government will chop that hand off” (Archive of the Polish Radio, 1956). 
The regime in deed deviated from the soviet model and the excessive use of terror; however, 
it would not restrain itself once challenged by the population. 
 
Yet another important issue concerning the repressive apparatus in Poland was that it 
was almost saturated with Soviet advisors in Poland, although they were “not as insolent as 
everywhere else” (Berman as cited in Torańska, 1985, p. 582). Furthermore, there were many 
Polish communists directly supervised by the NKVD in the civilian/party administration 
(Berman, as cited in Torańska, 1985, p. 585-589) and large number of the GRU agents in the 
army (Cenckiewicz, 2011). Furthermore, Poland was the only country where alongside the 
Soviet advisors there were citizens of the Soviet Union serving, called POPs (Performing the 
Duties of a Pole), who were dressed in Polish uniforms and were presented as Polish 
personnel, even though they rarely spoke Polish (Eisler, 2014, p. 208). The very fact that the 
Soviets deemed it necessary to be directly involved in the structures of the Polish state 
demonstrates their deep distrust of the Polish party and additionally the weakness of the 
communist party, which failed to mobilize a sufficient number of people to effectively run 
the state and army apparatus. The terror and persecutions in Poland cannot be dismissed as 
insignificant as they targeted every social group (Szwagrzyk, 2005). But it is vital to 
remember that the main impetus of the Polish repressive apparatus was directed at the armed 
resistance, unlike the USSR where terror was all-encompassing. Additionally, the communist 
leaders in Poland were aware of their unpopularity and weakness and feared that if they 
unleashed terror on the same scale as the Soviets, they would mobilise the entire nation 
against them (Czubiński, 1992). 
 Relations and attitudes towards Poles 
 
Polish communists, predominantly Poles themselves, knew that the task of ruling and 
building socialism in Poland would be a very difficult one, if not impossible. Gomułka even 
said that “[t]he Russian nation is obedient, Germans disciplined; Poland is difficult to 
govern” (Turlejska, 2010). In this respect, he was always able to correctly determine popular 
attitudes towards the regime. In one letter he wrote to Moscow in 1944, he said that “even if 
the Brotherhood of Saint Anthony” announced a similar programme to PPR “it still would 
have been dubbed as Moscow’s agents who were paid by Moscow’s money with the aim to 
bring the Polish nation to Stalin’s heel” (as cited in Kersten, 1986, p. 37). They were acutely 
aware of their unpopularity, weakness and isolation from the society. They were aware that 
“all the time” they “were a foreign body regardless of our intentions” (Budzyńska as cited in 
Torańska, 1985, p. 72). Their attitudes vary from awe to an outward resentment. Gen. 
Wojciech Jaruzelski (long time Minister of Defence, Prime Minister and later the President of 
Poland) almost admired Polish resistance to communism, which is illustrated by the 
following excerpt from Torańska’s interview: 
 
Jaruzelski[J]: Yakubovsky told me one time what he saw in Czechoslovakia. The mob 
on the street was yelling “to hell with Soviet Union” and the loudest one is this tall, 
ginger, young man. Ja podshot k-niemu (I approached him) – recalls Jakubovski – i 
skazal, ya tyebiya kak gvozdz v zemlyu zabiyu (and said, I will slam you like a nail in 
the ground). And he began to shout: da zdrastvoytet Sovyetskiy Saiuz (Long live the 
Soviet Union). 
 
Torańska[T]: Funny? 
 
J: No, no, for Yakubovsky that change in attitude of the young Czech man wasn’t 
funny. It was a proof of the power of the army. 
 
T: And what are you laughing at? 
 
J: I really like Czechs (…) but can you imagine such a change of reaction in Poland? 
T: Yes. I can imagine. 
J: I can’t (as cited in Torańska, 2006, p. 50). 
 This story, however, concerning the events of 1968, demonstrates the attitudes of the Polish 
communist leaders towards their own compatriots. They knew the use of force would act not 
as a deterrent, but as a unifying factor on Poles. That knowledge helps explaining the fact that 
the armed resistance was dealt with quite brutally, but repression and persecution of the 
civilian population was exercised with a significant degree of caution (Czubiński, 1992). 
Polish communists also understood the power and the intensity of Polish nationalism; 
Berman compares Poland to a “Pandora’s box” from which it is “easy to release evil spirits 
[of nationalism], but difficult to put them back” (in Torańska, 1985, p. 738). 
 
Conclusion 
 
The communists who ruled Poland after 1944 were conflicted in regards to the 
communist project as implemented in the Soviet Union. They believed in the communist 
project, or at least in socialism – Berman, Bierut, Gomułka, Ochab, Budzyńska (Eisler, 2014; 
Torańska, 1985) saw the social and economic changes in Poland that occurred after 1944 as 
positive. But it becomes apparent that they attempted to balance Polish nationalism with the 
ideological dictates of communism and a less repressive version of totalitarian power. 
Gomułka’s rehabilitation probably best illustrates this phenomenon and explains why he was 
so closely associated with the notion of “the Polish way to socialism” (Eisler, 2014). 
Additionally, all post-war Polish leaders had new and understood the Soviet project and they 
rejected its full application. Leon Chajn, undersecretary in the Ministry of Justice (see 
Appendix F), claimed that “the Stalinist scenery was no different to the Hitlerist one” (in 
Torańska, 1985, p. 438); then he adds that they planned “to do it differently, to do it better” 
and then expresses the doubt in the very system he supported (1985, p. 457). It is vital to 
remember that the fear of the Soviet Union was equally prevalent among the Polish 
communist elites as well as in wider society. Consequently, the power of the Soviet Union 
created a dichotomous mind-set among the communist leaders. As Staszewski put it, many 
things were done for “peace and quiet” (as cited in Torańska, 1985, p. 299). Although it 
might sound rather bizarre, they realised that the geopolitical condition was “forced” on them 
and they had to adapt to the demands of Soviet leaders since “there was no other perspective” 
(Ochab as cited in Torańska, p. 95 & 100). 
 
Their beliefs and national identity proved difficult to balance and although 
communist regimes are often instrumental in their use of nationalism in order to advance the 
communist cause (Zaremba, 2002; Zuzowski, 2008), it is possible to observe that in Poland 
 that scheme was reversed and that nationalism frequently competed with the communist 
ideology and after 1956 “nationalistic elements” were clearly visible within the regime 
(Staszewski as cited in Torańska, 1985, p. 358). That did not naturally mean the regime 
turned from a socialist to a nationalist one, although nationalism assumed primacy over the 
ideology. Yet in the first 12 years of the regime, the elites struggled between nationalism and 
ideology. This struggle warranted that the regime failed to produce a coherent narrative; the 
elements of communism were intertwined with nationalist rhetoric. The situation the Polish 
leaders found themselves after the war caused them to develop a dual identity – the official 
ideological one and the private, anti-Soviet and more nationalist one. With that mindset, they 
began the socialist project in Poland and their activities affected every aspect of social, 
political and economic activity of the Polish nation. Their dual identity permeated in to the 
society, which, owing to its pragmatism, also developed a dual identity – the official 
compliant with the new regime and the private, cultivating the traditional Polish national 
values, customs and traditions, which were in stark opposition to the regime. Zuzowski 
claims that “national communism is an oxymoron” (2008, p. 461) and that translated to 
Poland where the values of the new regime were antithetic to Polish nationalism. From their 
attitudes and actions, it is possible to observe that they were ideologically unconvinced and 
often openly opposed to Stalin’s methods. Officially, they didn’t even praise communism; 
they advocated socialism (Czubiński, 1992), understood by them most likely as a centralised 
and planned economy, where the state holds only the most important assets (Julia Minc as 
cited in Torańska, 1985). Their economic policies and failed collectivisation, which was not 
strictly enforced, permit the conclusion that they neither wanted to antagonise the society nor 
was communism their ultimate goal. Nevertheless, the Polish project was from the very 
beginning fraught in contradictions and inconsistencies. Geopolitics of forceful alliance with 
the USSR greatly limited Polish Workers’ Party’s ability to determine the internal policies. 
Therefore, a centrally planned economy was introduced, which, however, was moderated by 
the failure to collectivise the agricultural production, visibly contradicting the Soviet model. 
Communists’ awareness of lack of legitimacy on one hand resulted in open appeals to Polish 
nationalism in order to placate society. On the other hand, that lack of legitimacy resulted in 
creation of a quasi-totalitarian apparatus of power that held them in power. Such tensions 
ultimately doomed the project to either fail or be overtaken by nationalist element, which 
effectively happened after 1956 (Esiler, 2014). This perspective will allow for better 
understanding of mechanisms behind the Polish-socialist policies of nation-building and their 
outcomes. 
 Chapter IV: 
Expulsions and ethnic 
cleansing 
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Introduction 
 
As mentioned in Chapter II, the Poles had long developed a strong ethnic-based 
identity. When the communist party came to power in 1944, backed by the Soviets, they 
faced a challenge of legitimacy. This chapter aims to address the complex issue of the ethnic- 
cleansing that followed the communist takeover in Poland after 1944. In regards to the 
overarching question guiding this dissertation, this chapter will examine the dichotomous 
identity of Poland’s national leaders in terms of their support of ethnic cleansing, which stood 
in stark contrast to socialist/communist ideology promoting internationalism and “alliance 
and honest friendship between the nations” (BS, KRN/1, p. 5). It is important to note that the 
post-war ethnic cleansing came about as a result of a complex interplay of national and 
international interests that effectively facilitated the process of forced removal of Germans 
among other groups. Remarkably, all parties involved in the redrawing of the post-war 
political order were interested in the creation of Polish ethno-state: the Western Allies, the 
USSR and the Poles themselves (Nitschke, 2000). This chapter will first need to examine the 
reasons why each of the aforementioned agents supported the Polish nation state. 
Furthermore, this chapter will analyse the appropriate legislation that reflected the desire for 
an ethnic state and the respective bilateral and multilateral treaties that facilitated the 
population transfers (Curp, 2005, 2006). Finally, this chapter will examine the internal 
population transfers that aimed to strengthen the appearance of the ethnic homogeneity. 
The Polish Workers’ Party embarked on the fully nationalist project in order to 
“strengthen the appeal of the communist government” (Service, 2012, p. 532). Service (2013) 
and Zaremba (2002) both analyse the use of nationalism and nationalist rhetoric. However, 
both argue for the instrumental use of nationalism in order to gain legitimacy. There were 
three major factors that influenced the project of homogenization of Poland. Firstly, Poles, 
through their post-1795 history, established a strong ethnic identity, which resulted in a desire 
for a nation state. That desire had been strengthened by the German occupation of 1939-1945. 
The communist party launched a project of creating a nation state, which aimed to respond to 
Polish nationalist drives, thus lending the government legitimacy it lacked. 
In order to better demonstrate the scale of the post-war ethnic cleansing, it would be 
useful to present and compare the ethnic structure of Poland according to the 1931 census and 
the data that was presented to the Council of Ministers in 1950: 
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Table no. 1 – Poland’s ethnic composition 
 
1931 Census 1950 Data (Mironowicz, 2000, p. 
94) 
Ethnicity Number of people Number of people 
Poles 21 835 000 24 400 000 
Ukrainians 
(and Lemkos) 
3 250 000 100 000 
Jews 3 113 900 180 000–240 000 
Belarusians 995 000 110 000 
Germans 734 000 140 000 
Lithuanians 100 000 10 000 
 
 
The scale of the ethnic cleansing is clear from the table above. The overall number of 
minorities did not exceed 1 million, while in 1931 they constituted almost a third of Poland’s 
population. The territorial settlements of the pre-war minorities are best illustrated by the 
following map: 
 
 
Figure 1 – Ethno-linguisic map of Poland (Source?) 
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The strong ethnic nationalism and a desire for an ethnic state (Prażmowska, 2010) caused the 
new Polish state and government to begin the nationalist ethnic-cleansing project as early as 
1944. The approximate numbers illustrate how 
enormous that project what was and the number 
of affected people from different ethnic groups 
previously living within Poland (see Appendix 
F). The table on page 4 suggests that the  
Germans were not the largest group targeted by 
the ethnic cleansing, but as Figure 2 
demonstrates, the post-war borders of Poland 
changed considerably. The lands populated by 
Ukrainian, Belarussian and Lithuanian minorities 
were annexed by the Soviet Union, leaving only a 
small portion of the pre-war Belarussian, 
 
Figure 2 – Eastern Europe post-1945(Source?) Ukrainian and Lithuanian population within 
Polish borders (Mironowicz, 2000).  For the loss 
of significant portions of her territories in the East (so called Kresy), Poland was 
compensated with the German territories of Silesia (Schlesien), West Pommerania 
(Pommern) and Masuria (part of Ost Preussen), which were populated by approximately 3.5 
million Germans in 1945 (Nitschke, 2000, p. 27) 
 
 
Ethno-symbolist motivation for ethno-centric sentiment of Poles 
 
The ethno-symbolist theory of nationalism argues that national identity is formed 
through time and encounters with the “other” (Smith, 1991; 1995). This helps to explain the 
phenomenon observed by Hobsbawm (1992), namely the rise of nationalism after any 
military conflict, especially the global ones of 1914-1918 and 1939-1945. The campaign of 
1939 resulted in the defeat of the II Polish Republic and its partition between the Third Reich 
and the USSR (Prażmowska, 2010; 2011). The hostilities and resulting occupation 
encompassed the entire territory of pre-war Poland, thus exposing every single Pole to either 
German (between 1939 and 1945) or Soviet (between 1939 and 1941) “otherness”, coupled 
with “brutal wartime” (Service, 2012, p. 531) policies of the occupiers. The experience 
helped galvanize Polish society along the ethno-religious line. Scholars agree that after World 
60  
War II, the peaceful coexistence of ethnic minorities within Poland (as well as in other 
countries of Eastern Europe) was simply impossible (Nitschke, 2008; Curp, 2001; 2006; 
Douglas, 2012; Mironowicz, 2000; Demshuk, 2015; Martin, 1998; Zaremba, 2002; Pasierb, 
1969). Thus the view that the expulsions of Germans “fell on the communist government” 
(2012) are easier to understand. This view also explains the consensus between the Polish 
Workers Party (PPR) dominated Polish Committee of National Liberation (PKWN) and the 
London Government in Exile (the government of Poland that fled the country in 1939) 
concerning the ethnic structure of post-war Poland and the nation-wide cooperation of the 
Church and all Poles in the endeavour to expel all the minorities from the Polish territory. 
Based on that general sentiment, the PPR embarked on the nationalist enterprise to make 
Poland a nation-state. Such a decision was dictated by the communists’ desperate need for 
legitimacy and indeed acted as a tool to rally the masses behind the new government 
(Mironowicz, 2000, Zaremba, 2002). 
The heightened ethnic identity of Poles can be observed from 1939 onwards and there 
was a nation-wide consensus that Poland should become an ethnic state (Nitschke, 2000). All 
across Polish society, from the Government in Exile residing in London to the Soviet backed 
the National Council of the Homeland and Polish Committee on National Liberation, and all 
political parties agreed that there should be no minorities in the post-war Poland (Nitschke, 
2000; Mironowicz, 2000; Curp, 2006; Douglas, 2012). This heightened national identity 
influenced the PPR and all the satellite parties that constituted the KRN on New Year’s Eve 
of 1943 (BS, KRN/1). In fact, the KRN deputies engaged in an outright nationalist, and in 
many cases chauvinist, discussion. For example, Deputy Jankowski, on the very first session 
of the KRN, claimed that “[u]nbelievable terror and barbarity of the enemy are enforcing, day 
by day, the hatred of the occupant by the [Polish] Nation” and that Poland was to be a result 
of “hard and decisive struggle with hordes of Hitlerist occupant, struggle for life and death” 
(BS, KRN/1, p. 4-5). Declarations such as the one made by the representative of the People’s 
Guard – one of the communist anti-German partisans – depute Turski that exclaimed “Long 
live the Free and Independent Poland … death to the German occupants” (BS, KRN/1, p. 12) 
aptly expresses the nationalist fervour of first sessions of the KRN. 
With the advances of the Red Army, declarations became more specific expressions 
of intent. On 4th session of the KRN, the chairman of the PKWN, Edward Osòbka-Morawski 
declared that 
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“in the course of the current war, among the masses of Poles, Ukrainians, Belarusians 
and Lithuanians, there has matured a decision to return to the borders of their 
fatherlands, dwell and live among their own compatriots (…) we believe that by this 
means we will solve a centuries old question of nationalities within our country (BS, 
KRN/4, p. 2). 
On the 31 December 1943, Bolesław Bierut, the president of the KRN (and a head of the 
Soviet sponsored state), began to make territorial claims of behalf of Poland, which had a 
strong anti-German sentiment: 
the East Prussia – the natural habitat and a stronghold of most dangerous class in 
Germany – the Junkers, which had always been the pillar of imperialism and German 
reaction, must, in the name of peace and the security of all world be turned from the 
seat of conflict, to a bridge linking the peaceful nations of Eastern Europe with sea. 
(BS, KRN/6, p. 28) 
It is possible to observe in the above quote Bierut’s attempt to fuse the nationalist and anti- 
German rhetoric with the ideological vocabulary of communism. However, many of the KRN 
sessions often turned into a chauvinist anti-German spectacle. With the advances of the Red 
Army and the imminent fall of the III Reich, the revanchist sentiment escalated and tone of 
the PPR became even more anti-German. For example, deputy Sommerstein in his speech on 
4 May 1945 claimed: 
“The entire German nation, which profited from these crimes, which willingly took 
upon itself the mission of the Herrenvolk [the master nation], which did not effect a 
single protest against the most abhorrent crimes in the history – must return all it took, 
must repair all it destroyed, must provide a full satisfaction and cure the wounds it 
inflicted to all nations that cherish peace and freedom. (BS, KRN/7, p. 141) 
Finally, discussion about the Germans in the KRN assumed a dehumanizing language, which 
was used to wind up the state apparatus in the actual process of the expulsions; this is 
exemplified by depute Odorkiewicz’s exclamation “we need to get rid of this German ulcer, 
radically … remove it” (BS, KRN/7, p. 191). These nationalist and often chauvinist claims 
have very little in common with the communist or even socialist ideology and are the 
expression of the sentiment prevalent in Polish society in 1944/1945. Similar opinions were 
voiced towards other ethnic groups within Poland, like the Ukrainians: 
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From the 3rd partition of Poland the population of the counties along the Bug (…) was 
subject to mass Russification and with time they lost their orientation concerning their 
national affiliation. It is not surprising then that in 1939, when the hitlerist hordes with 
fire and sword, were destroying Polish villages, this population stood alongside the 
aggressor. (…) For this reason the Polish Government is conducting a resettlement 
action of that population that was repeatedly forced to support the UPA hordes, so to 
settle them on territories left by the German population and to allow for their peaceful 
economic and national development. (AAN, MAP sygn. 778, p. 18) 
 
 
As can be seen from the above comments, nationalism almost completely overpowered the 
ideology of fraternal communism. These documents also clearly identify the main ethnic 
enemies – Germans and Ukrainians. Germans were perceived to threaten the Polish nation’s 
biological existence (Nitschke, 2002), while Ukrainians (namely Ukrainian nationalists 
represented by UPA) were perceived as German collaborators and responsible for massacres 
of Poles in Volhynia during the war (Kasianov, 2006; Pasieka, 2015). As mentioned before, 
this exposure to the “other” (Smith, 1988, 1991), coupled with the threat to the very existence 
of Poles as a nation (Czubiński, 2000; Mironowicz, 2000) heightened an already strong 
Polish ethnic identity. Pre-war Poland, however repressive to her minorities (Prażmowska, 
2011), never fully embraced Dmowski’s teachings about assimilation or outright expulsion. 
The horrors of the occupation, however, elevated Dmowski’s vision of an ethnically 
homogenous Poland to a central position in Polish society and politics (Beherends, 2009), 
such that a Polish ethno-state was not only perceived as a desired model for Poland, it was 
perceived as the Polish raison d’état (Kacprzak, 2010a). The formulation by PKWN of 
policies outwardly hostile and discriminatory to Germans was supported across the entire 
political spectrum of Polish politics (Kacprzak, 2010b, Pazik, 2013). 
Soviet national policies as templates for Eastern Europe 
 
Having explained the motivations and sentiments of Poles towards the end of the 
World War II, this chapter can now move towards the Soviet motivations for advocating a 
Polish ethno-state. The Soviet Union, like its predecessor the Russian Empire, was an 
ethnically, religiously and linguistically diverse country (Pipes, 1974, 1990). Terry Martin 
rightly observes that the USSR never wanted to transform itself into a homogenous nation. 
However, he does emphasize the fact that from as early as 1920s, the Soviet authorities either 
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encouraged migration of respective ethnic groups to their national republics, raions and 
oblasts or actively removed Russian settlers from non-Russian territories, thus creating a 
patch-work of compact ethnic settlements with in the Soviet Union (Martin, 1998). These 
ethnicities were later subject to forced re-settlement and following a period of “ethnic 
proliferation”, subjected to Russification (Martin, 1998, p. 825). By 1945, Russian 
nationalism was fully endorsed by the USSR, which subjugated other ethnicities to it 
(Kunicki, 2012). Since, as previously established, the USSR was the only dominant power in 
Eastern Europe, it naturally applied its national policies to their new territorial acquisitions. 
Therefore, the expulsions of Germans and other ethnic minorities can be seen through the 
context of the Soviet instruments of power as the expulsions were launched simultaneously in 
all Soviet dominated states, mainly Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania (Mironowicz, 
2000). 
 
 
International consensus 
 
From the Teheran Conference in 1943 onwards, there was an international agreement 
that the post-war Poland should become an ethnic state. The conference that involved the 
main Allied leaders – Churchill, Stalin and Roosevelt – was the first inter-Allied meeting that 
took place and aimed to formalize the post-war political order in Europe (Zaremba, 2002). 
The Allies supported the expulsions as they saw these as the only way to maintain peace. On 
15 December 1944, Winston Churchill made a speech to House of Commons where he 
expressed the support for the border change and expulsions resulting from it. It is worth 
quoting the most important points: 
I cannot feel that the Russian demand for a reassurance about her Western frontiers 
goes beyond limits of what is reasonable or just.…I cannot believe that such an offer 
should be rejected by Poland. It would, of course, have to be accompanied by the 
disentanglement of populations in the East and in the North. The transference of 
several millions of people would have to be effected from the East to the West or 
North, as well as the expulsion of the Germans—because that is what is proposed: the 
total expulsion of the Germans—from the area to be acquired by Poland in the West 
and the North. For expulsion is the method which, so far as we have been able to see, 
will be the most satisfactory and lasting. (Churchill, 1944 in HANSARD, vol. 406). 
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Roosevelt agreed with Churchill on the expulsions, on the grounds that a previous population 
transfer between Greece and Turkey was successful and. Indeed. had stabilized the situation 
in the region (Sherwood, 1948). 
The Soviet vision of Poland, presented in Teheran, was, as argued by Bilenky (2012), 
a result of centuries of Russian political imagining that had placed the Poles between the 
Oder and the Bug. In the Soviet system “Poland’s mission was to be a Slavic borderland 
against aggression from the West” (Beherend, 2009, p. 449). And national policies, owing 
much to the strong Polish ethnic identity, demanded an ethnically homogenous Poland, which 
would not have been weakened by any ethnic rivalries. 
Implementation of expulsions 
 
The issue of factual and historical representation of the expulsion of minorities has 
been widely covered by scholars. Thus, the aim of this dissertation is not to provide a detailed 
historical account of the events. The ethno-symbolist perspective will be used to analyse the 
dual identity of Polish communists, who embraced the nationalist cause over communist 
ideology. Indeed, the process of demographic engineering launched in by the regime is the 
most graphic example of its susceptibility to Polish nationalism. This chapter will provide 
only an overall view and the timeline of the expulsions that created the modern Polish ethnic 
state. The expulsions themselves can be divided into four stages: 1) the military expulsions – 
until the fall of 1945; 2) the post-Potsdam expulsions warranted by international treaties – 
between 1946 and 1949; 3) the so called “Aktion Link” between 1950 and 1951 that aimed to 
reconnect families separated by the war and the resettlement process; and 4) the voluntary 
German migration between 1952-1958 (Nitschke, 2000, p. 226). The peak population transfer 
was achieved in 1946, when total number of 1 649 088 Germans were removed from Poland 
(Nitscke, 2000) out of the estimated 3.5 million (Nitschke, 2000, p. 27) who had lived in the 
post-war Polish territory. There were effectively three routes that the German repatriates were 
to follow: a sea route “A” from Szczecin to Lübeck; rail route “B” from Szczecin to Bad- 
Segeberg and route “C” from Kaławsk (Kholfurt – pre-1939; nowadays Węgliniec) to 
Marienthal (Retecki, 2010, p. 48). By 1949; the Potsdam phase ended and the forced 
resettlements ceased and the Germans were allowed to either stay in Poland or voluntarily 
emigrate to the FRG or GDR, under “Aktion Link” or on their own volition (Curp, 2006). 
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Agencies 
Before this chapter moves forward; it will explain the role that the main state agencies 
played in the ethno-nationalist project of ethnic cleansing. The first was the Ministry of 
Public Administration (MAP), the equivalent of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Mironowicz, 
2000). Its main objective was to identify the location and the population of the main ethnic 
groups that the communists wanted to expel. It coordinated the resources, like trains, wagons, 
and police forces, needed to conduct ethnic cleansing, and regulated the schedule of the 
expulsions. The second office was created in 1944 and was called the State Repatriation 
Office – PUR – (Dz.U., 1944, nr. 7, poz. 32) and its main objective was to create staging 
areas across new Polish territories in which repatriates (both ethnic minorities and Poles) 
were supposed to be provided with basic supplies and care before being sorted according 
their destination and embarking on their respective trains, buses or ships (Dz.U., 1944, nr. 7, 
poz. 32). The third agency was the Ministry of Recovered Territories (MZO), created in 
November 1945 (Dz.U., 1945, nr. 51, poz. 295). The main task of the MZO was to organise 
the resettlement of Poles coming from abroad (or within Poland) to the territories taken from 
Germany. It was responsible for distributing abandoned German property and estates. The 
overarching task was to link the administration and the infrastructure of the Recovered 
Territories with the rest of Poland. The People’s Army of Poland (LWP) alongside with the 
Citizen Militia (MO) were charged with enforcing the expulsions, escorting the 
representatives of minorities to local staging areas and protecting the trains or other means of 
transport that were carrying Germans or ethnic minorities from within Poland (Mironowicz, 
2000). 
 
 
General Legislation 
 
It is apparent that the policies and legislation passed by the government are the 
clearest representations of its ideological standpoint and objectives. Therefore, this chapter 
will now move to analyse the policies, international agreements that the Polish Committee of 
National Liberation/Provisional Government developed. The population transfer needed 
meticulous organization and supervision. Therefore, soon after the last “Republican Accord” 
has been signed, on 7th  October 1944, PUR was established (Dz.U., 1944, nr. 7, poz. 32). 
Under the Article 1 the PUR was responsible for: a) repatriation of the population from the 
territories of other states to the Polish territory and b) regulation of the planned influx of the 
repatriates. This Act laid the framework for the population transfer that was to be conducted 
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on Polish territory. Its main stated objectives were to bring Poles scattered during occupation 
to Poland. The creation of PUR is important as it served not only to repatriate Poles, but later 
on all other minorities that were left within the new Polish borders, as well as Germans. 
Until the end of 1944, the PKWN did not engage in any legislation concerning population 
transfers or ethnic minorities and, on 31st of December 1944, it was dissolved and replaced by 
the Provisional Government (Dz.U. 1944 nr 19 poz. 99). With the signing of international 
treaties confirming the new Polish borders, the government issued a Decree on 
Administration of Recovered Territories, creating the Ministry of Recovered Territories on 13 
November 1945 (Dz.U. 1945, nr. 51, poz. 295). Emphasizing the temporary character of the 
Ministry and placing the PUR under its jurisdiction, the decree specified the administrative 
competence of the MZO (Dz. U. nr. 51, poz. 295, Art. 1-3). 
Expulsion of ethnic groups: Germans 
 
Legislation 
 
The next legislation, passed on 28th of February 1945, was a Decree on exclusion of 
hostile elements from the Polish society (Dz.U. 1945 nr 7 poz. 30). Although its initial 
articles dealt with the rehabilitation process of Polish citizens who were forcibly enlisted on 
III or IV of German national lists (Deutsche Volsksliste hereafter DVL), Article 18 of this 
Act specifies that on “all territories of the Polish Republic forcibly incorporated to the Third 
Reich and on the area of former Free City of Gdansk,” all property of citizens of the Third 
Reich and people of German nationality, regardless of their citizenship status, should be 
confiscated. Although historians like Nitschke (2008), Curp (2006) and Douglas argue that 
the expulsions had no legal grounds before 1946, Gosenwinkel (2009) argues that the post- 
war legislation on the dispossession laid the ground for the expulsions themselves. The 
legislation specified that the Reichsdeutsche (Germans living within Germany) and the 
Volksdeutsche (Germans living outside German borders) were not to be at any point part of 
the society within the new Polish state. Deprived of their material possessions and stripped of 
any legal rights, they were dependant on the government. This provided an opening for the 
expulsions themselves. In fact, the openly chauvinistic and anti-German policy was 
implemented while the hostilities had not yet been finished highlighting that the Decree on 
exclusion of hostile elements served two purposes. The first was a signal that the government 
intended to punish the traitors – those who have been enlisted on the 1st  and 2nd  DVL, and 
that it intended to punish the perpetrators – who at that time could be clearly identified as 
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Germans. This policy was a rallying tool for the government and in the immediate post-war 
reality could effectively serve as a unifying tool for the Provisional Government (Zaremba, 
2002). 
Inconsistencies, resulting most likely from lack of legitimacy, can be observed as 
soon as April 1945, when the government officially relaxed its policy towards the traitors 
identified in the Decree on exclusion of hostile elements – those enlisted on the 1st and 2nd 
DVL. On 14 April 1945, the ordinance of the Justice Minister specified the conditions for 
rehabilitation of those enlisted on the 2nd DVL or placed in a group privileged by the 
occupant (Dz.U. 1945, nr. 12, poz. 70). The limiting of the scope of the initial persecution 
clearly illustrates that communist-dominated Provisional Government, by relaxing the 
initially passed laws, wanted to broaden its support base. On the 8 May 1945, World War II 
was officially over and new national celebration – National Celebration of Victory and 
Freedom – was officially established (Dz.U. 1945, nr. 21, poz. 116), which yet again 
appealed to nationalist sentiments. 
On the 28 April 1946, the Citizenship of the Polish State on the Recovered Territories 
Act was passed (Dz. U. 1946, nr. 15, poz. 106) and followed by the Decree of Exclusion of 
Persons of German Nationality living on the Recovered Territories, passed on 13 September 
1946 (Dz. U. 1946, nr. 55, poz. 310). There was a significant delay between the February 
agreements and the September decree, which can possibly be explained by the legislative 
delay accompanying any international agreements and the overall difficult task of rebuilding 
the war-torn country. Nevertheless, the September decree yet again clearly showed the 
nationalist inclination of the Polish Government. 
Implementation of the expulsions 
 
With the official end of hostilities, the newly liberated Eastern European began the 
process of ethnic cleansing, thus initiating the largest forced population movement in the 
European history (Douglas, 2012). It is important to note that the expulsions did not originate 
in Poland, but in Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak government advocated the forcible 
removal of Germans form its territory as early as 1943 and immediately after the end of war 
it began the ethnic cleansing, that in many ways inspired the Polish Provisional Government 
(Nitschke, 2000). In fact, the best proof of that, as well as the chauvinist and extreme 
nationalism the PPR embarked on, is the order of the commander of the 2nd Army of the 
People’s Army of Poland given on 24 July 1945: 
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[T]reat them the same way they treated us. Many had forgotten how they dealt with 
our children, wives and the elderly. The Czechs could act in a way that the germans 
[sic] fled their territory. It is necessary to carry out the task in a most harsh and 
decisive manner, so that the german [sic] dross would not hide in various buildings, 
but so it would flee on its own and after arriving on its soil was thankful to God that 
it’s still alive. We should not forget that the gremans [sic!] will always be germans 
[sic]. When executing your task do not ask but give commands. (CAW, LWP, sygn. 
III/6015, p. 135) 
This order demonstrates how intense was the nationalism the communist authorities wanted 
to embody. The second apparent thing is the use of the word “german” and referring to 
Germans as “it” followed by various offensive adjectives. Such a form was observed by the 
author of this dissertation in various archives and various documents right until 1947. Most of 
these documents were not available to the public at that time, but it is possible to assume that 
this propagandist and deeply chauvinist language had at least two purposes – to dehumanize 
the Germans and to wind up the state apparatus that was to rid the new Polish state of 
Germans, although it is worth noting that the attitude of Polish communists was a “derivative 
of a general vision of foreign policy adopted by Stalin” (Nitschke, 2000, p. 43). 
Indeed, the first set of German expulsions – the so called “wild” expulsions initiated 
and carried out by the army – were the most disorganized and were marked with brutality 
(Kordan, 1997). But due to Allied objections they were halted in July 1945 for the remainder 
of the year the resettlement was conducted on a voluntary basis (Nitschke, 2000, p. 142). 
There were examples of Germans, like Paul Eggers, who organized bus transports to 
Germany for the purposes of resettlement (Pasierb, 1969, Scans 5 and 5a). In fac the 
expulsions carried out by the army were largely unsuccessful, as the Germans made their way 
back to the territories taken by Poland. Additionally, brutal expulsions conducted in 
Czechoslovakia caused the German population to flee to Polish/Soviet occupied Silesia about 
which J. Goryński informed the MON on 9 August 1945 (AAN, MAP, sygn. 2471, p. 25). 
The effectiveness of the policy was probably not the main concern of the Polish government; 
it was the expression of intent. By forcibly driving out some Germans, the communists 
signalled to the West that they intend to keep the territories they co-administered with the 
Red Army (Zaremba, 2002) and to the Polish nation that they would fulfil the need of the 
Poles to live in an ethnically homogenous nation. 
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The outward expression of nationalism and officially anti-German policies fulfilled 
their purpose, at least initially. These policies united the nation behind the new authorities 
and even the institution that was to be the main source of the opposition for the regime in the 
future. The expression of that support and Church’s complicity in violence directed against 
the German population are encapsulated in the letter of Stanisław Adamski – Bishop of 
Katowice – to the Ministry of Public Administration from 27 July 1945: 
I have informed the Wrocław curia about the determined stand of the Polish 
Government, that in Poland there will not be a German minority at all and that 
Poland, will not allow even those Germans that opposed Hitlerism, to stay. I have 
informed them as well that Poland, giving up large territories in the East, in order to 
rid herself of minorities, will receive in return western lands, formerly Polish lands, as 
a restitution for injustices done to Polishness across centuries. As far as the abuses go 
… I am afraid that cases that cannot be hidden, might cause serious difficulties on the 
international arena as well as the peace conference. (AAN, MAP, sygn. 79, p. 6-7) 
It could hardly be possible for the high-ranking Church official to be more in tune with the 
line the new government adopted. Indeed, the abuses were frequent, but as Douglas (2012) 
argues, these were moderate in comparison to the abuses the German population suffered in 
other Soviet-dominated countries. Adamski’s letter demonstrates, however, that the 
nationalist line adopted by the communist-dominated government was a very powerful tool in 
uniting the society and gaining support for the regime. Another demonstration support for the 
regime in this matter can be provided by the interviews conducted for this project. E.H 
claimed that “Poland deserved these lands for what she had lost [in the East] … the Germans 
deserved it [the expulsions] for what they did to us” (Personal communication on 
18.02.2016). Almost all interviewees (except M.W) agreed that expulsion of Germans was an 
appropriate measure conducted by the government (Personal communications between 05.02. 
and 23.02.2016). 
With the halting of the military expulsions came the period of the Potsdam peace 
conference. The international framework for the expulsion of Germans from the Soviet 
controlled part of Europe was signed on 2 August 1945 and was specifically outlined in 
Chapter XIII of the Potsdam Agreement which established the Combined Repatriation 
Executive (CRX) and in terms of Poland it assumed the repatriation of 2 million Germans to 
the Soviet Occupation zone and 1,5 million to the British Zone. The respective agreements 
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between Poland and the Occupation zones were signed on 14 February 1946 (Kacprzak, 
2011, p. 76). Although these agreements granted Poland the new territories, the fact remained 
that in Silesia, Pomerania and Masuria there existed two administrations: Polish and Soviet. 
They often competed with each other for authority and clashed in their approaches to the 
German population. 
Soviet military administration and strengthening of the anti-German sentiments 
 
The war and a brutal German occupation galvanized the Poles as a nation and resulted 
in a strong anti-German sentiment. This sentiment was reflected in the state legislation during 
the last stages of the war and immediately after the end of the hostilities. It is important to 
emphasize the role that the Red Army and the Soviet military administration, in cooperation 
with the Polish government, played in administering the Recovered Territories (Douglas 
2012; Nitscke 2000), played in strengthening of the anti-German moods among the settlers, 
who were to take place vacated by the Gremans. The Red Army officers were often engaged 
in outward support for the Germans – Bolesław Bierut notes that, in Słupsk County, “a 
certain Tarasov would not allow the repatriates [Poles] to settle because he got attached to the 
Germans” (AAN, Archiwum Bolesława Bieruta, sygn. 254/IV, v.1, p. 90). In a similar vein, 
the Government Representative in Lębork, Władysław Szcześniak on 10 July 1945 informs 
the Polish authorities “in the area the cases of Soviet soldiers or officers throwing out Poles 
and setting germans [sic] become more frequent”. (AP Sz, UWSz, sygn. 167, p. 28). The new 
Polish authorities exactly knew what often caused Soviet hostilities; the Director of Polish 
Railways, Pietraszkek, informed the KRN that Poles are often removed, in order to get rid of 
any potential witnesses to the Soviet practices of dismantling and transferring of factories and 
equipment to the USSR (AP w Szczecinie, UWS, sygn. 223, p. 15). It was the practice of the 
Soviet military administration to “reclaim” the Germans – meaning to use them as a free or 
cheap labour force, which was quickly adopted and formalized by Polish authorities, though 
mainly on account of the insufficient number of qualified workers within Poland (AAN, 
MAP, sygn. 764, p. 1 and sygn. 2471, p. 26). Soviet policies demonstrate that Polish 
nationalism could also be aggravated by external factors, obstacles in expulsions posed by the 
Soviet administration contributed to the anti-German (and to a large extent anti-Soviet) 
attitudes, which reflected the treatment the expellees received from the regime officials and 
general population. 
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Treatment of Germans 
 
Highlighting the intensity with which the Polish Workers’ Party implemented the 
expulsion policy was the often-brutal treatment of Germans. Major Boothby, from the British 
Occupation Zone, on 27 May 1946, issued an official complaint about the “inhuman” 
treatment of the “repatriates” and threatened that the British administration would no longer 
accept the resettled Germans if the conditions on their journey were not improved (AAN, 
MZO, sygn. 563, p. 61); remarkably, there is no trace of similar complaints from the Soviet 
zone. Indeed, the thefts and abuses committed on Germans were a plague throughout the 
entire process of the population transfer (APWr, UWWr, sygn. V/474, p. 107; AP Sz, UWSz. 
Sygn. 3425, p. 111; AP O, WUO. sygn. 83, p. 182; AAN, MAP, sygn. 761, p. 79). It is 
important to note that most of these abuses were committed either by the soldiers, officers of 
the Citizen Militia, or the Security Office. There were abuses committed by the civilians but 
these did not assume the scale of those committed by the state officials. Regardless of the 
post-war anti-German sentiments, the cases of the decent treatment of Germans did happen 
(Nitscke, 2000) and these also have left a trace in the documents. For example, four German 
citizens, Kurt Bender, Alfred Dietrich, Werner Elias and Erwin Fuch, wrote on 2 May 1946 
to thank those “responsible for the repatriations” claiming that they will “remember the 
kindness shown and help received” (AAN, MZO, sygn. 563, p. 49). In many cases, as the 
MBP notified the MAP, Poles played an active role in hiding the Germans who wanted to 
avoid “repatriation” (AAN, MAP, sygn. 761, p. 50-54). This shows that although a very 
strong and chauvinist nationalism was endorsed and promoted by the state, which resulted in 
violence against Germans, the post-war situation in Poland was much more complex than 
many historians (de Zayas, 2006; Curp, 2006 and Douglas, 2012) acknowledge. 
With the signing of these agreements, Poland became a part of an international system 
aiming to create nation states in the Eastern Europe; although the Potsdam Conference 
officially ended the Versailles International Regime, it retained the “Wilsonian interpretation 
of national self-determination” (Levene, 2000, p. 28) and further strengthened the 
international system that favoured the nation-state (Hobsbawm, 1992). The state apparatus, 
with MZO in particular, was prepared to conduct what Lehman calls an “unparalleled process 
of demographic engineering” (2010, p. 286). The process and detailed numbers have been 
already described by historians (Nitschke, 2000; Curp, 2006; Douglas, 2012); therefore, this 
dissertation does not aim to provide a detailed account of the process of the resettlements of 
Germans. It is enough to state that the vision of Poland completely free of Germans failed to 
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materialize, by the end of the resettlement program in 1949 because between 125 to 160 
thousand Germans remained within Poland. However, that was a number that would not 
threaten the integrity of the new Polish state. The initial nationalistic legitimization was 
accomplished by 1948 (Zaremba, 2002); therefore, there was a gradual relaxation of the 
nationalist rhetoric, one that allowed the new Citizenship Act of 8 January 1951, wjich, under 
the provisions of Article 3, effectively granted Polish citizenship to the remaining German 
population (Dz. U. 1951, nr. 4, poz. 5). 
 
 
 
 
Ethnic cleansing of Byelorussians, Ukrainians and Lemkos in eastern provinces and 
Codename “W” 
Legislation and treaties 
 
The first international agreement that Polish Committee of National Liberation signed 
after it was constituted on 21/22 July 1944 (Dz.U. 1944, nr. 1, poz. 1) was the agreement with 
the government of the USSR, signed on 27 July 1944 and resulting in cessation of all Polish 
territories seized by the USSR after 17.09.1939 (AAN, PKWN, XIV/17, p. 15–21). These 
territories, known as Kresy, (Vilnius, Lwów and Stanisławów areas) were a patchwork of 
Polish settlements intertwined with settlements of ethnic minorities (Ukrainians, Belarusians 
and Lithuanians). In Kresy, ethnic minorities actually constituted the majority of the 
population. By ceasing territories east of the river Bug, Poland removed the majority of 
Lithuanians, Belarusians and Ukrainians inhabiting her territory; although reduced in number, 
the minorities still remained in eastern provinces. Although demographically less significant, 
these minorities often questioned the legitimacy of the new Polish state and in many cases 
were engaged in armed resistance to the regime (Mironowicz, 2000). From this border 
settlement stemmed the so-called “Republican Accords” between the PKWN and Ukrainian, 
Belorussian and Lithuanian SSRs, submitted on the 4th  session of the KRN. The first two 
were signed on 9th of September and the latter on 22nd of September 1944 (BS, KRN/4, p. 
363-376). The main principle of these agreements, under Article 1 (between PKWN and all 
concerned SSRs), was the “voluntary” evacuation of these ethnic populations (BS, KRN/4, p. 
363). These documents demonstrate that the expulsions were started as early as 1944. These 
treaties laid the groundwork for the population transfers and were probably most crucial 
documents signed by the Polish Committee of National Liberation, the expulsion of Germans 
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who followed overshadowed their source and legal basis that began to form almost 
immediately after the creation of the Polish Committee of National Liberation. It is also 
important to emphasize that population exchange between Poland and USSR was not 
reflected in any formal legislation. 
Implementation of population transfers 
The new border settlement with the Soviet Union and the “republican accords” signed 
between Poland and LSSR, BSSR and Ukrainian SSR (AAN, PKWN, XIV/17, p. 15–21; BS, 
KRN/4, p. 363-376) settled the new border and warranted “voluntary” population transfers 
between the Western SSRs and Poland. These were summarized and restated in a new 
repatriation agreement between Poland and USSR, signed on 6 July 1945 (Marciniak, 2013, 
p. 129). The principle of “voluntary” repatriation did not work in practice and the Polish 
population was effectively forced out of USSR, and Belarusians and Ukrainians driven out of 
Poland (Mironowicz, 2000). There were cases were the Ukrainian population actively resisted 
the “evacuation” and there is a note to MAP from 19 September 1947, claiming that “in 
Jarosław there has developed a trade of public registers, where the Ukrainian population 
might buy a register verifying their Polish nationality, then they register in an adjacent county 
for resettlement as Poles” (AAN, MAP sygn. 780, p. 38). The total number of resettled 
population in that area between 1944 and 1946, as calculated by Sula was 1 247 417 (2002, p. 
75). This number, however, includes Poles, Lithuanians, Belarusians and Ukrainians – 
meaning that was the total number of resettled people in that area, which left significant 
numbers of Ukrainians who managed to resist these policies. By 1946, the USSR was no 
longer interested in bilateral population transfers (Marciniak, 2013), leaving the Polish 
government with a still significant Ukrainian minority especially in the Lublin province. Yet 
again, this chapter does not aspire to provide a detailed historical account, since the factual 
recreation of these events are present in the historiography (Mironowicz, 2000; Żurko, 2000; 
Sula, 2002, Olchawa, 2007). In turn, this chapter will analyse these policies from an ethno- 
symbolist perspective, having in mind that the communist government of Poland had adopted 
a strong ethno-nationalist stance. 
The nationalistic rhetoric and the war experience heightened nationalism and there 
was not only a strong anti-German feeling but heightened chauvinism as well. It is probably 
most adequately illustrated by a notification from 7 June 1947 by the Lublin Voivode, 
following the instruction of the Ministry of Public Administration issued to the local 
administration, which claimed that “the Polish Government conducts the resettlement action” 
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in order to protect the Ukrainian minority from prosecution from the Ukrainian Partisan 
Army (hereafter UPA - an anti-Soviet, nationalist Ukrainian Guerrilla; AAN, MAP, sygn. 
778, p. 18). 
The actions of the UPA, which was fighting the new communist regime, often 
targeted Polish civilians and burned villages settled by Polish repatriates from the east (AAN, 
MAP sygn. 778, p.1). In terms of winding up the state apparatus against the Ukrainian 
population, the regime used an identical rhetoric of dehumanization as in the case of the 
German population. County superintendent Bocian, in his note to Ministry of Public 
Administration, used the expression “Ukrainian hordes” (AAN, MAP sygn. 778, p. 4). 
Furthermore, it is possible to observe the use of “ukrainians” which paralleles the previous 
“germans” (AAN, MAP sygn. 780, p. 2). As Mironowicz (2000) argues, the tensions between 
Poles and Ukrainians in the region fuelled by the struggle between UPA and the government 
forces. This caused a paradox in which the Polish anti-communist partisans clashed with 
UPA for the same reasons as the state troops. The situation, especially after 1946 when the 
USSR refused to conduct any further population transfers (Marciniak, 2013), proved 
increasingly difficult for a government claiming national unity and ethnic homogeneity, 
especially after one of the generals of the army – Karol Świerczewski – was shot dead during 
a clash with UPA troops on 27 March 1947, near Jabłonki (Bata, 1987, p. 181). 
The death of Świerczewski triggered a government response that targeted the Lublin 
Voivodeship on 7 June 1947. The Lublin Voivode, following the instruction of the MAP, 
issued a notification to the local administration, which ordered the forced removal of the 
Ukrainians (AAN, MAP sygn. 778, p. 18). The forced resettlement of Ukrainians was not 
accompanied by any nationalistic legislation; in fact, the resettlement, codenamed “W” or 
“Wisła,” was a secretive endeavour conducted by the Ministry of Public Administration, the 
Ministry of State Security, and the Polish People’s Army. It is interesting that in the above 
explanation of the government action, the reason provided is quite openly nationalistic but the 
conclusion warrants “national” development of Ukrainians. It is important to note that the 
Akcja “W” was conducted in 1947 and it cannot be seen as an entirely nationalistic 
endeavour of the Polish government but as indicative of the advancing Sovietisation of the 
political regime in Poland. 
Akcja “W” targeted not only the Ukrainians, but also a small minority living in the 
south-eastern part of Poland – the Lemkos. The resettlement of Ukrainians did not trigger any 
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negative response; however, the treatment of Lemkos caused a noticeable response from the 
Lemko émigrés, particularly in the United States. There is one telegram to the Prime Minister 
Osòbka-Morawski, signed by the chairman and secretary of the Lemko Association in New 
York, which condemns the forcible removal of Lemkos (AAN, MAP sygn. 781, pp. 2-3) and 
a memorandum of the American League of Russians and Carpatho-Russians in Philadelphia, 
in the same vein as the telegram (AAN, MAP sygn. 781, p. 19). Initially, forcefully resettled 
in the Recovered Territories, the Lemkos in general were treated more leniently than the 
Ukrainians. The earliest case in the archives concerns Jan Bartosz, a Lemko who was allowed 
to return to his previous place of residence on 30 June 1948 (AAN, MAP, sygn. 781, p. 35); 
in another case, Paweł Galik, after his official request addressed to President Bierut (AAN, 
MAP, sygn. 781, p. 40-42). The ministerial file is filled with applications made in a similar 
vein to Bartosz’s and Galik’s; many of them received the approval of the administration to 
return to areas they had been expelled from (AAN, MAP, sygn, 781, pp. 44-73). The 
Ukrainians were perceived as a real threat and therefore not allowed to return to their former 
homes, but Lemkos, a group considerably smaller and not engaged in the ethnic struggles 
fostered by Germans during the occupation (Mironowicz, 2000) were allowed to return. 
Conclusion 
 
The situation in the post-war Poland was a very complex one. The ethnic-cleansing 
scheme launched by the new government as early as 1944 was probably the most powerful 
and vivid manifestation of Polish ethnic nationalism in history (Kersten, 1967). In the case of 
the expulsion program, the two seemingly contradicting theories of nationalism – ethno- 
symbolism and modernism – complement each other in providing a better understanding of 
the Polish struggle for a nation state. Ethno-symbolism (Smith, 1998; 1991; 1995) allowed 
the author of this dissertation to provide the historical context and the explanation for the 
remarkable strength of the ethnic identity among Poles, both prior and post 1945. The 
modernist theory (Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm; 1992) allows the expulsions to be placed in a 
wider political and international context – namely the international political regime that 
favoured a nation-state and which originated from the Versailles settlement (Hobsbawm, 
1992). Additionally, the teachings of Roman Dmowski (1904/2007; 1927/2007) provided an 
intellectual bridge between these two theories. Furthermore, his vision of an ethnically pure 
Poland and the means to achieve it was endorsed and implemented by the PPR in the shaping 
of the post-war Polish reality. 
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The issue of the dichotomous-identity (national-ideological) of the Polish communists 
also broadens the understanding of the processes that occurred after 1944. The fact that a de 
facto leader of post-war Poland (I Secretary of the KC PPR), Władysław Gomułka, became 
the Minister of the Recovered Territories and supervised the task of removing Germans from 
Poland in her new territorial shape (the role of Gomułka and his nationalism will be discussed 
in the identity chapter). It would be difficult to deny that Gomułka was entirely committed to 
the communist/socialist cause (Czubiński, 2000, Prażmowska, 2010). However, his 
nationalist tendencies and rhetoric were widely known and they did eventually lead to his fall 
from power in 1948, when he was prosecuted for “rightist-nationalist deviation” (Zaremba, 
2002, p. 88), which signalled the official abandonment of the nationalist rhetoric and full 
Sovietisation of the Polish political regime. This brought the relaxation of anti-minorities 
policies (Mironowicz, 2000) and the intensification of the State-Church conflict (Zaremba, 
2002) and the replacement of nationalism by ideology as the official rhetoric of the PZPR. 
This chapter focused on the policies of ethnic cleansing, which are from any 
perspective, a purely nationalist endeavour. From the modernist perspective, ethnic cleansing 
and the homogenisation of the state population in terms of language, ethnicity and religion 
can be viewed as most outwardly nation-building policies (Deutsch, 1963; Gellner, 1983; 
Hobsbawm, 1992). However, the issue is much more complex. The PPR in the years between 
1944 and 1948 did not only embark on a struggle to build or re-shape a nation. The ethnic 
identity was galvanized by the World War II and the occupation; the multi-ethnic model of 
the II Polish Republic was no longer valid and the peaceful coexistence of Poles and ethnic 
minorities was impossible (Nitschke, 2000). On the other side, the power of the new Polish 
authorities originated from the Soviet Union and the Red Army and, therefore, the regime was 
perceived as a foreign one (Kersten, 1992). In efforts to legitimize their power, the Polish 
communists embraced the Polish ethnic-nationalism as a tool for gaining and keeping power 
(Zaremba, 2002). They even broadened their membership and included former extremely 
nationalistic activists like Piasecki (Kunicki, 2012). Nationalism and exploitation of anti- 
German sentiments were used as a legitimizing tool primarily (Zaremba, 2002). 
With the gradual strengthening of the Soviet power in Poland, the nationalist rhetoric 
was gradually relaxed, to be completely abandoned in 1948 with the transformation of Poland 
into a Soviet-style mono-party system, after the merger of the PPR and the PPS into the 
Polish United Worker’s Party (Zaremba, 2002). The Sovietisation begun as early as 1946 
when the new government rigged the referendum and then the parliamentary elections in 
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1947 (Czubiński, 2000). Having officially legitimized itself on the international arena and 
having the full might of the Red Army behind them in Poland, the communists no longer 
needed the nationalist rhetoric to gain support; as Zaremba put it, the party leadership decided 
that “Dmowski was not a Marxist after all” (2002, p. 73). Therefore, the closer to 1948, the 
weaker the chauvinist language of the Polish Workers’ Party. After the initial thrust of 
nationalism, which can be seen as a nation building policy and in fact satisfies the criteria for 
it, the party officials reverted back to ideology. That internal contradiction aids in 
understanding eastern national politics. 
However, it is impossible to overlook the fact that the struggle for an ethnic state and 
the massive demographic engineering (Kacprzak, 2011) that followed in fact do carry a 
striking resemblance to a nation-building policy (Conversi, 2004), which aim to unify the 
society around the state and the government. Notably, the demographic engineering that the 
Polish communists engaged in was remarkably successful in uniting all the elements of 
society, even the Catholic Church (vide Bishop Adamski) that in later years would provide 
the main platform for the opposition, in a struggle for a common objective; (Prażmowska, 
2010). As such, it is an undeniable contribution of the Polish communists to the shape of 
modern Poland and to Polish nationalism generally (Martin, 1998). Thus, this chapter has 
highlighted that, in the struggle for legitimacy, the communist government managed to 
transform Polish society. The transformation came at the cost of the largest forced migrations 
in history (Douglas, 2012, Lehman, 2010), but it rapidly and irrevocably changed the ethnic 
and religious structure of Poland (Kunicki, 2012). Although the expulsions and ethnic 
cleansing did not affect all representatives of ethnic minorities, as some were allowed to 
remain in Poland, the demographic transformation of Poland allowed it to approximate a 
nation-state model, while the number of ethnic minorities did not threaten the integrity of the 
new state (Nitschke, 2002). The demographic elevated the Catholic Church to a central 
position within the Polish society. The expulsions also managed to reintroduce Silesia and 
Western Pomerania into the Polish identity, reflected in the ethnographic study conducted by 
the author (Personal communications conducted on 05-07.02.2016; 10.02.2016; 18- 
19.02.2016; 20-22.02.2016) which were previously absent from the Polish political 
imaginarium (Davies & Moorhouse, 2002). 
Thus, in the period between 1944 and 1948, Polish national identity and aspirations 
were manifested in the ethnic-cleansing program established the modern Polish ethnic state. 
Underlying the dichotomous identity of the communist leadership was the attempt to use this 
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nationalist project to rally support for a regime that lacked legitimacy in the eyes of the vast 
majority of Poles. Even though the leadership abandoned its nationalist rhetoric after 1948, in 
order to re-focus on the creation of a communist society, the very existence of the new ethnic 
state would stand as a major obstacle to the larger ideological project, resulting in a deeply 
conflicting mindset among the Polish leadership. The issue of the post-war power struggle is 
a complex one, but it is justifiable to conclude that the strong Polish national identity in many 
cases was not overpowered by the communist ideology, even at the highest party posts. Thus 
the PPR could so easily embrace the nationalist rhetoric. The respective ethnic identities were 
too strong and made any peaceful coexistence impossible, and the ethnic cleansing so desired 
by many Poles was sanctioned internationally. Finally, the tool for legitimacy in this case of 
the Polish communists’ activity proved to be both effective in rallying the society behind the 
PPR and in transforming the Polish society ethnically, linguistically and religiously, which 
had a most profound impact on the form of Polish nationalism and identity. 
 Chapter V: Symbolic 
nationalism 
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Introduction 
 
Nationalism is probably most visibly manifested through a set of national symbols 
and rituals (Smith, 1991). In this matter, both main schools of nationalism – modernism and 
ethno-symbolism – agree that symbols, rituals and celebrations are an essential part of 
nationalism and statehood, although ethno-symbolists argue that traditions, alongside national 
identity, develop through history (Smith, 1983, 1991), while modernists claim that traditions 
and practices are “invented” (Hobsbawm, 1992, p. 1). Furthermore, the “invention” of 
tradition intensifies with rapid and dramatic social, political and economic shifts that weaken 
social bonds (Hobsbawm, 1992, p. 4). Hobsbawm’s interpretation appears to explain the 
invention of new rituals and practices in the post-1944 Poland, where the social, political and 
economic system was shattered in 1939 and reinvented according to Marxist-Leninist 
principles after 1945. However, the Polish example cannot be fully explained by the 
modernist approach – the traditions and symbols were not invented anew, but rather re- 
invented, re-emphasized and given new contexts and importance; the break from the pre-war 
traditions was not as blatant as it would initially appear (Osęka, 2007). By investigating 
national celebrations, national symbols and institutions that were re-invented during the 
period between 1944 and 1956, this chapter will argue that although this sphere of state 
activity was probably the most ideological, the Polish Worker’s Party and later Polish United 
Worker’s Party (Polska Partia Robotnicza –PPR; Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza – 
PZPR) still attempted to largely accommodate Polish nationalism, thus creating their dual 
identity 
The emphasis will be put on the main national celebrations – 1st of May and 22nd of 
July; Labour Day and National Holiday of Poland’s Renascence (Narodowe Święto 
Odrodzenia Polski) as well as the Fete of the Sea (Święto Morza) since these, alongside 
numerous other celebrations and holidays, were celebrated with the greatest pomp and 
ceremony. Next, this chapter will investigate the changes made to national symbols – the 
emblem and anthem – and to traditional Polish institutions. The reactions and attitudes of 
Polish society will also be investigated, as they help to assess the success of the regime’s re- 
invented, standardised and universalised rituals by which Polish communists attempted to 
spread their values. The dichotomous identity of Polish communists, investigated in the 
previous chapter, serves to rexplain the rather bizarre combination of nationalism and 
ideology that emerged through Polish national celebrations during the Stalinist period. 
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Rituals and celebrations 
 
Pre-war Poland had two main national holidays: 11th November – the Independence 
Day which commemorated (and still does) the symbolic date of the declaration of Polish 
independence after the period of partitions in 1918; and 3 May – the anniversary of the Polish 
constitution passed on that date in 1791. In addition, the Polish holiday calendar was filled 
with numerous historical anniversaries and Catholic holidays (Osęka, 2007). The purpose of 
these celebrations was mainly commemorative, while in the post-war Poland national 
celebrations aimed to provide “occasions to applaud the leaders, expressing joy over the end 
of the war and stir hatred toward the enemies” (Osęka, 2007, p. 11). Additionally, unlike in 
pre-war Poland, participation in national celebrations was mandatory and strictly enforced 
(E.H. Personal communication on 18.02.2016). The ceremonial calendar in People’s Poland 
also swelled to include a large number of celebrations with the involvement of the state itself. 
Osęka provides a list, far from complete, but focusing on the most important state 
celebrations which constituted the new set of state sponsored rituals: 
1 January – New Year 
 
17 January – liberation of Warsaw (by Red Army) 
27 January – anniversary of Lenin’s death 
23 February – anniversary of the creation of the Red Army 
8 March – Women’s Day 
1 May – International Worker’s Day 
6 May - Steelmaker’s Day 
Mid-May to early June – People/Folk Holiday (Święto Ludowe) 
 
1 June – Children’s Day 
 
Last week of June – Fete of the Sea (Święto Morza) 
 
22 July - National Holiday of Poland’s Renascence (Narodowe Święto Odrodzenia 
Polski) 
 
Third Sunday of August – Aviation Holiday 
 
First half of September – Dożynki (Harvest Festival) 
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12 September – Railwayman’s Day 
12 October – Polish Army Day 
7 November – anniversary of the October Revolution 
4 December - Miner’s Day (Barburka) 
21 December – Stalin’s birthday (in Osęka, 2007, p. 105-106). 
 
However fragmentary, the list of new officially celebrated holidays appears impressive; 
numerous state sponsored (secular) festivities were most likely demonstrate Stalinism’s 
“horror vacui” but also aimed to compete with the Catholic calendar, although in the early 
years of the regime the Church participated in national rituals alongside Polish communist 
officials (Osęka, 2007, p. 104). 
The holidays this chapter investigates are 1 May, 22 July, and Fete of the Sea. The 
first two were the most important from the ideological perspective and were most solemnly 
celebrated. The Fete of the Sea, present in the pre-war Poland, assumed importance combined 
with the new Polish borders and wider access to the Baltic Sea, which the regime used as a 
propaganda and legitimacy tool (Osęka, 2007). Most importantly, these celebrations had a 
universal and uniform adherence across Poland. 
One of the most important celebrations followed by the regime was the International 
Worker’s Day. Marxist ideology and new “proletarian” (Berman, as cited in Torańska, 1985, 
p. 599) character of the state demanded that labour and labourers occupy a central position in 
state rituals. First, it is important to re-create the main elements of the International Worker’s 
Day that emerged from the ethnographic study. On the day before (30 April), there were 
“festive academies [akademie – gathering of local community] (…) and speeches in Soviet 
style” (A. K. Personal communication on 13.02.2016). On 1 May, in the morning “everyone 
gathered on a square, the party secretary gave a speech and we left to parade in front of the 
tribune and there we yelled ‘Long live! Long live!’” (P. K. Personal communication on 
10.02.2016). The parade itself was a true spectacle, as E.H. recalls: 
For me the 1st May parade, because a child did not contemplate the political sense of 
Labour Day, was a holiday of joy. On this day, in the suburb I lived in there were 
glassworks and the director of these glassworks was an avid communist and he could 
mobilise all his resources on that day; he had sports and dancing sections, kindy and a 
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choir. All of this was mobilised by Sykus, which was his name, on that day (…). No 
one could beat Sykus in this city [Wałbrzych] in terms of quality and grandeur of this 
parade, in terms of variegation and all connected with it (Personal communication on 
18.02.2016). 
In larger cities, there were also floats representing various industries (PKF 46/13), banners 
and slogans like “Long live the Polish Worker’s Party” (PKF 46/13 – 1 Maja w Lodzi) as 
well as caricatures of Western politicians (PKF 49/19). After the parade was over, there were 
more informal dances and festivities and as J. K. recalls there was always free vodka and 
sausage at the end of the parade (Personal communication on 05.02.2016). That seemed to be 
a very important part of the celebrations as W.R recalls: 
My mum worked with this man, Zbyszek Chmielewski in the PSS [Powiatowa 
Spółdzielnia Spożywców – County Consumers’ Co-operative] and he needed to make 
sure there would be sausages, he brought vodka to the butchers and they drunk it and 
made those sausages, stuffing them with toilet paper I think, since there always was a 
shortage of meat. But heads would roll if there wouldn’t be enough sausages for 1 
May. (Personal communication on 13.02.2016). 
The food and vodka were additional incentives for participation, since even the pomp and 
circumstance could not alone encourage mass participation. Official propaganda dubbed the 1 
May celebrations as “spontaneous, traditional manifestations,” yet all interviewees mention 
the mandatory participation, which, if evaded, could bring serious consequences (Personal 
communications 05.02 and 22.02.2016). Osęka (2007) argues that these celebrations were 
centrally planned and were used as a tool for enforcing regime power. 
The 1st May parades or demonstrations were also present in Polish political and social 
landscape before the war, yet the post-1945 communist government reinvented this holiday 
and placed it among the most important of national holidays. Ideologically, International 
Worker’s Day was always linked to broader left of the political spectrum, especially to 
communism, yet specifically in Poland, in the years of the new regime until 1949, 1 May 
started with a Catholic mass in in the official state celebrations (Osęka, 2007). Furthermore, 
this holiday that epitomised communist internationalism was never entirely free of nationalist 
elements. The instruction of the Central Committee of the Polish United Worker’s Party, 
issued on 1 April 1949, clearly enunciated the slogans and postulates of the 1 May 
celebration as “international solidarity and strength of our state” (emphasis in the original, 
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APSz, ZM i MRN w Szczecinie, WSP, sygn. 141, p. 9). Alongside the main claim of 
communist internationalism, there is mention of strengthening of the Polish state; such an 
ideological-nationalist combination is frequently found in aspects of the Polish communist 
regime. 
If 1st May revolved mainly around ideological celebration, however, with nationalist 
elements, 22nd July, a national holiday that replaced the pre-war Independence Day of 11 
November, contained elements of ideology but revolved mostly (at least formally) around 
national celebration – the re-establishment of Poland after WWII. In this instance, the people 
were not the main participants of the celebration but only the spectators. 22 July was mainly 
celebrated through official speeches and military parades and blatant displays of national 
military strength produced much more positive reception among the society (Osęka, 2007), as 
confirmed by the ethnographic study, where P. Z. claimed that “the army marched 
beautifully, in formation, I loved it” (Personal communication on 17.02.2016). The additional 
ritual, at least before 1949, were official galas held the night before, which included the 
singing of the national anthem and “Rota” (see Appendix G 1 and 2), as in Szczecin on 21 
July 1947 (APSz, UWSz, WSP, sygn. 1046, p. 111), which Osęka (2007) confirms was a 
common practice all across Poland. The main difference between 22nd  July and 1st  of May 
was voluntary participation: the regime encouraged it but did not, however, coerce Poles to 
attend (Osęka, 2007). 
22 July had also one other purpose: it became “people’s holiday of joy and review of 
achievements” (in Osęka, 2007, p. 80) and the authorities made sure to link the new national 
holiday with launching or inaugurating new investments. In 1947 in Warsaw, 22 July was 
closely linked to the commissioning of new tractors and buses, bought in France, for the 
people of Warsaw (PKF 47/31). The following year, it was linked with the construction of the 
new party headquarters at Nowy Świat street in Warsaw, which was supposed to be “the most 
beautiful evidence of consolidation of the Polish nation” (PKF 48/31). In 1949, Poles literally 
received “a treat” since the confectionery factory Wedel or at that time 22 July Confectionery 
Factory produced “additional tonnes of chocolate and sweets” (PKF 49/52). Throughout the 
period, national celebrations commemorating the resurrection of Polish statehood after WWII 
revolved around propaganda and attempts to bribe the population with consumer goods and 
investments, rather than exciting the national spirit. 
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Yet another national celebration was strictly observed by the regime – the Fete of the 
Sea, which belonged to a repertoire of the pre-war Polish state (Osęka, 2007); the festival 
was, however, given new importance and context in the light of the new Polish borders and 
access to the sea. Right after the war, in 1945, it was celebrated in Gdansk on 29th June and 
1st July (PKF 45/18; 45/19); the following year in Polish port of Gdynia on 8th June (PKF 
46/25); but in 1947, the main celebrations were held in Szczecin between 27th; and on29th 
June (Stettin) – in the Recovered Territories (APSz, UWSz, WSP, sygn. 826, p. 45). It is 
possible to observe that, unlike the two other national celebrations, the Fete of the Sea did not 
have a fixed date. The new context of this national celebration served to ascertain the Polish 
rights to the Recovered Territories, to promote the wider access to the sea, and to celebrate 
Poland becoming a “maritime state” (PKF 46/25). As such it was used as early as 1946, when 
the state organised a celebration called “We hold the guard on Oder” between 13 and 14 
April 1946 (APSz, UWSz, WSP, sygn. 841). This celebration was inaugurated with sports 
events and the docking of Polish Navy vessels in Szczecin Port on 13 April, followed by a 
military parade, mass and blessing of the military banners the next day on Jasne Błonia (a 
large open and green space in north of the city centre) (APSz, UWSz, WSP, sygn. 841, p. 2- 
3). Notable was the presence of the Catholic Church in the state celebrations, which remained 
a common practice until 1949 (Osęka, 2007). 
The celebration itself had a political motive that was discussed at a secret conference 
at General Lenartowicz’s (Commander of the Szczecin Army Division) house on 26 January 
1946, where General Mossor, Deputy Chief of Staff instructed by the authorities, discussed 
the matter of “a manifestation that the local population should, together with the army, 
organise by mid-April at the latest” (APSz, UWSz, WSP, sygn. 1053, p. 35). That statement 
alone sheds a light on the “spontaneity” of various manifestations organised in that period, 
which most often belonged primarily to propaganda activity. Similarly, in this case “the 
manifestation should encompass the largest possible portion of the society to ascertain that 
Szczecin and Pomerania were and are Polish territories. As a reason for the manifestation 
some date, from the period when Szczecin belonged to Poland, needs to be found” (APSz, 
UWSz, WSP, sygn. 1053, p. 35). In this context, the national celebrations confirm Oseka’s 
(2007) claim that state rituals were a tool of power, both within and outside Poland. 
Therefore, the elaborate celebrations held in Szczecin were tightly connected with the 
new narrative of the regime, specially the territorial aspect of it. The Fete of the Sea was 
celebrated over three days ,27, 28 and 29 of June 1947. The first day was the blessing of “one 
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of the largest hospitals in Poland” (APSz, UWSz, WSP, sygn. 826, p. 47), which fits the 
practice of presenting new major investments to the society discussed earlier. On the next day 
the schedule stretched between 13:30 and 21:00 and started off with sports events, ending 
with wreath laying on soldier’s graves: first the Soviet, then Polish (APSz, UWSz, sygn. 826, 
p. 49). On the 29 June, the celebrations started at 9:00 and were filled with official speeches 
(from the President), military and navy parades, sports events, and finally a bonfire and 
dancing that stared at 22:00 (APSz, UWSz, WPS, sygn. 826, p. 51). It is apparent that such a 
complex and prolonged celebration aimed to awe the spectators and achieve certain 
propaganda goals – internally to display the power of the new regime, and abroad to re- 
emphasize the Polish claim to Szczecin. Only the first aspect is analysed in the official 
documents and Stefan Kosior, the author of the report, claims that although “many people 
abstained from participation … in terms of propaganda the Fete of the Sea was quite 
successful” (APSz, UWSz, WSP, sygn, 826, p. 59 and 61). 
Symbols and institutions 
 
Yet another aspect of statehood is national symbols and traditional institutions. In this 
aspect as well, the new regime seemed to re-invent and re-emphasize, rather than invent 
anew. The resurrected Poland, after 1918, chose to formalise its coat of arms even before she 
established her borders and formalised the political structure of the new state. The Bill on 
coat of arms and national colours was passed on 1 August 1919. Under the provision of 
Article 1 paragraph 1, the coat of arms was to be “a white eagle with its head turned right 
(left for the observer), with wings raised upwards, golden claws, crown and beak in 
rectangular red field (template No. 1)” (Dz. U. 1919 nr. 69 poz. 416, p. 1 – see fig.H1). 
National colours were to be “white and red, in oblong parallel stripes, where on the top is 
white and red on the bottom (template No. 5)” (Dz. U. 1919 nr. 69 poz. 416, p. 1 – see fig. 
H2). In this form, the Polish coat of arms survived until 1927, when it was changed by 
Presidential decree (Dz. U. 1927 nr. 115 poz. 980 – see. H3). In 1927, the official state was 
established to the words of “Poland has not yet perished” (Dziennik Urzędowy Ministerstwa 
Spraw Wewnętrznych 1927 nr. 1 & 2, poz. 60, p. 58 – see Appendix H). 
When the communists began to consolidate their power from 1944 onwards, they 
needed to address the issue of national symbols. The coat of arms was changed by the 
National Council of the Homeland (Krajowa Rada Narodowa – KRN) and supposedly 
replaced by a “Piast eagle”, the term itself rather vague, since the large and fragmented Piast 
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dynasty did not possess a standard coat of arms (Jaworska, 2003). The eagle that appeared on 
official state documents and during official state celebrations resembles the design introduced 
in 1927, although the golden crown has been removed (see fig. H4). The official change of 
the national coat of arms came in 1952, with the passing of the regime’s constitution where 
the national coat of arms was specified as “an image of a white eagle on a red field” (Dz. U. 
1952 nr. 33 poz. 232, p. 370) and the formal template introduced with a Decree on coat of 
arms and national colours of the People’s Republic of Poland and state seals (Dz. U. 1955 
nr. 34 poz. 314 – see fig. H5). It is obvious that the changes introduced by the new regime did 
not break away from Polish traditional national symbols – no legislation or decree was passed 
to change the anthem or the flag; the eagle only lost its crown, but otherwise the design was 
identical with the pre-war one. The change was motivated by ideological reasons as the 
crown was associated with monarchy and the previous regime (Czubiński, 2000). Thus in the 
realm of state symbols, the party did not invent new ones, but chose to retain most, while 
changing the coat of arms. 
Traditions are important in national narratives and so are traditional institutions of 
power and government (Hobsbawm, 1992; Smith, 1991). In this case, the communists 
presented a more radical approach. While still retaining some important traditional 
institutions, they abandoned others and created new ones at the same time. It is important to 
name these most traditional Polish institutions of government, the Sejm and the Senate, 
which together constitute the Parliament. These were developed and formalised between the 
15th and 16th centuries (Prażmowska, 2011), where the Sejm was the Lower House and the 
Senate the Upper House. These two were re-instated by the interwar Polish state and 
embedded in its constitution of 1921 (Dz. U. 1921 nr. 44 poz. 267) and were retained despite 
any changes to the political system in 1935 (Dz. U. 1935 nr. 30 poz. 227). Another important 
institution was the Head of State. Poland ceased to exist in 1795 as a monarchy and was 
reinstated post-1918 as a republic; therefore, the republican tradition was in a very 
Hobsbawmian sense invented in Poland. 
The issue of Parliament is probably the most important and it is vital to emphasize 
that from the very beginning, the communists broke away with the Polish parliamentary 
tradition. The first communist organ of power that constituted itself on New Year’s Eve in 
1943 was the National Council of the Homeland and was a self-proclaimed legislative body 
that de facto replaced the Sejm. Notably, the communists introduced a set of institutions that 
were a complete novum in Polish political tradition – the National Councils (Dz. U. 1944 nr. 
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5 poz. 22) and in this new system, particularly in its phrasing it is possible to observe the 
ideological influence of the USSR. The system of the Councils placed the KRN at the top; 
then there were provincial National Councils, county National Councils, then urban and 
communal National Councils (Dz. U. 1944 nr. 5 poz. 22, p. 27). The very term ‘council’ was 
imported from the Russian сове́ т (soviet – meaning council) and the structure and hierarchy 
bear a striking resemblance to the system of soviets/councils in the USSR (Hahn, 1988). The 
system of national councils survived for the duration of the People’s Poland (Czubiński, 
2005), while the National Council of the Homeland was abolished with the elections of 1947 
and the Sejm was reinstated. The Senate, however, was abolished, which caused great 
tensions within the country, even though the communists did not dare to abolish it outright, 
but resorted to rigging the 1946 referendum. The falsified results of the referendum allowed 
communists to remove the Senate from Polish political landscape (Prażmowska, 2011). 
The issue of the Head of State followed the reverse pattern – initially the post of the 
President was retained and performed by Bierut, who was also the Chairman of the National 
Council of the Homeland (Prażmowska, 2011). In 1952, the post of the president was 
abolished with passing of the new constitution and replaced by the Council of State, which 
was a collective Head of State (Dz. U. 1952 nr. 33 poz. 232). The institutions were changed 
but procedures remained almost identical with the pre-war ones. According to the 1921 
constitution, the president is elected “for seven years with absolute majority by the Sejm and 
the Senate, joined into the National Assembly” (Dz. U. 1921 nr. 44 poz. 267, p. 614); 
similarly, the Council of State is elected by “the Sejm from its body on the first session” (Dz. 
U. 1952 nr. 33, poz. 232, p. 353). So it is possible that the new regime replicated the 
procedures of the interwar Polish state. 
Polish communists, in the field of national symbols and celebrations, represent a 
rather mixed approach. They invented, or rather imported, some celebrations and institutions 
directly from the USSR; some symbols, like the coat of arms, were changed but still based on 
the previously accepted traditions and customs. Certainly the number of state sponsored 
celebrations significantly increased after 1944, but these were not a sign of communist 
“horror vacui” as argued by Osęka (2007, p. 104) but predominantly aimed to replace 
Catholic holidays so popular before the war. In many cases, the new regime picked up the 
previous state celebrations, re-invented their context and used them as a propaganda tool 
(vide the Fete of the Sea), but borrowing from the previous regime appears to be an attempt 
to prove continuity. Through their use of previous rituals, the communist government most 
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likely tried to demonstrate that only the social context changed after 1944, but not the national 
one. Strictly Soviet holidays were enforced and Polish leaders had a limited authority about 
the “revolutionary” holidays that came from the USSR (Osęka, 2007). Nevertheless, these, 
too, served their propaganda and myth-making purposes to establish a myth of liberation by 
the Red Army and fraternal cooperation with the Soviet Union. More importantly, the new set 
of celebrations aimed to serve as “a permanent history lesson” and was predominantly an 
instrument of power (Osęka, 2007, p. 114). 
In the realm of traditional state institutions, Polish communists struggled between a 
break with tradition and a somewhat conservative approach. Initially, they abandoned the 
Polish parliamentary system (although just in name), only to restore it, but without the 
Senate. Bierut initially served as the President and even resided in the Belvedere in Warsaw, 
the traditional residence of Polish Presidents (Łukasiewicz, 1987). Then the collective Head 
of State was introduced in 1952, a clear break with Polish political tradition. The struggle 
between ideology and nationalism within the Polish communist party warranted that it could 
not fully embrace the USSR political model, so alien to Poles; nor could it unequivocally 
support the previous institutions. The shape of the People’s Poland, therefore, was a result of 
the uneasy compromise between ideology and nationalism, which created a hybrid of Polish 
traditional institutions and Soviet inventions. 
Attitudes and responses 
 
State celebrations and symbols occupied an important role in communist Poland 
(Osęka, 2007). As one of the interviewees recalled, they aimed to create “a new political 
identity” (E.H. Personal communication on 18.02.2016). Furthermore, the regime infused 
these celebrations with ideology and propaganda and in many cases assessed the degree of 
propagandist success, as in Szczecin (APSz, UWSz, WSP, sygn, 826, p. 59 and 61); however, 
as Osęka (2007) argues, communists themselves also fell victim to their own propaganda; 
thus, generally propaganda reports concerning major celebrations claim positive results. 
However, it is vital to emphasize that due to the internal struggle between nationalism and 
ideology, the values that the communist party aimed to instil “were not coherent, but a sort of 
collage” (Osęka, 2007, p. 55). They did introduce some new holidays and greatly expanded 
the existing state rituals, both for propaganda purposes and as a tool of power (Osęka, 2007). 
The new celebration calendar was, like the communist ideology itself, incompatible with 
Polish nationalism. Even if one looks at the fragmentary holiday calendar of People’s Poland 
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(Osęka, 2007, p. 105-106), it is difficult to find holidays that directly address Polish national 
pride (maybe except 22 July). Ideological form and incoherent content produced a mix of 
responses that ranged from cautious curiosity and awe to an outward rejection and mockery. 
This range of responses was present across all the sections of society (Osęka, 2007). 
The internal struggle and lack of revolutionary zeal among Polish communists is 
apparent in their superficial approach to sentiments displayed during state celebrations. As 
Osęka argues, “no one expected Poles that they would truly love Stalin (or even respect him) 
– the authorities cared for one thing, that after shouting the slogan ‘Long live comrade 
Stalin!’ people would compete in expressing convulsive euphoria” (2007, p. 41-42). In most 
cases the authorities could not even achieve that superficial enthusiasm. Generally, people 
wanted to “get it over and done with” (J.K. Personal communication on 05.02.2016), 
especially during the 1 May parade, where participation was mandatory. Some, like A. K. and 
P.K, participated because “one could dance and have fun afterwards” and “drink a glassful 
with friends” (Personal communications on 10.02. and 13.02.2016). Others, like E.H. and 
T.T., participated because they were teachers and their participation was strictly enforced 
(Personal communication on 10.02. and 18.02.2016). Some like T.F. went because “it was 
fun for the kids” (Personal communication on 10.02.2016). Among all the interviewees, the 
author found only one that participated in the state rituals gladly and believed “that something 
could be improved, something introduced” (G.S. Personal communication on 17.02.2016). In 
most cases, the general attitude towards the new state celebrations was rather hostile. As J.K. 
put it “there were Polish flags on the street, but between them there were Soviet ones! That 
was a fucking disaster!” (Personal communication on 05.02.2016). In many cases, adults and 
children attempted various deceptions to avoid participating. In schools, for example, all 
pupils had to march in the parade and teachers were responsible for enforcing it. Before any 
school formed a procession, there was a roll call to check attendance and as J.U. recalled 
I was always charged with carrying the red banner, probably because I was repatriated 
from Ukraine and that would look good, but after the roll call I handed the banner to 
my classmate, told him I needed to pee and run off into the park. (Personal 
communication on 13.02.2016) 
W.R. managed to be excused from participating by forging notes informing the school about 
a deceased relative, which was one of the few accepted justifications (Personal 
communication on 13.02. 2016). P.K. recalled one of his work colleagues who “wouldn’t 
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drink a drop of alcohol, but was blind drunk twice a year – on 1 May and 22 July” (Personal 
communication on 10.02.2016). T.T. was a teacher and her job would be threatened had she 
not participated but “every now and then I’d let my pupils go for ice cream instead. Then I 
was really afraid and couldn’t sleep at night from fear of something bad happening, but they 
were always in one piece the next day” (Personal communication on 10.02.2016). 
Civil disobedience assumed also another dimension – some were openly, or secretly, 
celebrating the pre-war national holidays like the 3 May and 11 November. J.K. recalled that 
every house was obliged to put out the flag for 1 May and then put it down the next day and 
there were 
many who didn’t put a flag on 1 May, but would on 3 May. When the militia or other 
officials came and asked why they still have the flag on display they would always get 
an answer: we forgot to take it down after 1 May (Personal communication on 
05.02.2016). 
T.T confirmed the story, adding that “these were only the brave ones, the less brave would 
celebrate it quietly at home” (Personal communication on 10.02.2016). M.W. recalled that 
after the war he and other university students decided to organise their own celebration of 3 
May refrain from participating in 1 May “because it was a Bolshevik holiday”. On the 3 May, 
M.W. and his colleagues began celebrating the pre-war holiday by attending the mass in the 
cathedral and then they “marched on the main street of Łódź, then they fired at us, but these 
were secondary details” (Personal communication on 20.02.2016). In Szczecin in 1947, 
someone posted anti-regime flyers in Polish and Russian a night before the celebrations 
(APSz, UWSz, WSP, sygn. 1053, p. 89). Additionally, there were some who managed not to 
participate at all, like U.R. who nevertheless “liked to watch” the parades (Personal 
communication on 13.02.2016). M.S. was strictly forbidden by her husband, notably a 
member of the party, to participate in any state celebrations on the grounds that “it was more 
than enough that he [the husband] had to take part” (Personal communication on 13.02.2016). 
The attitudes of the party members were not uniform either. Party officials were not 
always respectful of the state ceremonials and there were many incidents where officials 
turned up drunk or were the first ones to leave the celebration (Osęka, 2007, p. 168). In some 
cases, party officials publically mocked the system and the leaders. Osęka presents a very 
blatant example found in the archives; a party official in Gorlice, when presented with a large 
portrait of Bierut exclaimed “oh, this son-of-a-bitch is huge,” and then started singing a song: 
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“there’s a lettuce with small leaves, don’t you fuck a communist, ‘cause if Stalin will find 
out, he shall nationalise your ass” (2007, p. 178). It is probably difficult to obtain more 
blatant and serious mockery from a state official himself. J.K. claimed “that the lower in the 
ranks they were, the less they cared” (05.02.2016). There were definitely more reports of 
vandalising regime symbols on the part of the society rather than the party, but it is important 
to note that the new set of values was incompatible with Polish nationalism and the party 
members themselves were Poles, who often could not and would not identify themselves with 
the regime and its values and symbols (Osęka, 2007). 
Conclusion 
 
In terms of national celebrations and symbols’ it is possible to outline two major 
principles that governed this sphere of state activity in communist Poland: 1) the authorities 
were satisfied with outwards and superficial displays of support and enthusiasm; 2) wider 
society either occasionally boycotted the state celebrations or participated for very trivial 
reasons like free food and drinks. While such responses may not have been universal, they 
were nevertheless prevalent. In fact, it is difficult to find any elements of patriotic exaltation 
when one observes state celebrations in communist Poland. For the regime, it was tool of 
propaganda and power (Osęka, 2007). For society, it was another part of the new reality and 
the people needed to “adapt to it, otherwise it would be hard” (W.R. Personal communication 
on 13.02.2016). In the realm of national holidays, the communists were most daring when 
they banned two most important national days – 3 May and 11 November, mainly on account 
of these being anti-regime in their nature. They replaced these with a new celebration – 22nd 
July – and elevated the International Worker’s Day in a similar format to the Soviet Union 
(Osęka, 2007). In many cases, they re-instated the pre-war holidays like the Fete of the Sea, 
while others originating from folk and peasant traditions like Dożynki (Harvest Festival) 
were given official state ritual (Osęka, 2007). In this respect, the communists seem to have 
produced a collage of past-traditions and new practices. Such a collage reflects the wider 
dilemma about the dual identity of the communist government. It would have been 
impossible for the regime to be unaware of people’s lukewarm response to the cultural 
imposition of communist power, likely undermining their ideological convictions. 
A similar approach can be observed towards national symbols and traditional 
institutions. Some, like the Sejm, were retained, although initially rejected and some rejected 
although initially embraced – like the Presidency. The regime dared not change the anthem 
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and also successfully adopted a strongly anti-German Rota. The national coat of arms lost a 
crown, which was a bourgeois symbol (Jaworska, 2003), but otherwise the design was 
identical with the pre-war one. Initially, the regime also incorporated Catholic practices that 
were so popular in the pre-war Poland. Yet another sphere of state activity presents the 
struggle between ideology and nationalism that was present the system from its very 
beginning. Once again, due to this struggle the regime failed to produce a coherent narrative. 
A bizarre collage of values dominated public life and was manifested though national rituals 
that failed to unite the society around the regime; yet again a society presented with a mixture 
of Soviet and Polish elements could not identify itself with them and effectively rejected 
them, retreating back to well-known Polish traditions. Lack of understanding, coupled with 
the intensity and often physical strain – the Fete of the Sea celebrations lasted more than 13 
hours (APSz, UWSz, WSP, sygn. 826, p. 51) – encouraged people to either avoid 
participating in or to mock the rituals (Osęka, 2007). Geo-political conditions warranted that 
Poles would accommodate to the new regime, officially expressing support and consent, 
while privately opposing the regime. The dichotomous-identity that evolved within the Polish 
communist party was projected onto the entire nation. 
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Chapter VI: 
Education 
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Introduction 
 
The education system under the post-war Polish political regime has been widely 
criticised in modern Polish historiography. Statements such as “blatant indoctrination” 
(Kamusella, 2010, p. 114), “manipulative functions” (Kałużna, 2014, p. 69) and “politico- 
ideological indoctrination” (Osiński, 2010a, p. 1) occur in the majority of the literature 
concerning the subject. Kosiński even argues that the education system was aimed to create 
the “new mentality” (2000, p. 12) of communism and Kosiorek analyses the authoritarian 
pedagogy of the state and all the risks that it caused, arguing that education was subdued to 
the needs of the state, overlooking the developmental needs of young people and socialneeds 
in general. (2007). Arguments outlining the successes and the positives of the education 
system introduced between 1944 and 1989 (Moraczewska, 2010) are rare; thus Polish 
education during the communist era also falls into the “black hole” of Polish history, 
aconcept advocated by Czubiński (2000). The aim of this chapter e is not only to analyse the 
ideological content of the Polish education system (and its outward rejection by society), but 
to examine the scope and impact of the communist government’s policies that created an 
education system described not only by adjectives such as “ideological” and “indoctrinating” 
but also “universal”, “compulsory” and “free”. This chapter will employ the elements of the 
modernist theory of nationalism (Conversi, 2004) to analyse the purpose of the Polish 
education system, and the ethno-symbolist perspective in analysing the failure of the 
communist government to instil the regime’s values (Smith, 1988, 1991). 
From the modernist perspective (Gellner, 1989; Conversi, 2004), every state aims to 
gain a total control over the education system, which should provide a universal tool used to 
disseminate regime, state or national values. From this standpoint, education (Anderson, 
1983) can be viewed as a nation-building policy (Conversi, 2000; 2004). Therefore, 
modernism assumes that the nation, with all its values and traditions, is secondary to the state, 
which can easily educate and disseminate its values through education. The ethno-symbolist 
perspective (Smith, 1989; 1991) assumes that the state is secondary to the nation and it 
cannot reinvent the nation, since nation formation is a historical process that proves 
extremely durable and resistant to change. Therefore, attempts to alter national identity are 
perceived as a threat, further strengthening national bonds (Dmowski, 1907/2007). This 
chapter will analyse the impact of the new education system introduced by the communist 
government and the Polish response to it. Additionally, it will analyse the consequences of a 
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universal and compulsory education system in creating access to national values, thus 
strengthening Polish ethno-religious national bonds in opposition to the regime. 
Phases of the education system 
 
The education system was in a constant process of development and redevelopment; 
Żaryn (2009) argues that there were seven development phases between 1944 and 1989. The 
first phase occurred between 1944 and 1950 and was concerned with post-war reconstruction 
and the creation of a new organisational structure for education, which was ideologically 
charged, but still operated on the basis of the pre-war system. The second phase was a model 
of an “honest, folk socialism and internationalism” (Żaryn, 2009, p. 122) and was observable 
between 1951 and 1957. The following phases of “the thaw”; “stabilisation of socialism and 
its continuation”; and “the compromise with Solidarity and the new wave” were still 
ideologically charged, but operated on the basis of the first and second phases (Żaryn, 2009, 
p. 122-123); furthermore, they are outside the chronological scope of this dissertation. Thus 
only the first two will be analysed. 
The first phase was officially sanctioned by the Decree on the Organization of the 
education in the interim period passed on 23 November 1945. Under Article 1 of the Decree, 
“the Minister of Education can organize or allow to organize schools and courses not 
foreseen in the bill of 11 March 1932” and under Article 4 the Minister had the right to 
“stipulate the rules of employment of persons [teachers] and their fulfilment of vocational 
qualifications” (Dz. U. 1946, nr. 2, poz. 9). In practice, that meant that there would be shorter 
courses and lower expectations for education workers (except in the higher education sector), 
in order to re-build the cadres of teachers and academics who were decimated during the war. 
The attmpts of the Polish Committee of National Liberation’s and later the Provisional 
Government’s attempts to reconstruct and expand the education system can be observed as 
early as 1944 with the creation of the Marie Curie-Skłodowska University in Lublin on 23 
October 1944 (Dz. U. 1944, nr. 9, poz. 42), which was followed by the creation of new 
universities like Silesian University of Technology (Dz. U. 1945, nr. 21, poz. 118); 
University and Technical University in Łódź (Dz. U. 1945, nr. 21, poz. 119-120); Mikołaj 
Kopernik University in Toruń (Dz. U. 1945, nr. 34, poz. 208); and Gdańsk Medical Academy 
(Dz. U. 1945, nr. 45, poz. 253). Furthermore, existing universities and tertiary education 
institutions in the Recovered Territories and Gdańsk were transformed into Polish state 
educational institutions (Dz. U. 1945 nr. 21, poz. 121 and nr. 34 poz. 207). In the span of one 
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year, eight new tertiary education institutions were created in the country ruined by war. The 
sheer number and scale of the PPR action shows that the new system education was to 
occupy a very important place. The importance of the education in the new Polish political 
reality is also reflected in the funding it received. 
The education system was an “ideological front” of the new regime (Osiński, 2010b, 
p. 1) and was perceived to be one of its most important tools. Its importance is reflected in the 
budgets passed by the new government. In the first post-war Budget Bill of 1946, the  
Ministry of Education was awarded a total budget of 5 092 322 300 złp out of the total budget 
of 36 229 394 601 złp (Dz. U. 1946, nr. 50, poz. 284), thus constituting approximately 14% 
of state spending in 1946. In 1947, the education budget totalled 20 135 707 000 złp, 11% of 
the total state spending (Dz. U. 1947, nr. 50, poz. 257). The following year it was increased 
by approximately 16 billion (Dz. U. 1948, nr. 1, poz. 1) and between 1949 and 1950 was 
oscillating around 50 billion złp. (Dz.U. z 1949 r. Nr 022, poz. 151; Dz.U. 1950 nr 16 poz. 
138). Education budget exceeding 10% of the total state spending can only be observed 
within the time frame that Żaryn (2009) outlines as a reconstructive one. This seems to be 
confirm his argument that need to reconstruct the education system caused more state 
spending. After the first phase – between 1950 and 1956 – the education budget consistently 
oscillated around 9% of total state expenditure. (Dz. U. 1951, nr. 18 poz. 145; Dz.U. 1952 nr 
17 poz. 101; Dz. U. 1953 nr 26 poz. 101; Dz. U. 1945 nr. 19 poz. 72; Dz. U. 1955 nr. 15 poz. 
82; Dz. U. 1956 nr. 12 poz. 60); however, it is important to note that the Ministry of 
Education’s budget between 1946 and 1956 was consistently in the top 3 largest ministerial 
budgets, which further emphasizes the importance of education to the regime. 
The first phase of reconstruction had its formal end in the abolition of the Ministry of 
Education and the creation in its place of the Ministry of Tertiary Schools and Teaching on 
26 April 1950 (Dz. U. 1950, nr. 21, poz. 181). The preparation for the consolidated of state 
control over educating and socialising youth was observable in 1949 when the Minister of 
Education was granted all the prerogatives of the Minister of Work and Social Care in respect 
to school youth (Dz. U. 1949, nr. 27, poz. 175). Therefore, by 1950, the state monopolized 
the education and the upbringing of new generations. With that it entered the phase of 
intensified indoctrination and Stalinisation of the education system (Żaryn, 2009). This 
period lasted until 1956/7. As Osiński (2010b) argues, the softening of indoctrination post- 
1956 was caused by the de-Stalinisation process in the USSR itself and the Eastern Bloc; 
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however, it did not enjoy the ideological relaxation experienced by other areas of life in 
Poland. 
 
 
The ideological charge 
 
Ideology undeniably played an important role in the new education system and was 
present from the very beginning of the communist rule. In fact, one of its first tasks of the 
Education Department was to organize the celebrations for the anniversary of the October 
Revolution on the 7 November 1944 (difference in dates corresponds to the use of Julian 
calendar in Russia). The instruction given to the surviving education structures stated: “the 
anniversary being a very important public holiday of our ally is a moment when we can 
document our attitude towards our friendly State … make all the necessary efforts so the 7 
November is celebrated solemnly” (AAN, PKWN, Resort Oświaty, sygn. XIV/23, p. 6). 
However, the initial period (1944-1948), although ideologically charged, was also nationalist 
in orientation. Osiński claims that the 11 November (National Independence Day) in 1944 
was to be celebrated in schools connected with the defeat of the III Reich (2010d, p. 20) and 
his claim is confirmed by archival research; the PKWN Education Department circular issued 
in pn 25 October 1944 instructed that 11 November “should celebrated exceptionally 
solemnly, because it is the first celebration … after the 5 years of Hitlerist enslavement”. 
Moreover, “whenever possible celebrations should be preceded by a mass” (AAN, PKWN, 
Resort Oświaty, sygn. XIV/23, p. 10). Not only were old national celebrations fully 
embraced, but were connected closely with religious celebrations. Connections were also 
made to the 19th century Polish independence movement by highlighting the role that peasant 
and left wing organisations played. Such a case is observable in the instruction of Żanna 
Kormanowa, director of the Education Reform Department of the Ministry of Education, to 
regional education superintendents (Kuratorzy oświaty) from 6 March 1946, ordering them to 
organize in schools talks about the Cracow uprising in its centenary, and Edward 
Dembowski, since youth “have the need to familiarise themselves more closely with such 
important and so little known period of democratic struggle in Poland” (APSz, KOSSz, WO, 
sygn. 2, p. 23). 
Contrary to socialist secularism (Moraczewska, 2010) the official teaching of religion 
was not abandoned (APSz, KOSSz, WO, sygn. 2, p. 75) and the Ministry of Education 
embraced the less ideologically charged and patriotic stance ordering schools to cooperate 
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with the Association for Care of Camps Organized During the Occupation (Towarzystwo 
Opieki nad Obozami z Czasów Okupacji – an institution that cared for survivors of 
concentration camps created by Germans on Polish territory) in order to “commemorate the 
victims” of the war and German occupation (APSz, KOSSz, WO, sygn. 2, p. 91). 
Although important to the regime, ideological indoctrination in schools was relaxed 
with the formation of Provisional Government of National Unity (TRJN), which was a 
broader coalition of several political parties (Osiński (2010d). Coalition agreement warranted 
the replacement of the Stanisław Skrzeszewski (communist – Polish Workers’ Party) with the 
more moderate Czesław Wycech (Polish Peasant Alliance – party in opposition to 
communism), who was predominantly concerned with reforming and improving the Polish 
education system, rather than equipping the regime with a tool of indoctrination. The minister 
himself was connected with a party opposing communists. Thus he did not officially endorse 
the use of ideology and propaganda in education; however, the executive members of 
Ministry’s Departments – like communist activist Żanna Kormanowa, came from the USSR 
and had “an experience in reference to the sovietisation of children” (Osiński, 2010d, p. 16); 
this severely undermined Wycech’s position, making him unable to eradicate ideology 
completely from the new education system. Instances of treating schools as propaganda tools 
can observed as early as 1946. In a circular issued on 15 May 1946, E. Schayer from the 
Ministry of Education instructs education superintendents that the Colorado potato beetle 
infestation and action to combat its effects “with appropriate explanation for the youth will 
have educational and socializing [uspołeczniający] effect. The Ministry instructs to organize 
such an action in every school” (APSz, KOSSz, WO, sygn. 2, p. 95). And indeed the anti- 
Colorado potato beetle action became embedded in the cannon of the Polish Anti-Western 
propaganda (PKF, 29/48; PKF, 25/50 PKF, 35/51; PKF, 36/53), inspiring hostility towards 
“the imperialist West”. In fact, the Colorado potato beetle originated in Colorado and at the 
turn of the 19th and 20th centuries reached Europe, spreading to become a severe problem for 
Soviet Bloc countries; nevertheless, the infestation had nothing to do with sabotage from the 
West (Maharijaya & Vosman, 2015) 
Ideological offensive intensifies 
 
By 1947, the Polish Workers’ Party had consolidated its power over Poland; that year 
marks the intensification of the ideological offensive in the Polish education system that, 
nonetheless, was never entirely free of Polish nationalist underpinnings. 
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The moderate minister Wycech was replaced by Skrzeszewski, who assumed the post 
for the second time (Osiński, 2010c). From 1947 onwards, the main aim of the education 
system was to 
transform Poles consciousness and to steer it away from a religious to a materialistic 
world view; creating acceptance and mustering support for Marxist-Leninist ideology, 
the socialist economy, the system of international alliances based on USSR 
dominance and a political system based on PPR/PZPR dominance. (Osiński, 2006, p. 
2) 
Since education was in the ideological frontline of the new totalitarian regime, it also 
received appropriate support and the attention of the secret police (Osiński, 2010b). The state 
assumed the total control of all educational publications (Wojdon, 2015) and embarked on 
construction of a coherent Marxist-Leninist historiography (Wojdon, 2012), making school 
an integral part of the “socialist state ritual” (Ciszewska, 2012, p. 5), while also trying to 
indoctrinate not only the students but also teachers, who were often employed on the basis of 
their political inclinations and created the situation where the teacher was “the representative 
of the regime” (Osiński, 2006, p. 3). A new political rhetoric was established to label the 
opponents of the new regime: “the adjective ‘bourgeois’ (morality, school, standpoint) was 
equivalent with the word evil and the adjective ‘socialist’ (morality, ownership, attitude 
towards work) with the word good” (Osiński, 2006, p. 4-5). 
Soon after its consolidation of power, the Ministry of Education launched in the 
academic year 1947/48 a new subject “Poland and the contemporary world [Nauka o Polsce i 
świecie współczesnym]” and its main “educational objective [cel wychowawczy]” was to 
facilitate “the understanding of the new reality … and emotional attachment to it” (APSz, 
KOSSz, WO, sygn. 311, p. 2). Furthermore, the new subject was to “strengthen the national 
awareness and attachment to Polish culture and its progressive traditions and discovering the 
relationship with all Slavic nations” and “to renounce the dichotomy between the group and 
the individual, through the fact that a socialized individual finds in the democratic system the 
most favourable conditions of development and actions within the framework dictated by 
social welfare” (APSz, KOSSz, WO, sygn. 311, p. 13). This clearly demonstrates and 
supports Osiński’s (2010a) and Kosiorek’s (2007) argument that young people were to be 
directed by the system and for the system and that collective needs would take the precedence 
over the needs of an individual, an ideology that contains elements of both nationalism and 
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Marxism. The teaching material in the new subject on Poland and the contemporary world 
included: “the German problem, elimination of Germans from Eastern Europe … alliance 
with the USSR as the fundamental part of our new foreign policy … dialectical materialism 
… millenary struggle of the Polish nation with the German drive eastward” (APSz, KOSSz, 
WO, sygn 311, p. 19 and 100). At the same time, the curriculum aimed to reinforce “national 
awareness” and promote attachment to Poland and Polish culture. Such objectives, even 
though intertwined with ideological content, demonstrate nationalist underpinnings as well as 
values typical of nationalist regimes – patriotism and devotion to the state as embodiment of 
the nation. The content provides a rather bizarre mixture of Marxist-Leninist ideology and in 
this case often stands in stark contrast to “true spirit of internationalism, socialism and 
progress” (APSz, KOSSz, WO, sygn. 5, p. 38) that the new state tried to instil in Polish 
youth. 
Regardless of inconsistencies, the new model of teaching constituted, as previously 
demonstrated, an enormous ideological weight. For understandable reasons, humanities were 
under the strongest ideological pressure (Osiński, 2010a). For example, year 6s (klasa VI) 
were learning the basic rules of Polish grammar on a following example: 
Dear Friends from the USSR! We are writing to You from Poland. We want to get to 
know You better. We heard and read a lot about Your Great Soviet Fatherland, about 
Generalissimo Stalin, about heroic work and struggle of the Soviet nation and Soviet 
youth. We are grateful to the Red Army for liberating our country from the enemy. 
We are grateful to the Soviet nation for constant help in building and improving of 
our people’s fatherland [ludowej ojczyzny]. We ask You to describe your life and 
work. We will be impatiently wait for your response. Best wishes from Poland. (the in 
Żaryn, 2009, p. 36). 
The heavy ideological charge in the humanities did not, however, mean natural sciences were 
excluded from the ideological offensive. A ministerial command issued on 6 September 
1949, at the height of the ideological offensive, clearly stated that the main goal of the state is 
to “create a scientific world view in accordance with Marxism-Leninism … therefore modern 
physics not only does not disprove materialism, quite the contrary, it confirms dialectical 
materialism” and the new system should “consciously and deliberately [emphasis in the 
original] establish a scientific and materialist perspective among the youth” (APSz, KOSSz, 
WO, sygn. 5, p. 103 and 107). 
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In a centrally administrated and authoritarian education system (Kosiorek, 2007) the 
focus on ideology found its way to assessment where questions carried equal ideological 
weight as the curricula, if not heavier. In 1955, the cabinet of the Minister of Education 
outlined the new set of exam questions for Polish language [język polski] for years 6 to 11 
(klasa VI-XI) and thus the year 7’s were to explain “on the basis of A. Mickiewicz’s poem 
<<To our friends the Muscovites>> [Do przyjaciół Moskali] … the poet’s attitude to the 
Russian nation” (AAN, MOśw, sygn. 22, p. 26). Year 8s needed to present “the poetic image 
of misery and revolutionary struggle of the proletariat in Tuwim’s <<Polish flowers>> 
[Kwiaty polskie]” or give the examples of “Polish-Soviet friendship and fraternity in J. 
Newerle’s <<Boy from the Don steppes>> [Chłopiec z salskich stepów]” (AAN, MOśw, 
sygn. 22, p. 29) and year 11s were to discuss “the awakening of class awareness in the 
countryside (found in novels of W. Wasilewska)” or analyse “the importance of B. Bierut’s 
speech, on the opening of the radio station in Wrocław, for the development of Polish 
culture” (AAN, MOśw, sygn. 22, p. 36) Similar expectations of the students were outlined in 
the Ministry’s instruction concerning the secondary education certificate exams in 1949, 
where four main points were emphasized: 
1) Social and economic reforms and their pivotal role for Poland; 2) National 
Economic Plan and its importance for the future of the State; 3) The role of the 
Recovered Territories – as the basis of existence of Poland – and therefore the vital 
importance of their development and repolonization; 4) The importance of the 
unification of the forces of Polish democracy in Bloc of Democratic Alliances – as a 
basis of social normalization and the future of the State in contrast with the 
reactionary forces hostile to the new Poland and democracy (the underground and the 
London emigration). (APSz, KOSSz, WO, sygn. 3, p. 101) 
Furthermore, students were required to be aware of “the new foreign policy of democratic 
Poland, international agreements if people’s Poland, the German question as a perpetual 
threat … especially to Poland and Slavdom ... common interests of Slavic nations … 
economic cooperation and alliance with the USSR” (APSz, KOSSz, WO, sygn. 3, p. 101). It 
is possible to observe the strong ideological charge of these sentences, but altogether they 
present a rather bizarre mixture of ideology, nationalism/chauvinism and pan-Slavism, an 
uneasy balance between ideology and nationalism. 
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Reactions to the ideological offensive 
 
In order to effectively conduct the new ideological offensive in Polish education, the 
regime needed to indoctrinate teachers. For this purpose, the Ministry of Education issued an 
instruction on 27 October 1949 ordering compulsory ideological education of teachers, who 
were obliged to be educated “in terms of a) Poland and contemporary world, b) social 
sciences, c) socialist pedagogic”; the process was finalised by an exam at which “the 
participants should demonstrate the knowledge and understanding of the following literature: 
1) B. Bierut – Ideological basis of the PZPR; 2) Fundamental social issues [Podstawowe 
zagadnienia spoleczne] – J. Siwek, ed.; 3) Collaborative work – Socio-economic news; 4) 
Kairow – Pedagogic” (APSz, KOSSz, WO, sygn. 2, p. 513-514). On top of that, the Ministry 
encouraged “ideological self-education” (AAN, MOśw, sygn. 14, p. 54). Quite logically, the 
ones directly responsible for the dissemination of regime values were to be selected and 
meticulously checked in terms of their ideological stance and the knowledge of “Marxist- 
Leninist classics” (AAN, MOsw, sygn. 14, p. 86). 
However, a year after the ideological offensive, the Ministry evaluated the 
implications of the new education system and its Marxist-Leninist ideological basis. The 
results were unsatisfactory for the Ministry: “we need to say that the teachers felt the need to 
finally grasp <<that Marxism>> so frequently written and spoken of, which they knew little 
about. We cannot, however find in this attitude a true interest in Marxism-Leninism” (AAN, 
MOśw, sygn. 14, p. 88). Furthermore, if certain teachers “could convincingly justify 
materialism” that “did not stop him from being a practicing Catholic” (AAN, MOśw, sygn. 
14, p. 90). Towards the end of the Stalinist period in Poland, the situation among the teachers 
from the ideological perspective was “disastrous,” as was the decreasing standard of teaching 
(AAN, MOśw, sygn. 28, p. 202). The teachers in some cases outwardly rejected the new 
ideological system and methods of teaching it, although there was a strict control over the 
content and teaching; in some instances, the teachers worked around it. J. K. described a 
following situation: “I had a history teacher in high school [in late 1950s], Professor [habitual 
way of addressing secondary teachers in Poland] D. On some occasions, he would enter the 
classroom and say ‘Today we will be doing what’s in the curriculum’ and on some days 
‘Today we will be studying history’” (Personal communication on 05.02.2016). A primary 
school teacher interviewed (Polish language and literature – started teaching in 1949) was 
given “reading materials [czytanki]” about Feliks Dzierżyński and Lenin, knowing their 
indoctrinating content. She recalled: 
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I wrote the summary of the Dzierżyński reading on the board and told the pupils to 
write it down in their notebooks, in case of inspection, they would have a proof that 
we did what was expected. And indeed the inspectors showed up soon after, they 
checked the notebooks, ticked one reading and then asked about the Lenin one. I told 
them we didn’t do that one. They wrote in their papers ‘shameful omission’ and then 
left. No unpleasantness followed. (T.T. Personal communication on 12.02.2016). 
These examples demonstrate that teachers sometimes chose not to follow the guidelines, thus 
minimizing the ideological impact of the education system. Moreover, some inspectors 
responsible for enforcing the ideological content, as demonstrated in this case at least, proved 
to be unconcerned about the “omission” that had been made by T.T. Furthermore, the 
examples demonstrate that the indoctrination and propaganda on one side and strict (in 
theory) enforcement of it created a contradictory identity among people. T.T. did what “was 
expected”, but her action suggests that she was against the educational propaganda and she 
did not force the students to familiarize themselves with the readings. The same attitude can 
be observed among the inspectors; officially, they made a note that one of the readings had 
not been done in T. T’s. class; however, no action was taken against her for not fulfilling her 
duties as “the representative of the regime” (Osiński, 2006, p. 3). Similarly, Professor D. on 
several occasions followed the official curriculum, although on others he was “teaching 
history” (05.02.2016). The very wording suggests that D. was against the regime and he made 
a clear difference between “the curriculum” and “history”. In a similar vein to T.T., he did 
what was demanded by the authorities, while not agreeing with it.  This attitude minimized 
the impact of the ideological offensive launched by the government and reinforced their 
dichotomous identity, noticed by the Ministry (AAN, MOśw, sygn. 14), which attempted to 
reinforce ideological preparedness and compliance with the communist government’s line; 
however, the results were far from satisfactory for the Ministry (AAN, MOśw, sygn. 28). 
While teachers’ reactions demonstrate the dichotomous identity of most Polish 
citizens (official compliance/private disagreement), students’ attitudes varied from passive 
resistance to an outward defiance. The indoctrinating school curricula in the humanities was 
limited to memorizing dates or fixed interpretations presented by the regime and, in many 
cases, failed to interest the students. Additionally, the state limited students’ activities and 
areas of interest. A notorious example was the introduction of Russian as a compulsory 
foreign language in schools. In the academic year of 1948/1949, only 40%, of total number pf 
students learning a foreign language took Russian as a school subject. In the following 
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academic year, the Ministry observed that its encouragement and efforts in “promoting” 
(making compulsory) Russian as chosen foreign language “brought a colossal increase in the 
numbers of students learning Russian, with the simultaneous decrease of the number of 
students learning other languages” (AAN, MOśw, sygn. 14, p. 238). This action alone caused 
student opposition. R.G claims that it was “a tool of Russification” (13.02.2016) and J.K. 
adds “it became a point of honour not to learn it”. Further views expressed to this project 
confirm that the students outwardly rejected the indoctrination (Personal communications on 
05.02 and 13-20.02.2016). However, it is important to take into the account that their 
recollections, made after the fall of the PPR/PZPR regime, might include some negative bias 
that impacted their interpretation of the past. 
There is, however, one person who participated in the ethnographic study for this 
project, who provided a valuable perspective. E.H. started her state education in 1949, a year 
the regime saturated the education system with propaganda. E.H recalled: 
I don’t know how to call it, but it felt like after I went to school I suffered from 
schizophrenia. I was young and the adults did not include me in their conversations 
and they never spoke about the situation in the country when I was young. So I went 
to school, I remember I was so excited and loved learning new things. When I came 
back from school I wanted to share my achievements and what I had learned with my 
family. I tried to talk to my uncle, the only male figure in my house since my father 
had died during the war, and told him the news from the Soviet Union and all the 
good things that Uncle Stalin had done for our country; he went red with fury and 
snapped ‘shut up, child!’. I couldn’t figure out what had made him so furious. 
(18.02.2016) 
E.H genuinely believed the propaganda disseminated by schools, yet even in her case the 
effect proved short-lasting for a very simple reason: 
in 1954 my other uncle came back from the GULag, a human wreck, I will never 
forget the mindless look in his eyes. By then I was old enough to know, the family 
decided it was the time I heard their story. The reason for my uncle’s fury was simple. 
He also was deported by the Soviets, but he came back in 1946. They told me all of 
the atrocities that our “greatest ally” committed on our people. I was shocked and 
devastated, but never again believed in anything they were telling us about the Soviets 
in school (E.H. 18.02.2016). 
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In the case of E.H, the family decided to wait until she was old enough, but in some other 
cases the family outwardly denounced the version of history taught at school; J.K., T.F., and 
R.G., were all informed by their parents about the brutality and illegitimacy of the communist 
government (J.K. 05.02.2016; T.F. 12.02.2016; R.G. 13.02.2016). The author encountered 
two people who were repatriated from the eastern parts of Poland taken by the USSR and, 
although young they clearly remembered “the horrors” of the repatriation and the “kindness” 
shown by the Soviet authorities; a long journey in a coal wagons (with no roof protecting 
passengers from cold, rain or snow); thus, from their own experience they knew that the 
official propaganda and version of history taught at school were false (T.R. and J.U. 
14.02.2016). In fact, family socialisation was the reason for the failure of the regime to 
indoctrinate society. The millions who survived the war and lived in the post-war Poland 
could testify to the falsity of stories told in school. The education system, and the state as 
such, were no longer believed be the carrier of national values and traditions. That role was 
taken by closest family and since the education system was perceived as a propagandist tool 
of the regime “young people turned to the Catholic Church for support and knowledge” 
(Osiński, 2006, p. 26) since this organisation was the only available alternative to the system. 
Paradoxically, the education system achieved the opposite result from the intended one: 
instead of “uniting the youth and the entire society around those extremely important tasks … 
during the period of constructing the foundations of socialism” (APSz, KOSSz, WO, sygn. 2, 
p. 487), “true internationalism” (APSz, KOSSz, WO, sygn. 6) and positive “emotional 
attachment” to the regime (APSz, KOSSz, WO, sygn. 311, p. 2), the education system 
mobilized society against the values promoted by the state and unwittingly pushed it towards 
the Catholic Church. 
The negative results of blatant indoctrination and visible decline in the standards of 
teaching produced yet another outcome - both the teachers and some party members began to 
criticize the use of propaganda in education between 1955 and 1956 (Osiński, 2006). On the 
wave of popular discontent and factional struggles within the party that led to a relaxation of 
the PZPR’s grip on power, voices from within and outside the party called for reform 
(Czubiński, 1995). While the regime never fully removed the ideological content, from 1956 
onwards the indoctrination worked on the basis of positive allusions to the system and 
itsideology, rather than making outright propagandist claims (Osiński, 2006). The regime was 
thus not only responding to its own internal nationalist inclinations, it was responding to open 
criticism and lack of “Marxist” practice in schools.  It is possible to surmise that the clash of 
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the party with the popular rejection of its ideology exacerbated their own dichotomous 
identity, while the attempt at enforcement of the ideological strengthened nationalist 
sentiment within the society. 
Illiteracy 
 
The very important issue of literacy is often ignored by Polish historians (Osinski, 
2006; 2010a; 2010b; 2010c; Wojdon, 2012; 2015; Żaryn, 2009). The efforts to combat 
illiteracy in post-war Poland are raised by Moraczewska, who claims that the regime 
achieved a formidable task of “popularizing the sterling national culture among the masses 
and democratize the cultural values in the broadest circles of the population” (2010, p. 121). 
Pre-war Poland had an overall illiteracy rate of 30% (Nowy Kurjer, 1935). However, 
establishing the rate of illiteracy among the ethnically Polish population overall might be 
difficult, since the data of 1931 considers the entire population. Illiteracy was most prevalent 
in the eastern part of the country, where most of the ethnic minorities lived (see Appendix H). 
Indeed, the universal literacy achieved through the efforts of the communist government is an 
undeniable and positive contribution of the party on Polish society. From the modernist 
perspective (Conversi, 2000; 2004), the achievement of universal literacy is a nation-building 
tool aimed at the dissemination of state promoted values. That would undeniably be the case 
with the communist government and its intentions for education. From the ethno-symbolist 
perspective (Smith, 1989, 1991; 1995), education is the process of the dissemination of the 
national high culture across all of the society which facilitates its transformation from a 
lateral ethnie to a vertical ethnie. That process might be facilitated by the state. However, as 
Smith (1989; 1991) argues, nation formation is a historical process that shapes the state, not 
conversely. The case of Poland does confirm Smith’s theory, since Polish culture developed 
long before the PPR/PZPR seized power, and the universal dissemination of national culture 
worked as a unifying factor for the Polish nation. However, the mobilization occurred against 
the regime, not behind it. 
Poland, devastated by the war and struggling with some negative legacies of the 
previous regime, suffered from large illiteracy rates, especially among the adult population 
(Moraczewska, 2010). In the immediate aftermath of the war, the regime needed to focus on 
the reconstruction and enhancement of the existing education structures (Osinski, 2006). As 
soon as the situation in the education system was normalized, the regime turned its attention 
towards achieving high rates of illiteracy. On 7 April 1949, the parliament passed the Bill on 
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eradication of illiteracy. The Bill itself was not devoid of propaganda, since the Article 1 
clearly stated: “in order to eradicate illiteracy, which is the legacy of bourgeois and 
squirearchy rule … social duty of free tuition for illiterates and semi-illiterates is introduced” 
(Dz. U. 1949, nr. 25 poz. 177). The ideological rhetoric cannot, however, overshadow the aim 
– universal literacy, which can only be perceived as a desired and necessary effort 
(Moraczewska, 2010). The nation-wide action included the efforts of the entire education 
sector and the military (Dz. U. 1949, nr. 25 poz. 177, Art. 21, par. 1 and 2), which thought 
adults and children literacy skills in their area of residence. The effort to eradicate illiteracy 
received enormous government support and funding – its budget in 1950 is calculated to be 
approximately 3.5 billion złp. That number does not seem impressive, especially when 
compared to large ministerial budgets mentioned before. However, this program alone had a 
larger budget than the Ministry of Heavy Industry and the Ministry of Mining and Energetics 
combined (Dz. U. 1950 nr. 16 poz. 138), which were the crucial elements of the socialist 
economy (Czubiński, 2000). The enormous funding and effort resulted in the announcement 
Government Plenipotentiary to Combat Illiteracy. Stefan Matuszewski announced on 21 
December 1951 the success of the campaign (Moraczewska, 2010, p. 124). The campaign 
was launched in 1949 lasted for approximately 2.5 years – rather a short period, 
demonstrating the determination of the authorities and serving as an example as their 
undeniable success, a decided positive. 
The consequences of eradicating illiteracy were that every Pole had access to the 
national culture (Moraczewska, 2010). National culture certainly served as a factor that 
strengthened national bonds. Yet as Chapter II has demonstrated, Polish national culture and 
national values like strict adherence to Catholicism and ethno-centrism, were fundamentally 
incompatible with the new socialist/communist regime. Universal literacy allowed for the 
uncontrolled dissemination of national values; in this respect, both from the ethno-symbolist 
and modernist perspectives, the PZPR government initiated a successful nation-building 
policy. It facilitated the completion of the transformation of Poles from a lateral ethnie to a 
vertical one in which all the national culture and national values were easily accessible to 
every member of the society. Contrary to the regime’s expectations, the Poles as a nation 
rejected the communist values, symbols and myths. However, the strict control the regime 
enforced necessitated that Poles develop a dichotomous public/private identity. The public 
one was maintained for pragmatic reasons, to avoid, as T.T. phrased it, “unpleasantness” 
(12.02.2016), while the private identity rejected the regime. By eliminating illiteracy, the 
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regime effectively unified and further homogenized Poles, but in doing so it undermined its 
very own foundations. 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has discussed the two most undeniable achievements of the Polish 
communist regime – free and universal access to education at any level (Kosiński, 2000) and 
the elimination of illiteracy (Moraczewska, 2010). The education system, however, was not 
established and expanded simply to educate the society – it was done to achieve a universal 
indoctrination and aimed at altering the Polish national identity, in line with the regime’s 
ideology. The indoctrination through education proved unsuccessful for four reasons: 1) 
Polish national identity was incompatible with the communist ideology; 2) the memory of the 
Soviet atrocities in Poland was still recent and vivid; 3) teachers and educators, especially in 
the immediate aftermath of war, were affected by these memories and did not enforce state 
promoted values; 4) the official history was verified by the memories and experiences within 
families. The regime was perceived as foreign and its attempts to indoctrinate the society 
were seen as attempts to “Russify” or “sovietise” the society – which can simply be described 
as attempts to de-nationalize Poles. That very fact and its perceived threat mobilized the 
Poles as much as any other external threat in their history. The state was no longer perceived 
to be synonymous with the nation, and values disseminated by the state were opposed. 
Paradoxically, the massive efforts in the education system proved futile. They failed to 
produce the “new mentality” (Kosiński, 2000); instead, they entrenched and magnified the 
features of Polish nationalism and national identity that developed through centuries – 
adherence to Catholicism and ethno-centrism. 
Furthermore, universal access to education and universal literacy provided Poles with 
the means of universal dissemination of the national culture and values. That undeniably 
strengthened the national bonds, allowed access to the national ethos, myths, sages and 
heroes (Smith, 1989). In this respect, the PZPR allowed the Polish nation to access a unified 
set of values and facilitated its transformation into a nation in a modern sense of its meaning 
– one that has a unified and universal set of values and symbols (Smith, 1989; Conversi, 
2004; Anderson, 1983). The post-war Polish government, in this respect, served as a 
facilitator of this process – it provided the means to universalize national values. The set of 
values it tried to instil, in place of the historic ones, was rejected and, moreover, perceived as 
a threat, which further strengthened Polish ethno-based nationalism. Additionally, the party 
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members themselves were Poles, and their national identity and set of national values 
identical with their compatriots. This nationalist sentiment found its way in several attempts 
to retain key parts of the Polish identity in the curriculum. Ultimately, the strength of Polish 
nationalism overpowered communist ideology. Throughout the period between 1944 and 
1956, the PPR/PZPR used nationalist rhetoric, most openly until 1948, but even during the 
ideological offensive launched in 1949 that was to promote “socialism and internationalism” 
(Żaryn, 2009, p. 122), anti-German nationalism still resonated within the official doctrine as 
the “German issue” (APSz, KOSSz, WO, sygn. 3, p. 101). 
The failure of the education system to become a nation-wide indoctrination tool is a 
complex interplay of circumstances, personal and national histories. The new propaganda 
was negatively verified by the national experience of the WWII; those who were directly 
responsible for educating youth neither believed nor enforced the official doctrine; the 
PPR/PZPR members struggled with the incompatibility of Polish nationalism and communist 
ideology; parents and the Catholic Church assumed the role of educators and carriers of the 
national identity. Indoctrination, if such cases were successful, was short=lasting, as the case 
of E.H. demonstrates. By sheer paradox, E.H. later chose the career of a teacher herself; her 
distrust of and opposition to the new system resulting from experiences of her family 
members, caused her to follow the path of T.K, who did “what was expected” while 
disbelieving the entire educational propaganda and not enforcing it. As a result of universal 
education and literacy, the communists strengthened Polish national bonds and unified the 
nation – not behind them, as they planned, but against them. 
 Chapter VII: 
Propaganda 
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Introduction 
 
The communist regime in Poland invested considerable resources into propaganda 
activity (Osęka, 2007). From the beginning of its existence, it struggled to control all forms of 
media within the country and to achieve the monopoly on information in a similar vein to the 
communist regime in USSR (Czubiński, 2000). Such control was not only a trait of a quasi- 
totalitarian regime, but was to serve an additional purpose for the regime. The new political, 
social and economic system, new borders and different ethnic composition (with an 
overwhelming majority of ethnic Poles) implied that Poland was being reinvented anew and 
to this desire the top party officials officially admitted: they were building “new” Poland, 
which had no precedent in history (Berman in Torańska, 1985, p. 599). The new state, as 
previously demonstrated, re-engineered the ethnic composition, created new state rituals and 
symbols, andintroduced a new education system. It also needed to produce new “myths” so 
essential to national narratives (Smith, 1991). Every regime has its founding myth; ancient 
Poland had its myth of a first Piast being chosen by people to be a prince (Labuda, 1991); the 
founding myth of the II Polish Republic was Piłsudski’s declaration of independence on 11 
November 1918, upon his return from Magdeburg (Czubiński, 2000). Polish nationalism, 
through historical experience, developed “historical” foes, Germans and Russians, a 
sentiment immensely reinforced by the experiences of WWII (Zaremba, 2002). 
The new regime that came after 1944, backed, and to a large extent, controlled by the 
Soviets, had to re-develop some traits of Polish nationalism and this was to be achieved by 
omnipresent propaganda; in fact, one of the interviewees claimed that “everything was 
propaganda” (E.H. Personal communication on 18.02.2016). The regime controlled the press 
and the radio (HIA, DSM, sygn. 158, scan 7-8). There were propaganda posters “all around 
the towns” (W.R Personal communication on 13.02.2016) and Film Chronicles screened in 
cinemas outlining the successes of the regime, however, “these [film chronicles] were quite 
popular, as they were not as pushy” (J.K. Personal communication on 05.02.2016). The aim 
of this chapter is to analyse all three aforementioned propagandist media (press, propaganda 
film and posters) and identify their goals, while demonstrating the legitimising use of 
nationalism in the initial period between 1945 and 1948. 
The three major objectives that the regime’s propaganda aimed to achieve were to first 
and foremost establish and propagate the regime’s founding myth –liberation by the Soviet 
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Army achieved by the fraternal struggle of Poles and Russians against Germans. Secondly, 
the regime aimed to discredit the pre-war anti-German guerrilla forces – Home Army mostly 
– and introduce itself as the major force that resisted the German occupation. Thirdly, 
propaganda aimed to instil in society attachment to the so-called Recovered Territories as the 
ancient Polish and “Piast” lands, and finally to promote the new social, political and 
economic system. In these goals it is possible to observe the dual identity of Polish 
communists – most of these objectives derived from, and aimed to enforce, national 
sentiment. Socialism was praised, however; especially in the period between 1945 and 1948, 
it was strongly intertwined in the official propaganda with patriotism. With the growing 
pressure for the sovietisation of Poland, the regime abandoned nationalist sentiments in its 
propaganda; however, with the gradual erosion of the regime post-1953, nationalist elements 
gradually returned to the official narrative, to be finally re-introduced in 1956 (Eisler, 2015). 
Friendship with USSR and hostility towards the West 
 
As members of a Soviet-installed and backed regime, Polish communists from early 
on used propaganda to glorify the Polish-Soviet “friendship”. The USSR, Soviet Army and 
Joseph Stalin appear frequently, with a positive commentary – in many cases economic and 
military assistance – in communist-controlled media. The first number of newly established 
newspaper – the Workers’ Tribune (Trybuna Robotnicza, here after TR) on 1 January 1945 
reported on the “USSR’s beautiful gift for Warsaw – 50 000 tonnes of flour,” an “expression 
of deepest and most sincere friendship of the nations of USSR to the Polish nation” (TR, 1945 
nr. 1-1/12, p. 2). The next day. the newspaper openly played a nationalist and revanchist tune 
by using slogans like “the Great Revenge approaches” and “death to germans [sic]” (TR, 
1945, nr. 2-2/12). Such blend of praise of the USSR and hatred for Germans appears 
frequently in communist propaganda. The USSR “hurrying to aid the Polish people” by 
sending medical supplies (TR, 1945 nr. 3-3/12, p. 1) is contrasted with “devils from hell” and 
“servants of internationalist bourgeoisie [Germans]” (TR, 1945 nr. 3-3/12, p. 2). The same 
cheerful approach to the Soviet Union is expressed in early film chronicles, which reported on 
the signing of the Polish-Soviet treaty of mutual assistance where the Prime Minister Edward 
Osóbka-Morawski claims the pact was only “a formal acknowledgement of this friendship 
and cooperation that has been born and that grows stronger every day. Long live the eternal 
friendship of Polish and Soviet nations! Long live the great Soviet Union!” (PKF 45/8). 
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As the German defeat approached, the Soviet Union and the Soviet Army assumed a 
role not only of “friends” but also liberators that “saved Europe’s civilisation from fascist 
organisers of [anti-Jewish] pogroms” (TR, 1945, nr. 67-1/29). On the 5th  May the TR 
published an anonymous account of a “first encounter” written by H.Z. where he claimed he 
immediately recognized a Soviet officer but “not from his uniform, or his beret, but from his 
face, his eyes that were good and cheerful” (TR, 1945 nr. 70-4/29, p. 3). The “cheerful” figure 
of a Soviet officer served to reinforce the image of USSR as a “stronghold of peace and 
freedom” (TR, 1945 nr. 255-7/30, p. 3). In 1946 the propaganda still officially praised the 
USSR and its army and proliferated the anti-German sentiment, but the new element was 
introduced – reports of crises and turmoil in the west, particularly in the US (TR 1946 nr. 3- 
3/31, p. 2; nr. 4-4/31, p. 3) and also mentions that the pope “prayed for germans [sic]” (TR, 
1946 nr. 4-4/31, p.4). Britain was accused of “whipping up a majority with the use of the 
military, police and fraud” in the Greek elections (TR 1946 nr. 91—28/28, p. 1). 
Simultaneously, the newspaper criticized the Allies for objections concerning the treatment of 
Germans being resettled from Poland (TR, 1946 nr.3-3/31, p. 3). 
In 1947, the October Revolution received substantial attention of the press for the first 
time in the regime press (TR, 1947 nr, 307-7/29, p. 1). In 1948, the regime propaganda was 
largely focused on the upcoming merger of the Polish Workers’ and Polish Socialist Parties; 
however, the Soviet Union was still praised as “the strongest guarantee of her [Poland’s] 
independence” (TR, 1948, nr.192-7/29, p. 5). In 1949, the TR dedicated the entire number to 
the Soviet Army on the anniversary of its creation (23.02), while in previous years it received 
only a small mention. From 1949 onwards, the propaganda became much more forceful and 
openly praising of Stalin, which was not the case between 1945 and 1948. Claims such as 
“Stalin is our leader and guide, thus our ideals, our ranks, invincible” (TR, 1950 nr. 200-1/45, 
p. 2) were made. Stalin also appeared on propaganda poster, alongside Bierut, with text 
claiming that “Polish-Soviet friendship is peace, independence and happy tomorrow of our 
Fatherland” (see fig. K1). At the same time, anti-Western propaganda assumed a sharper tone. 
On one of the posters, Truman and Eisenhower lean over Mein Kampf and the caption reads 
“teaching has not gone to waste” (see fig. K2). The visual outlay of these posters aimed to 
evoke certain feelings. Figures of Stalin and Bierut appear stately, against a backdrop of the 
Polish and Soviet flags, blue sky and a silhouette of the Soviet style skyscraper (most likely 
the future Palace of Culture and Science), while Truman and Eisenhower are caricatured, 
sharply contoured and sinister. 
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In 1949, Radio Free Europe was established and in 1952 the Polish section was 
created (HIA, Dokumenty Stanisława Mikołajczyka), which was also manifest in the regime’s 
anti-western propaganda. On one poster, the radio transmitter is placed in the jaws of a dark 
sinister creature, wearing a German helmet with a swastika on it. The commentary reads “An 
idiot who listens with such bliss. Whom does he help? Our mortal enemies.” On another 
poster, a speaker of Radio Free Europe’s head is filled with contents of flasks labelled 
“blackmail”, “lies”, “mendacity”, “gossip” and “slander” (see fig. K3 & K4). On the other 
hand, the regime-issued posters that encouraged people to read soviet magazines “as they 
facilitate the realisation of the six-year plan” and that “the Polish nation sees the Soviet Union 
as a bastion of peace and progress” (see fig. K5). A different poster from 1954represents the 
Soviet Union as a white dove of peace (see fig. K6). Yet another feature in Polish communist 
propaganda was the Colorado potato beetle, presented as “provocation of warmongers” (the 
capitalist West, namely the United States, PKF 50/25) who sabotaged Polish crops. 
The relationship with the USSR and hostility towards the West were presented mostly 
in the press and propaganda posters. The Polish Film Chronicles (Polskie Korniki Filmowe – 
PKF) do feature anti-Western propaganda; however, its intensity cannot compete with images 
presented in press or on posters. Similarly, the pro-Soviet propaganda was as J.K put it “not 
as pushy” in the Film Chronicles (05.02.2016). The Chronicles mention “stout-hearted 
fellows from Murmansk” (PKF 46/20), but the image of the USSR in those short 
documentaries seem to focus on industrial efforts in the USSR, like irrigation of the Kara- 
Kum (PKF 48/04), Magnitogorsk industrial complex (PKF 47/04), monetary reform (PKF 
48/05), fishing (PKF 49/29) or the re-building and expansion of Moscow (PKF 49/31). It 
presents an image of industrial grandeur, without a praising commentary in most cases. The 
ostentatious praise of the Soviet Union and Stalin can only be observed in a documentary 
concerning the death of Joseph Stalin (the longest documentary of that kind of the period – 26 
minutes of running time) in 1953, where Stalin was called “our best and wisest friend” (PKF 
53/11-12) and the Soviet Union depicted as a model for future developments in Poland. After 
his death, in honour of The Great Ensign of Peace and the Marshal of the Revolution (TR, 
1951 nr. 50-23/32, p. 1), one of Polish industrial centres, Katowice, was even renamed as 
Stalinogród (City of Stalin). 
The anti-Western and pro-Soviet propaganda was not the only lip-service to the 
USSR. Through the images and examples of Soviet help and assistance to Poland and through 
the portrayal of the sinister (often compared to Hitlerist) and warmongering attitudes of the 
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West, the communist regime attempted to legitimise and propagate the founding myth of 
People’s Poland – a friendship between the Polish and Soviet nations that developed 
throughout the war and the subsequent liberation of Poland by the Soviet army. The positive 
image of the USSR and its army aimed also on minimising the negative attitude that resulted 
from a strong Soviet military presence in Poland. 
Regime self-presentation 
 
Patriotism and anti-German underground 
 
As a foreign-backed regime, whose top members fled Poland for Soviet Union in 
1939 (Esiler, 2015), communists felt alien, isolated and vulnerable to claims of illegitimacy. 
Thus, the official regime propaganda aimed to present the communist efforts in the anti- 
German struggle, while discrediting the major resistance movement of WWII in Poland – the 
Home Army (Armia Krajowa – AK). The communist paramilitary formation the People’s 
Army (Armia Ludowa – AL) was a rather small and insignificant guerrilla force. Norman 
Davies claimed that it had never exceeded 100 000 troops (1999, p. 926), while Gontarczyk 
argues the entire communist underground totalled 5 000 men, and only about 3000 of them 
fought in the People’s Army (2013, p. 339), while the Home Army at its peak enlisted 300 
000 troops (Muzeum AK). Therefore, the regime attempted to inflate its role in the anti- 
German resistance movement. The most famous poster aimed to achieve that presented the 
comparison between the People’s Army and the Home Army. The communist guerrilla force 
is presented as a “giant” and the Home Army as a “damn reactionary midget” (see fig. K7), 
implying that the communist guerrilla forces vastly outnumbered the Home Army and played 
a much bigger role in the resistance movement. The anti-German guerrillas did not cease to 
exist after the end of the war; they remained in conspiracy and fought the communist regime 
(Prażmowska, 2008). In an attempt to discredit these troops, communists presented them as 
Nazi collaborators who continued the Hitlerist tradition. On one poster, they are presented in 
German uniforms, wearing swastika bands on their shoulders and one of them even has an 
appearance of the most dreaded SS Totenkopf uniform. The press reported on “fratricide as a 
proof of bestiality of Polish reactionaries” (TR, 1945 nr. 190-3/30, p. 3) or that “reactionaries 
took orders from germans [sic]” (TR, 1945 nr. 191-4/30, p. 2). Such attempts not only aimed 
to discredit the non-communist guerrillas; the top party officials during the period of up to 
1943 supervised a special tasks unit, whose main purpose was to gather intelligence 
(movements, names and addresses) about the Home Army and deliver it to the Gestapo (HIA, 
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DSM, sygn. 158, scan 433); thus, these attempts can also be viewed as an attempt to divert 
attention. 
At the same time, the regime’s press published reports outlining the anti-German 
struggle of the communists giving an overall account (TR, 1945 nr. 6-6/12, p. 1) and in 
specific cases, like economic sabotage in Nowa Wieś (TR, 1945 nr. 7-7/12, p. 2). The TR 
often published slogans like “the PPR (Polish Workers’ Party) – party of the working class, 
champion of national liberation” (1945 nr. 67-1/29, p. 5). The film chronicles celebrated the 
communist military effort of the Kościuszko Division (Soviet sponsored Polish division 
within the Red Army, formed on the USSR territory) at the battle of Lenino in 1945. These 
soldiers marched “straight towards Poland” and did not “soil the banner carrying our slogans: 
‘Honor and fatherland, for our and your freedom’” (PKF 45/30). At the same time, the regime 
praised labour and appealed to a sense of national solidarity through slogans like “every good 
Pole should cooperate on rebuilding the State” (TR, 1945nr. 71-5/29, p. 1) or “the 
reconstruction of the state in its new borders rushes thorough the blood of every Polish 
patriot” (TR, 1946 nr. 3-3/31, p. 3). It is possible to observe that the communists in the initial 
period appealed frequently to the national and patriotic sentiments of Poles, while at the same 
time presenting themselves as fighters for national liberation, inflating their role in liberating 
the country in an attempt to project the image of the regime being a patriotic “camp of 
progress” set against “the camp of obscurantism” (TR, 1946 nr. 115-26/28, p. 3). 
Comparison with the pre-war regime and praise of socialism 
 
The new regime, through its propaganda, attempted to discredit the government of 
pre-war Poland and justify and strengthen its position through comparisons with the previous 
regime that was always presented in a negative way. An essential part of that appeal was the 
post war reconstruction of Poland devastated by the war. The call for a rebuilding effort 
struck a patriotic tone from the very beginning such as when the film chronicles announced 
the rebuilding of the city of Białystok and claimed that “while the Polish soldier fights for 
motherland, you shall rebuild her!” (PKF 45/03). The claim was supported by the press, 
which announced that “we [the new government] shall rebuild [Poland] faster and more justly 
than others” (TR, 1945 nr. 72-6/29, p. 1). The rebuilding of Warsaw, nearly levelled to the 
ground after the uprising of 1944, was among the first announcements that the government 
had made in 1945 (PKF 45/04). The post-war reconstruction of Warsaw was indeed a great 
endeavour undertaken by the communists and, to boost national pride, the regime announced 
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that “the entire world admires Poland” (TR, 1945 nr. 301-23/29, p. 1) for her efforts. The 
rebuilding of Warsaw assumed a very important position in regime’s self-portrayal. On 
various occasions, like in the case of building the so called Marszałkowska Residential 
District (Marszałkowska Dzielnica Mieszkaniowa – MDM), the regime’s propaganda boasted 
that the MDM would house 45 000 people,” 200 magnificent stores, 11 schools, 2 hospitals, 4 
cinemas, 5 theatres, 3 stations of the underground rail”; new houses would have “all the 
features of modern house living”, all of course in stark contrast to pre-war Warsaw (PKF 
50/36). In some cases, the regime propagated promises that it would not or simply could not 
keep, like the rebuilding of the Royal Castle announced in 1950 with intended completion in 
1954 (PKF 50/26) (itonly materialised in 1970) or construction of metro for “socialist 
Warsaw” (PKF 51/02), which was completed after the fall of the regime. Nevertheless, these 
grand projects appealed to national pride, like the Royal Castle, and allowed the regime to 
compare itself positively with the pre-war regime. 
Such comparisons were not only present in the plain of large state projects. The 
regime used every opportunity to emphasize social achievements and improvements it 
introduced, which can be frequently observed in propaganda. In 1946, the regime announced 
that holidays in Spas was no longer “a privilege of the chosen few” (PKF 46/21). New 
practice “children colonies” were introduced and the regime quickly announced that “never 
before has childcare assumed such scale” since half-a-million children took part in these 
holiday excursions (PKF 46/26). State-sponsored seaside holidays for children became yet 
another occasion to discredit the pre-war regime since “many would spend their lives not 
even having a glimpse at the sea in previous Poland” (PKF 51/30). Such comparisons 
concerned every aspect of life in new Poland. Rzeszów, for example, “before the war was a 
neglected little town with narrow streets and awry houses” but in new Poland “old houses 
were demolished, in their place rise modern residential districts” and the city begun its rapid 
industrialisation (PKF 52/03). Electrification of the countryside was presented as yet another 
improvement unachievable in the pre-war Poland (PKF 46/36), which also failed to educate 
its population, leaving the communists to deal with “shameful legacy of capitalist rule”, 
which of course was dealt with swiftly and effectively (PKF 50/44). Even the workers 
previously neglected by the state got the care they deserved, like miners who had an 
unlimited access to Wincenty Pstrowski’s Preventorium for black lung disease. The chronicle 
emphasizes that in most cases patients were repatriates from France where conditions in 
mines were much worse and black lung disease rated six times higher (PKF 50/16). 
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The new regime presented itself in a positive light compared to the previous regime; 
national appeals appear frequently throughout the entire period between 1944 and 1956, even 
after the official nationalist rhetoric was abandoned by the party post-1948. Examples of 
improvements aimed to demonstrate not only the superiority of the socialist system over 
capitalism, to present it as a better alternative for Poles as a nation. However, while still 
carrying an ideological charge, official propaganda attempted to appeal to national sentiments 
and present the new system as one that aimed to advance and improve the national cause. 
Recovered Territories 
 
The post-war borders of Poland, as mentioned in previous chapters, were different 
from the pre-1939 ones. Poland lost a significant portion of her territories in the East and was 
compensated with German territories of Silesia, Pomerania and part of East Prussia. The 
recovered territories played a major role in the regime’s propaganda. In order to justify these 
territorial changes, the regime resorted to references from Polish medieval history. These 
lands were presented as “anciently Polish” and “returning to the Motherland after centuries of 
German occupation” (PKF 45/05; 45/12). Rather than conquered, these territories were 
presented as “liberated” (TR, 1946 nr. 1-1/31, p. 2). References to ancient Piast lands were 
made with claims of Poland returning “to the sea” (PKF 45/07). On one propaganda poster, 
the figure of the first Polish king – Bolesław Chrobry (the Brave) – stands against a backdrop 
presenting new Polish borders with a commentary “we have not been here since yesterday, we 
used to reach far into the West” (see fig. K9). References to the Piast legacy (see fig. K10) 
and following the “trail of Wrymouth”, Polish prince Bolesław Krzywousty (Wrymouth) 
ruled in the 12th century known for his wars with Germany, see fig. K11). Sometimes the 
propaganda stretched Polish historical borders to Szczecin (Stettin – only briefly within the 
Polish state in 10-11th centuries), calling it “the bastion of Bolesławs [greatest early medieval 
Polish rulers carried that name]” (see fig. K12). 
The emphasis was also placed of Recovered Territories’ importance to national 
economy (PKF 45/22) and appeals were made to encourage Polish settlement on these 
territories; as one chronicle presented it, these “territories torn away from the enemy need to 
be rejuvenated by a stream of Polishness” and it was in “the West that the future of the 
[Polish] Republic would be decided” (PKF 45/18). In order to emphasize the success of the 
regime, the propaganda focused on displaying Polish successes mostly in the Recovered 
Territories. Thus, “Polish engineering thought” triumphed in Wałbrzych’s coking plant 
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“Bolesław Chrobry” (PKF 49/22) and first female wójt [communal administrator], Helena 
Wytrwał, was nominated in Lower Silesia to present the social progress and emancipation of 
women (PKF 49/07). The regime encouraged migration to Recovered Territories, especially 
agricultural, claiming that farmers would receive more and better land (PKF 47/20). On 
another occasion in 1947 the official propaganda boasted that 6 million Poles worked on the 
Recovered Territories, which “sealed the Polishness of these lands” (PKF 47/18). In 1948 the 
regime organised a large propaganda event – the Exhibition of Recovered Territories (PKF 
48/33), which aimed to demonstrate the Polish history and achievements on these lands. The 
announcing poster alluded to the ancient Slavic mythology – the cuboid pole showing an 
eagle and workers on its left facet and a face on the right (see Ap. I Fig. 13) is an obvious 
allusion to the ancient Slavic god Svetovid, who was represented in a cuboid form with four 
faces directed to four sides of the world. Such an iconographic depiction served to emphasize 
the ancient Polish claim to these lands. The propaganda concerning the Recovered Territories 
was primarily driven by nationalist tones, emphasizing Polish victory over the German 
occupants, yielding territorial gains (while the lost territories in the East received no 
mention). Furthermore, the expulsion of Germans is also portrayed in the regime’s 
propaganda; one of the film chronicles fares well to Germans “for ever” (PKF 46/10), 
emphasising the totality of Polish victory and its security – an outright appeal to nationalism 
Attitudes and responses 
 
Propaganda served three major purposes – to convince Poles of Polish Soviet 
friendship; to promote the regime trough negative comparisons with the pre-war regime; and 
to instil a sense of attachment to Poland’s new western borders. To all these, aspects the 
regime payed a considerable attention and resources through the press, posters and 
documentary films. Openly nationalist tunes and appeals aimed to reach a wider audience in a 
society that was, in general, rather suspicious of the new regime. 
The first purpose of the propaganda – inspiring positive feelings towards USSR, 
Soviet Army and leadership – was a complete failure of the regime. As J.K. recalls, “the 
hatred towards the Soviets was widespread” (Personal communication on 05.02.2016). 
Stanisław Mikołajczyk’s secret informant in Poland reported that “hatred towards Russians in 
Poland is simply frightening and is present in all social echelons and classes” (HIA, DSM, 
sygn. 158, scan 9). The fear of persecution for open defiance resulted in official compliance, 
while anti-Soviet humour was widespread as a form of defiance. Mikołajczyk’s informant 
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gives an example of a joke circulating in late 1940s “Why all the dredges have been removed 
from Vistula? They will be used to deepen Polish-Soviet friendship” (HIA, DSM, sygn. 158, 
scan 140). J.U. claimed that “no one believed that Soviets were our friends” (Personal 
communication on 13.02.2016). The failure of this propaganda objective was confirmed by 
the overall results of the ethnographic study; the author encountered only one out of 3) 
interviewees positively inclined towards “Polish-Soviet friendship”; the remainder displayed 
outwardly negative attitudes as far as the USSR was concerned. 
Secondly, the government attempted to present itself in a favourable light in order to 
gain popular acceptance. In this case, the communists also failed to achieve their goal. The 
main protégées of the regime – peasants and workers “hated the regime” (HIA, DSM, sygn. 
158, scan 10). The dual identity was probably the most apparent in this case, as even party 
officials, after shouting propaganda slogans from the tribunes, “‘took skin off’ and mocked 
their own slogans’” (HIA, DSM, sygn. 158, scan 10). The president, Bolesław Bierut, was one 
of “the most hated men in the country” (T.K. Personal communication 12.02.2016). Yet the 
fear of persecution in this case revealed the dual identity among Poles – officially compliant, 
some “were even forgiven for joining the party, if they did not dob in their neighbours” (HIA, 
DSM, sygn. 158, scan 10). Yet again, humour served as a means of private defiance. Jokes 
like “what’s the difference between a cloth and the government? You can wipe your hands 
with a cloth and your ass with the government” or “Where does comrade Bierut live? At the 
rear of Marshall Stalin’s” (HIA, DSM, sygn. 158, scan 15). Ethnographic interviews revealed 
even more radical opinions. J.K. called the regime “those red sons of bitches” or “that red 
plague” (Personal communication on 05.02.2016); others like T.K. or 
E.H. used the word “traitors” (Personal communications on 12 and 18.02.2016). Most likely, 
the hardship of everyday life stood in stark contrast to the official propaganda. One of 
Mikołajczyk’s informants claimed that, under the communist regime in Poland, “the social 
gains of the working class vane” and poverty and exploitation are widespread (HIA, DSM, 
sygn. 158, scan 68). Even the nationalist undertones of the regime’s propaganda, could not 
win them widespread support. However, it is important to notice that Władysław Gomułka 
was widely popular on account of his defiance of Stalin; the popular opinion about him was 
that “Gomułka was a communist, but a Polish communist”. Thus the nation responded 
positively to expressions of nationalism, even when they came from top- ranking communist 
officials. 
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The only propaganda success of the regime could be observed in reference to the 
Recovered Territories. As early as January 1949, there were reports of “growing attachment 
to the Recovered Territories” (HIA, DSM, sygn. 158, scan 73). It is rather difficult, however, 
to solely contribute this success to communist propaganda. E. H’s claim probably best 
described the general sentiment of these lands as “a compensation [for territories in the East] 
we deserved. Furthermore, there is physical evidence testifying that these lands were Polish 
once” (18.02.2016). Most likely, the propaganda’s success was due to the fact that the point 
of view it tried to present was not so farfetched and the general population could not easily 
gague its falsity. However, as E.H. claimed, there were buildings all across these territories 
that could be identified as Polish since they were commissioned by Piast princes and 
completed while these land still had both political, cultural and ethnic ties with Poland – 
various Piast necropolises being an example. Furthermore, it appealed to Poland’s past, with 
all her myths and traditions. This area of the regime propaganda was solely nationalist in its 
substance, and thus could appeal more easily to larger portion of the population. 
Conclusion 
 
Communist propaganda in Poland was largely rejected. Only the narrative of the 
Recovered Territories gained popularity. The main issue, however, is that propaganda 
contained nationalist undertones throughout the period between 1944 and 1956. After 1948, 
the party might have fought for “peace and socialism” but it was always paired with the 
“greatness of our beloved Fatherland” (TR, 1951 nr. 118-1/35, p. 1). Polish communists did 
not try to promote solely the ideology of either socialism or nationalism. An analysis of the 
regime’s propaganda reveals a blend of socialist/communist ideology and advancement of the 
national cause. The regime emphasized Poland’s political isolation before the war and 
believed this to be the root cause of the defeat in 1939. The new ally was also Poland’s 
protector, and thus contributed to national security (TR, 1946 nr.1-1/31, p. 2). After the war, 
the regime could exploit two sentiments, anti-German and anti-Western, and such attempts 
are observable in the official regime narrative. However, even appeals to nationalism were 
not successful in many cases. The monopoly on information was not equal to shaping reality. 
Millions of Poles were exposed to harsh and worsening economic conditions, which was 
expressed in a popular joke “Why is it so bad if it is so good?” (J.K. 05.02.2016). Millions of 
Poles repatriated from the Soviet Union, or who survived the occupation of eastern 
borderlands between 1939 and 1941, were living testimonies to falsity of official propaganda. 
Poles were also exposed to Soviet troops stationed in Poland and the image of a good and 
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cheerful Soviet officer could not stand against the commonly observed image of “drunk 
brutes” (W.R. 13.02.2016). Moreover, as reports from Poland suggest, many party officials 
did not take the propaganda slogans seriously; they performed their official duty, but even to 
them, most propaganda appeared absurd and they mocked it. While an attitude of official 
compliance and obedience was prevalent in the public sphere, numerous anti-regime jokes 
confirmed the private resistance, if only in humour. The propaganda as a nation-building tool 
failed: rather than uniting the people with the regime through numerous appeals to national 
values and patriotism, it united the nation in mockery of it. The only plausible narrative, that 
of Recovered Territories, gained popularity, this can be ascribed to popular acceptance of fait 
accompli, since Poland was in no position to overturn these changes, and to the fact that it 
appealed to the distant history of independence and medieval grandeur, striking openly 
nationalist tones. Only these tones resonated successfully with Poles. 
 Chapter VIII: Church 
and State 
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Introduction 
 
The post-1944 regime, advocating the Marxist and materialist doctrine, had a very 
complex and strained relationship with Polish religious institutions and with the Catholic 
Church in particular. The antipathy of the Catholic Church was the only consistent policy 
pursued by the Polish communist government, although the struggle varied in its intensity 
and tactics, depending on political and social circumstances (Dudek & Gryz, 2003). The issue 
of relations between the Church and the State in Poland has received considerable academic 
attention, which resulted in analyses of both the Stalinist period (Fijałkowska, 1999; 
Noszczak, 2008) and of the entire communist period (Dudek & Gryz, 2003; Żaryn, 2004). 
During both the Stalinist period and post-1956, the regime attempted to eradicate any 
influence of religion in public life (and that was not limited to the Catholic Church) and to 
establish a new secular identity, as Jakub Berman asserted when interviewed by Torańska 
(1985). The attitude towards the Catholic Church (and other Christian denominations) in the 
period investigated by this dissertation can be divided in two distinct chronological phases: 
first the period of tolerance and cooperation during the consolidation of the regime (1944- 
1948) followed by a period of open persecution, the destruction of Church’s agency, and its 
subjugation to the state (1949-1956). The turbulent events of 1956 allowed the Church to 
regain and reassert its position within the Polish society, as well as forcing the state to 
abandon once and for all the tactic of open confrontation and persecution, which was 
replaced by tactics of surveillance and invigilation (Żaryn, 2004). 
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the two distinct phases of communist 
tactics towards the Catholic Church and other Christian denominations and link them to the 
nation-building project launched by the communists in 1944. The dual identity in the case of 
Church and state relations did not manifest itself in a deviation from the Soviet model but 
rather on an individual level. While the state pursued and enforced anti-religious policies, 
individual members of the party administration cultivated Catholic traditions in secret and 
defiance of official party guidelines (Musiał & Szarek,2008). Acknowledging the existence 
of other strains of Christianity, this chapter will focus mainly on Catholicism, as it was both 
statistically (Noszczak, 2008) and historically (Dudek & Gryz, 2003) the most significant in 
Polish history. In order to investigate this issue, this chapter will provide an historical 
overview of developments that elevated the Catholic Church in Polish society prior to 1944. 
This chapter will then examine the persecution phase, which climaxed in 1953 and finally 
failed in 1956.  Illustrating the important point to draw out of these two phases is the 
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communist party’s realisation of the inevitability of its dual identity; the persecution and 
effective elimination of religious influence from the public sphere was an essential part of the 
communist project, rejected by Polish society and moderated by the authorities post-1956. 
Historical overview 
 
The origins of Polish statehood are closely intertwined with Catholicism. The first 
historic ruler of Poland – Mieszko I – was baptised in 966, thus launching the Christianisation 
of his domain (Labuda, 1999). Even the first official document mentioning the Polish state 
can be found in the Vatican Archives – known as Dagome iudex. In this document from 
about 991, a duke called “Misca” offers his state (called Schinesghe) under the protection of 
the Holy See; the historical coincidence of dates allow us to probably identify Misca as 
Mieszko (Labuda, 1999, p. 160-161). In year 1000, the Polish state received its own 
ecclesiastical metropolis, based in Gniezno, and church administration in form of bishoprics 
were established in Kraków, Kołobrzeg and Wrocław, with the additional bishopric in 
Poznań, directly controlled by the Holy See existing from 968, confirming the political 
independence of the Polish state (Banaszak, 1989, p. 55). Further co-existence of the Church 
and state followed in a pattern similar to other European countries (Labuda, 1999). 
The next milestone in the Church-state relations occurred in the 14th century, with the 
personal union between Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Prior to union with 
Poland, Lithuanian monarchs followed paganism, however their dominion stretched over vast 
territories inhabited by followers of the Orthodox Church (Jasienica, 1963/2008). The Polish 
clergy was charged with the task of Christianisation, thus expanding its influence eastwards. 
However, the Polish-Lithuanian union warranted that the state (established as formal 
federation by 1569) become religiously diversified, which became even more significant with 
the period of Reformation. Long-lasting religious diversity warranted that the period of 
religious Reformation was not marked with violence and persecution, which contrasted the 
patterns observed anywhere else in Europe at that time (Tazbir, 1967). By the second half of 
the 16th century, another event served to reinforce the role of the Catholic Church in Poland - 
the death of the last male heir of the Jagiellonian dynasty in 1572, beginning the period of 
elected monarchs until the third partition of Poland in 1795. During that period, monarchical 
succession was not determined by primogeniture, but by the will of the nobility (szlachta), 
who elected the king after his predecessor’s death (Jasienica, 1963/2008). With the death of 
the last Jagiellon in 1572, the question arose, who should formally serve as the sovereign in 
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the absence of a king (interregnum)? This task was entrusted to the Polish Primate 
(archbishop of Gniezno), who would serve as interrex during every interregnum that 
occurred post-1572 and periodically fused the religious and secular authority, while the 
Catholic hierarchy served as a custodian of state integrity (Jasienica, 1963/2008). 
 
 
As an ethnically and religiously diverse state, Poland was susceptible to calls of 
unification and these were provided by the Catholic Church and the counter-Reformation 
(Tazbir, 1982, p. 50). In fact, such attempts at religious unification were effected in 1596 by 
Union of Brześć (Jasienica, 1967/2007a). The union warranted that the Orthodox Church 
within the Polish-Lithuanian state should keep its rites, calendar and language, while 
accepting the primacy of Rome. Likowski argues that, by the end of the 17th century, all 
Orthodox hierarchs within the borders of the Polish-Lithuanian state joined the union (1907, 
p. 337) and his conclusion is supported by Kłoczkowski (1992), who however argues that the 
partitions and more than a hundred years of persecution were able to some extent revert the 
gains of the 1596 union of Churches. 
In the turbulent 17th century, Poland-Lithuania was invaded by non-Catholic powers 
like Sweden, Russia and the Ottoman Empire (Jasienica 1967/2007a and b), which served ro 
reinforce Catholic identity (Smith, 1991). Following the last partition of Poland, the Church 
served as a reminder of lost statehood and as a protector of national values (Prażmowska, 
2011); the Catholic Church was always supportive and often engaged in Polish struggle for 
independence (Banaszak, 1991). With such a deep historical and cultural history, it was 
natural that the Catholic Church would assume a significant role in the new Polish state that 
re-emerged after 1918, The most obvious expression of the close relationship between 
Church and State was the concordat signed between the Republic of Poland and the Holy See 
on 10 February 1925 and ratified on 23 April the same year (Dz. U. 1925 nr. 47 poz. 324). 
The terms of the Concordat were probably the most favourable in Europe (Rzepecki, 2011). 
Article I allowed the Church to “freely exercise its ecclesiastical authority and jurisdiction as 
well as administration of its affairs and its property according to God’s and canon law” 
(reference). Article II allowed for free communication between Polish clergy and the Vatican 
and issuing of pastoral letters and directives. The government obliged itself to assist in 
carrying out the ecclesiastical decrees under Article IV, on the other side the Holy See agreed 
under Article IX that “no part of the Republic of Poland should not belong to a bishop whose 
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seat is located outside the borders of the Polish State” and while asserting that the nomination 
of bishops and archbishops is a prerogative solely reserved to the Pope “His Holiness agreed 
to consult the President of the Republic before nominating … to assure the President has no 
issues, of political nature, to raise against that nomination” in Article XI. 
These conditions ensured that the Catholic Church played an important role in Polish 
social and political life. The Concordat of 1925 embodied these traditions and reaffirmed the 
role of the Church. The communist project launched in Poland after 1944 had to take the 
Catholic Church into its political and social calculations, having in mind its prominence in 
Poland. The new project, although infused with ethnically based nationalism, drew heavily 
from Marxist doctrine, which was irreconcilable with religion (Kenez, 2003, p. 887). Thus, 
the government would display hostility towards the Church from the very beginning of its 
existence and eventually engage in a struggle with the Catholic Church: a struggle that would 
last until the fall of the communist regime in Poland in which the Church played a significant 
role (Żaryn, 2004). 
Marx’s critique of religion and papacy’s critique of socialism 
 
The relationship between the Marxist ideology and religion wasmarked by hostility 
from the very beginning of the Marxist movement. It was Karl Marx who famously called 
religion the “opium of the people” (Marx, 1844, p. x). In his critique he not only focused on 
Catholicism, but on all religious cults, claiming they provided an “illusory happiness” and a 
distraction from the real problems the workers faced (Marx, 1844). In his article concerning 
the Jewish question in Europe, he maintained that religion would always oppose the 
revolutionary movement and concluded “how is religious opposition made impossible? By 
abolishing religion” (Marx, 1844a). In his Capital vol. 1 (Chapter I, Section 4) Marx directly 
linked religion to the “bourgeois” system and argued that abolition of the old regime required 
the abolition of the cults it had produced. Therefore, anti-religious attitude was at the very 
core of Marxist ideals, warranting that states adopting the Marx’s doctrine would also, by 
default, attempt to eliminate religion from public life. 
If Marx’s doctrine was openly anti-religious, then Catholic doctrine was equally anti- 
Marxist and anti-socialist. There are three papal encyclicals openly condemning the Marxist- 
inspired socialist movement: Quod Apostolici Muneris, Rerum Novarum and Quadragesimo 
Anno. The first one, published in 1878, is blatantly clear on the papacy’s stand on the matter. 
Leo XIII claimed that: 
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the deadly plague that is creeping into the very fibers of human society and leading it 
on to the verge of destruction (…) We speak of that sect of men who, under various 
and almost barbarous names, are called socialists, communists, or nihilists. (1878, sec. 
1). 
In Rerum Novarum, Leo XIII contemplated the hard conditions of workers, yet the socialist 
doctrine is for him a “remedy … manifestly against justice” (1891, sec. 6). In Quadragesimo 
Anno, published exactly 40 years after Rerum Novarum, Pius XI argued that socialism and 
Catholicism cannot coexist, although acknowledging some of its beneficial aspects, which 
are, however, not specified: 
If Socialism, like all errors, contains some truth (which, moreover, the Supreme 
Pontiffs have never denied), it is based nevertheless on a theory of human society 
peculiar to itself and irreconcilable with true Christianity. Religious socialism, 
Christian socialism, are contradictory terms; no one can be at the same time a good 
Catholic and a true socialist (1931, sec. 120). 
It is therefore evident not only that Marxism and socialism were against religion, but that 
Catholicism was vehemently anti-socialist and anti-Marxist; their coexistence within a state 
was impossible and they were bound to clash. Since Catholicism was so strong in Poland, and 
the episcopate loyal and freely communicating with the Vatican (under the terms of 1925 
Concordat), it was likely to oppose the new regime. 
The initial period (1944-1948) 
 
Legislation, propaganda and agencies dealing with the Church 
 
The position of the Catholic Church within the context of the post-war changes was 
most aptly summarised by Stefan Kisielewski, who argued that “communists, and 
furthermore Russian leaders, realized the importance of the Church in Polish life and 
understood that without the Church no Polish statehood, even the Marxist-socialist one, could 
not be built. At all, let alone in those times” (1990, pp. 72-3). Indeed, before the communists 
could consolidate their power, they followed a policy of non-confrontation (at least on a large 
scale) with the Catholic Church. In 1945, Bierut was supposed to have said “that no-one will 
persecute the Church in Poland” and that he himself had to attend mass every now and then 
(Łukasiewicz, 1987, p. 40) This section will thus explore the Communist government’s 
tactics and relations with the Church during the period of consolidation of power, during 
which time 
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the Catholic Church and the (officially) Marxist state coexisted rather peacefully and in fact, 
the Catholic Church proved instrumental in securing the Recovered Territories by 
establishing ecclesiastical structures for the regime (Jaworska, 2013). 
The policy of non-confrontation was first expressed at the very beginning of the new 
regime and within one of its central aims – land reform. The decree on land reform issued by 
the Polish Committee of National Liberation openly stated that “the legal status of the landed 
estates belonging to the Catholic Church, or other religious communes, shall be determined 
by the Legislative Sejm” (Dz. U. 1944 nr. 4 poz. 17). Thus, for the time being, the      
religious property remained unaffected by nationalisation. However, soon after that apparent 
declaration of non-confrontation, the government unilaterally broke the Concordat of 1925, 
motivated by the fact that pope Pius XII appointed the bishop of Danzig Carl Maria Splett as 
Apostolic Administrator of Chełmno diocese. There was also and Apostolic Administrator for 
German Catholics appointed to Gniezno-Poznań archdiocese. The government claimed that 
this was a blatant violation of the Concordat, namely Article X, which expressly forbade any 
foreign bishop ecclesiastical authority on Polish state territory. On 12 September 1945, the 
Council of Ministers decided it was no longer in force, which was published in the Voice of 
the People (Głos Ludu) two days later (Rzepecki, 2011, p. 290-291). These actions and the 
phrasing of the Article 1e of the land reform decree demonstrate that the regime was prepared 
to confront the Church, but found itself too weak and isolated to attack the Church 
immediately after its takeover of Poland. Simultaneously, the regime issued three decrees that 
created a secular administration and authority, by introducing civil registers, over birth, 
marriage and death certificates, previously maintained by the Church (Dz. U. 1945 nr. 48  
poz. 270, 271, 272). The party line was to allow the Church to operate unobstructed until the 
regime was consolidated enough to strike (Marecki & Musiał, 2007, p. 6). 
The regime’s hostility, from the very beginning, was further expressed by the creation 
of a department in the Ministry of Public security, the central coordination of the repressive 
apparatus. Initially, it was Department I; by late 1945, it was reorganised and Department V 
(Socio-Political) was created. Within it, Division V was established to supervise the clergy. 
Division V was subdivided into three sections: 1) dealing with Roman-Catholicism; 2) 
responsible for Greek Catholic, Orthodox, Evangelical and other protestant churches and 3) 
supervising religious organisations. They operated under the supervision of Julia Brystigier 
(dubbed “bloody Luna”) until 1954 (Szwagrzyk, 2005, p. 34-35). The creation within the 
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repressive apparatus of units directly dealing with religious affairs higlights that the regime’s 
intentions were hostile from the very beginning. 
These hostile intentions were partially expressed during the transitional period; 
however, the regime needed the Church’s legitimacy, and therefore, the Church took part in 
national celebrations, rituals and festivities until 1949 (Osęka, 2007). Public hospitals were 
“blessed” by Catholic priests (APSz, UWSz, WSP, sygn. 826, p. 47) and official celebrations 
began with a mass and sometimes a blessing of military banners (APSz, UWSz, WSP, sygn. 
841, p. 2-3). In 1945, on 3 May (anniversary of the constitution of 1791) in all churches 
masses were held, thanking God for the liberation of the country, which was widely 
publicised by the regime (PKF 45/11). Moreover, not only in Poland but across the Soviet 
Bloc, the communist regimes found it necessary, at least temporarily, to use religion as a tool 
for maintaining social order in the period of transition (Mirescu, 2009, p. 58-59). 
Corpus Christi was also celebrated with pomp and circumstance and the official 
propaganda announced that for the first time in six years “the bells tolled, prophesizing the 
truth of faith and liberty” (PKF 45/14). The same year, the 14th Pomeranian Division in 
Bydgoszcz, in the presence of the Marshall of Poland Michał “Rola” Żymierski, received 
their “blessed” banners (PKF 45/33). In 1946, celebrating the 155th anniversary of the 1791 
constitution, high-ranking communist officials attended the mass in the Carmelite Church in 
Warsaw (PKF 1946/14) and on 22 July the same year, the Poniatowski Bridge in Warsaw 
was re-opened in a ceremony attended by Bierut himself and large priests “blessing” the 
newly reconstructed bridge (PKF 1946/24). In 1947 there was a state sponsored transition of 
ingress of the new bishop of Łódź (PKF 1947/18). In 1948, the Church as a positive feature 
disappeared from the official propaganda and in 1949, propaganda began to be openly hostile 
to the Catholic Church, having organised and transmitted gatherings condemning “the 
hostility of the politicized part of the clergy” (PKF 1949/15). 
The reasons that the Church lent its legitimacy to the communist authority can be 
explained by the transitional nature of the communist regime: the Church officials could not 
be certain what form would the new regime assume, or how long would it last (Kenez, 2003, 
p. 884). Such an attitude was illustrated in a conversation between Gomułka and a priest in 
1946, as Stanisław Mikołajczyk recalled. When asked by Gomułka “when will the Church 
finally agree with our government!?” the priest (although Mikołajczyk does not state his 
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name or position, it is possible to speculate that the priest was the Primate – August Hlond – 
the only cleric in a position to negotiate with the government) responded that 
We have time. You know we have been in Poland for thousand years. After all, your 
party is less than three years old. Yes, we have time to wait; we are not impatient. 
And after all, we don’t want to be hasty and make a new agreement because one will 
never know what will happen to you or the other people ruling your party. You will 
probably remember a very prominent Polish communist from before the war – Mr. 
Warski, as well as others who fled to Russia and later died in Russian concentration 
camps. We, as the Church, are dealing not with political matters, but with beliefs and 
morale of the People. Many generations will pass and many political systems will 
pass but the Church will remain the same. (HIA, DSM, sygn. 103 pp. 381-382) 
It is apparent that Church officials were not certain about the longevity of the regime, but 
quite assured of the Church’s position. Thus they decided not to confront the new authorities, 
resuming all public functions, following the tradition of Church’s participation in public life. 
As the “priest” pointed out, Church would outlast the regime (as it did); therefore, the Church 
as an institution would not openly engage in a struggle with the government, nor would it 
enter any agreement with it. By claiming that the Church dealt with the “beliefs” and 
“morale” of the population, the “priest” implied that the Church would perform its 
ecclesiastical and public functions, in the same vein as it had done before the war. In fact, the 
Church even moved to exert its authority in the Recovered Territories. 
The territories acquired post-1945 created a challenge for Polish communists, with a 
large German population (see Chapter IV) and virtually no Polish administration on these 
territories. The state found itself in a position to nationalise all the estates and property 
situated in the Recovered Territories. On 2 March 1945, the authorities issued a Decree on 
abandoned and derelict property (Dz. U. 1945 nr. 9 poz. 45), which was later 
awarded the status of a legislative act (Dz. U. 1945 nr, 17 poz. 97). In 1946, a 
Decree on abandoned and post-German property was issued, making the state     
the proprietor and administrator of all property found on the Recovered   
Territories. The 1945 bill also set up a Liquidation Commission to supervise the 
transfer of property to other state (and initially private) structures and 
organisations. 
133  
Almost simultaneously with the aforementioned legal proceedings, the Polish 
Catholic Church begun establishing ecclesiastical structures on the Recovered 
Territories. Apostolic Administrators were appointed by the Polish primate August 
Hlond (who had in this case special procuration from the Holy See) in Gorzów 
Wielkopolski, Gdańsk, Wrocław, Olsztyn and Opole (Noszczak, 2008, p. 45). These 
nominations warranted that the Polish ecclesiastical administration in the Recovered 
Territories was established, even though German Catholic bishops, like Carl Maria 
Splett, were still officially holding their posts. 
The establishment of the new ecclesiastical structure was intertwined with the 
process of the expulsion of Germans and re-settlement of Poles on these territories (see 
Chapter III). With the influx of Polish Catholic repatriates, the authorities were faced 
with the ever-growing demand for Catholic priests, who were also awarded a church 
building, which (under the bill of 6 May 1945) was state property. 
Creating Church structures in the Recovered Territories – Church-State 
cooperation 
The Catholic Church proved instrumental in establishing Polish authority in 
Recovered Territories (Zając, 2005) and in fact the regime saw it as a tool of “re-polonising” 
its new territorial acquisitions (Chabasińska, 2009, p. 41). The letter of Szczecin Voivode 
(provincial administrator) to the Department V of the Ministry of Public Administration 
outlines that every priest arriving in the new diocese must receive “jurisdiction” from the 
local bishop and that German bishops were reluctant to grant jurisdiction to Polish priests. He 
informed the Ministry of a suggestion made by “a circle of Polish clergy” to “obtain in Rome 
an episcopal jurisdiction, for one of Polish priests, over the Recovered Territories” (APSz, 
UWSz, WSP, sygn. 1288, p. 14). Indeed, such jurisdiction was granted to Primate Hlond, 
who was able to appoint Apostolic Administrators of dioceses incorporated into Poland 
(Noszczak, 2008). As the incorporation of newly acquired territories progressed, and the 
influx of Polish migrants and flight and expulsion of Germans continued, the communist 
administration found itself confronted with a popular “demand” for Catholic priests. Stefan 
Rawicz, administrator of Złotów County, on 15 September 1945, reported that there was “no 
population of other religious confession” in the area and therefore “five post-evangelical 
churches were allocated” to the Catholic Church. He asked for “allocation of an additional 
12” (APSz, UWSz, WSP, sygn. 1288, p. 32). At the same time, the authorities appeared to be 
concerned and assisted in establishing the Polish Catholic Administration in Recovered 
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Territories. The Government’s Plenipotentiary for West Pomeranian District asked the 
Szczecin curia for a list of all priests and churches in its administration, adding that it also 
should “outline needs and wishes” (APSz, UWSz, WSP, sygn. 1288, p. 77). 
In some cases, communist officials were confused about the state approach to 
the Catholic Church and granting it former protestant property. In the case of former 
Cathedral in Kamień Pomorski (Cammin), consecrated by the Catholic Church, the County 
administrator asked the authorities if he could “at all issue such a document (granting the 
cathedral)” and if the authorities could provide guidelines concerning “future matters of the 
property of the evangelical church” (APSz, UWSz, WSP, sygn. 1288, p. 303). In some cases, 
local officials appeared almost biased in their support of Catholic priests acquiring protestant 
property. On 18 Fenruary 1947, Aleksander Kraśnicki, priest of Polish National Catholic 
Church, lodged an official request for the acquisition (18.02.1947) of a church building on 
Mickiewicza 20 in Koszalin (former Schlosskirche), denied by Koszalin County 
(12.05.1947). Following that, Kraśnicki lodged an official complaint, which caused the 
Voivodeship Office to demand explanation from the County (19.12.1947). In its 
investigation, the Voivodeship Office revealed that there had been other church buildings 
granted without its knowledge to the Catholic Church in Koszalin area. However, the County 
responded that these churches had been already consecrated by Catholics; “thus the County” 
believed “the matter to be settled”; no further inquiries were made and Catholic Church was 
allowed to keep the buildings (APSz, UWSz, WSP, sygn. 1290, p. 201, 207, 225, 225, 231, 
232). 
 
By 1947, some communist officials began to be concerned about the lenient approach 
towards the Catholic Church, often adopting the form of favouring the Catholics over other 
Christian faiths. On 10 June 1947, the director of Social-Political Department in Szczecin 
issued a letter to Voivode Leonard Borkowicz, which proposed a practice of granting a priest 
only one church building to “avoid a situation when a priest arriving in the County claims all 
church buildings … in an attempt to prevent other faiths” from establishing themselves “on 
the Voivodeship territory”. Leonard Borkowicz’s response was brief, written on the letter 
itself, and read as follows: “An ill practice – causes unrest. These (church buildings) should 
be granted with the reservation of an adequate (minimal) number for <<other faiths>>” 
(APSz, UWSz, WSP, sygn. 1293, p. 157). If local communist officials, often Catholics 
themselves, could have favoured the Catholic Church because of their religious 
denomination, Leonard Borkowicz, a lay Jew and an avid communist, was realising the party 
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line – and in the period between 1944 and 1948, the party line was to favour the Catholic 
Church. Appearing supportive of the Church created a sense of continuity and legitimacy to 
the regime. 
Troubled relations in time of cooperation 
 
Although initially the government followed a policy of non-confrontation, the 
period between 1944 and 1948 was marked by growing suspicion on both sides and was not 
free from clashes between officials and Catholic priests. Isakowicz-Zaleski, archdiocese of 
Cracow, points out that Catholic priests were often victims of political murder committed by 
communist authorities, giving the example of priests Michał Rapacz and Franciszek Flasiński 
(2007, p.31-32) and a Jesuit, Władysław Gorgacz (2007, p. 33). In other less extreme 
instances, the clergy itself was behind clashes with the local officials. In a letter from 24 
April 1946, to Apostolic Administrator in Gorzów Wielkopolski, Starogórd (presently 
Stargard) County administrator Szmigielski reported the case of parish priest Tadeusz 
Długopolski, who announced that on masses held on 1, 3 and 9 May “party banners could not 
be carried into the church, since it would be a breach of canon law”; however, later 
Długopolski clarified that it “concerned only these parties who fight the Church”. Szmigielski 
was clear in stating “that there are no such political parties in Poland” and asked the 
Apostolic Administrator for his compliance and agreement: “otherwise celebrations will not 
be allowed” (APSz, UWSz, WSP, sygn. 1288, p. 453). This issue clearly demonstrates that 
the clergy was suspicious, if not openly defiant, of the new regime, which on its part wanted 
to display (even forcefully) its religious affiliation. 
On other occasion, a parson in Gostyń buried a man, Edward Zawadzki, without a 
death certificate from the local civil registry, a violation of the Law of civil registry’s acts 
issued on 25 September 1945 (Dz. U. 1945 nr. 48 poz. 272). Asked why he had not followed 
the government law, the parson responded “that he did not know, since … the authorities do 
not send him legislative registers” and on other occasion “that he cannot follow the secular 
ordinances, since the Polish state had broken the relations with the Vatican”. The parson’s 
practices of ignoring the local civil registry caused the local population to “avoid the civil 
registry” (APSz, UWSz, WSP, sygn. 1290, p. 237). In this case. the authorities decided to 
plea to the Apostolic Administrator to remove the parson from Gostyń (APSz, UWSz, WSP, 
sygn. 1290, p. 243), a letter that remained unanswered. 
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On the account of party members, clashes with the Church were more open and 
certainly more violent. On the night of 24/45 December 1946, several local members of the 
Polish Workers’ Party “committed an assault on an administrator of the Roman-Catholic 
Church in Dobiesławów … during his religious service they forcefully took the tabernacle 
with the Holy Sacrament and removed him from the church, thus publicly insulting an object 
of religious cult.” In this case, the authorities had to react and the court proceedings reveal 
that three PWP members – Mikołaj Kwiatkowski, Tomasz Watras and Antoni Gembke – 
were sentenced for 3, 2 and 2.5 years of imprisonment respectively (APSz, UWSz, WSP, 
sygn. 1290, p. 552-553). On another occasion, in Połczyn Dębski, an employee of the local 
Security Office, on the night of 19/20 June 1947, “drunkenly … actively assaulted a depiction 
of the Virgin Mary … slamming it against the ground and stomping on it … using most 
vituperative words.” In this case, the matter was supervised by the Voivode Borkowicz 
himself, which resulted in Dębski’s arrest, on which Borkowicz’s note “taken care of” written 
in the report testifies (APSz, UWSz, WSP, sygn. 1293, p. 1). 
Another occasion on which the authorities displayed suspicion of Church activity was 
Primate Hlond’s tour of the West Pomeranian Voivodeship. Among some officials, this visit 
was yet another quagmire. Leon Malczewski, Pyrzyce County administrator, in a letter 
marked as urgent, on 27 October 1947, asked the Voivode: “1) Can I officially travel to 
County’s limits to officially greet the Cardinal, 2) Can I speak and great officially at all, 3) 
How should I generally behave during reception?” (APSz, UWSz, WSP, sygn. 1295, p. 25). 
All local officials reported to the Voivode about Primate’s visit. Kołobrzeg official reported 
that a “triumphal gate” was set up form Zielenów direction, while Hlond arrived from Korlin 
(the opposite side of the city) allowing a local official “to suspect that the aforementioned 
(Hlond) was aware of quiet instructions of local County Office, forbidding an ostentatious 
welcome” (APSz, UWSz, WSP, sygn. 1295, p.43). In Jastrów, Hlond “made a short speech 
without accents hostile to the democratic (communist) regime” (APSz, UWSz, WSP, sygn. 
1295, p. 47). The most problematic was Hlond’s visit in Złotów County, where “decorations 
on Agriculture and Trade Cooperative’s [which were government property] storefronts were 
discovered” and in Zakrzew “during the celebrations private and cooperative’s stores were 
closed, while in the Communal Office there was only one employee.” This triggered an 
official investigation; however, the authorities “could not establish which stores were closed” 
(APSz, UWSz, WSP, sygn. 1295, p. 103, 104, 97). 
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It is possible to observe a pattern, in a period just after the war, in which the regime 
was supportive of the Catholic Church and benefitted from its advice and activity in the 
Recovered Territories. As the consolidation of power progressed, the authorities became 
more suspicious and sometimes openly hostile. The initial period is marked by the confusion 
of officials, who often did not know how to act towards the Church. Nevertheless, in the 
initial period, the Catholic Church actively participated in the public life, and its activity, with 
few exceptions, went on relatively uninterrupted. It is vital to emphasize that while conflicts 
and clashes did occur at the individual and local level, on the state and institutional level, 
cooperation and non-confrontation were the dominant policy. 
Period of persecution (1949-1956) 
 
Worsening relations 
 
Official persecution of the Catholic Church escalated in 1948, signalling a change in state 
policy. On 29 May 1947, Edward Quirini (Director of Public Administration Department in 
Ministry of Recovered Territiories) wrote in response to Borkowicz’s request that “the 
Ministry would not like to instigate a state-wide action of limiting public [mostly run by the 
Church] fund-raisers. However, by 1948, all Church fund-raisers were disallowed, especially 
in the event of a state-run fund-raiser for the reconstruction of Warsaw (APSz, UWSz, WSP, 
sygn. 1292, p. 1 and 5). With a letter of 8 August 1948, the Apostolic Administrator 
informed the Pomeranian authorities that militia in Charzyno dispersed a religious 
procession and, although it did trigger an investigation, it is possible to observe the 
escalation, since the Charzyno incident was not an individual attack, but engaged local 
militia structures (APSz, UWSz, syngn. 1295, p. 599). On 5 August 1949, the government 
issued a decree on Protection of the freedom of conscience and faith, which guaranteed 
freedom of religion (or lack thereof), but also stipulated that those “who abuse the freedom 
of faith and conscience for purposes hostile to the regime of the Republic of Poland shall 
serve a sentence of minimum 3 years” (Dz. U. 1949 nr. 45 poz. 334. Art. 8 § 1). 
 
Confrontation  and  new legislation 
By 1949, the government re-evaluated the policy of non-confrontation and began 
its assault on the Catholic Church. During the session of the Secretariat of the Politburo 
held on 20 january 1950, the issue of Caritas (a charity organisation run by the Church) 
was discussed and a “mandatory supervision of the ‘Caritas’ organisation” was issued by 
the Minister of Labour and Social Care (BN-Polona, Protocol nr. 5,5, p.2-3). A month 
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later the Politburo discussed issuing a government declaration that would “widely 
inform the society about the hostility of the leading circles of the episcopate towards 
People’s Poland” and further, the Politburo concluded that “it should not limit itself to 
issuing a declaration, but proceed to concrete actions. Nationalising Church property and 
creation of the Ecclesiastical Fund should be such a blow” (BN-Polona, Protocol nr. 58, 
pp. 1-2). Thu,s on 20 March 1950, the government issued a Bill on State takeover of the 
dead hand property, the guarantee of parsons’ agricultural farms and creation of the 
Ecclesiastical Fund which fulfilled the declaration of the 1944 land reform and, “in 
order to remove the remnants of squirearchal-feudalist privilege,” nationalised all landed 
estates of the Church (and all other religious communes) without compensation, thus 
depriving the Catholic Church and other faiths their material bases of operation (Dz. U. 
1950 nr. 9 poz. 87). That very legislative act pushed the Church, hitherto following the 
policy of passive resistance, to seek a compromise with the government, which was 
signed on 23 April 1950 (HIA, DSM, sygn. 149, scan 554). The agreement was used as a 
propaganda tool for the authorities who did not intend to follow the agreement 
(Noszczak, 2008). 
Having materially undermined the position of the Church, the government moved 
to subjugate the Church to the state. On 9 February 1953, the bill on Filling of the 
church posts was issued, giving the state the full authority to nominate parsons (local 
authorities) and bishops (the Council of Ministers), who also had to swear an oath of 
allegiance to the People’s Republic of Poland (Dz. U. 1953 nr. 10 poz. 32). The 
episcopate, headed by Stefan Wyszyński, issued a memorial, commonly known as Non 
possumus (We cannot allow), protesting against government’s persecution. The 
persecution and terror inflicted on the Church and the society, however, rendered any 
opposition ineffective. 
 
 
Removal of Apostolic Administrators and bishops, show trials 
 
Destruction of the Church’s financial independence was followed by removal of 
Apostolic Administrators appointed for the Recovered Territories. Such an action was 
motivated by the fact that the regime broke the Concordat and ecclesiastical authorities were 
no longer obliged to present episcopal nominees to the authorities for approval. The official 
confrontation policy was signalled in Bierut’s speech that called the military chaplains “to 
break with reactionary clergy and to intensively spread the ideals of Marxism, Leninism, 
Stalinism and the praise of the greatest leader of the mankind – Stalin” (HIA, DSM, sygn. 
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149, scan 525). The session of the Politburo held on 20 January1951 discussed the issue and 
outlined the matter of changes in the church administration since 
On Saturday 27 I the exchange of delimitation documents will occur [with the 
Democratic Republic of Germany, officially warranting Polish border on the Oder- 
Neisse line] the Political Bureau recommends launching a propaganda action this 
week through the press, film, radio, under slogans of: 
1. Liquidation of the temporary state of ecclesiastical authorities on the Recovered 
Territories 
2. Demanding the episcopate in Poland to assume a stance concerning the 
ecclesiastical administration on the Recovered Territories that is in accordance 
with national interests … 
The action of removing administrators of the apparatus and appointing of the vicars 
should be held on Friday 26 January 1951. (BN-Polona, Protocol nr. 49, p. 1) 
The removal of the Apostolic Administrators blatantly broke the autonomy of the Church, yet 
still the Primate – Stefan Wyszyński – approved their nomination in February 1951 in order 
not to provoke the regime and to avoid the schism of five dioceses (Noszczak, 2008, p. 53). 
Although officially arguing for the strengthening of the Church structure in the Recovered 
Territories, the government indeed weakened it. Although the delimitation treaty was signed 
with Eastern Germany, Pius XII waited for “political sanctions” (HIA, DSM, sygn. 149, scan 
807), which were only achieved in 1970 when Western Germany acknowledged the border in 
a separate treaty. The Church followed suit and the full Polish Church administration of the 
Recovered Territories was established by 1972 (Isakowicz-Zaleski, 2007, p. 23). 
As Gomułka claimed “if the Church is almost untouchable, the struggle with clergy 
… has long traditions in Poland” (as cited in Noszczak, 2008, p. 46). For as long as Gomułka 
was in power, the regime did not officially target the Church as an institution, but it targeted 
individual priests and bishops known for their defiance. The official tactics changed after his 
fall from power and the outward assault on both the clergy and the institution. These policies 
climaxed in show trials of high-ranking clergymen known as the “trial of Cracow’s curia”; 
second was the trial of Kielce Bishop Kaczmarek. 
The process of Cracow’s Curia started on the 21 January 1953 and was recorded by 
the official press. The Worker’s Tribune (Trybuna Robotnicza) printed detailed reports of the 
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proceedings against “the spy gang” that included six clerics (Józef Lelito, Rudolf Schidt, 
Tadeusz Turowski, Franciszek Szymanek, Wit Brzycki and Jan Pochopień) as well as three 
civilians (Edward Chachalica, Michał Kowalik and Stafania Rospond) who confessed 
“revealing all odiousness … history of treason and hatred” of their own nation (Trybuna 
Robotnicza, 1953a, p. 2). On 23 January, the Worker’s Tribune escalated its accusations by 
claiming that “the Vatican inspires German revisionism” and that the actions of the accused 
were “an anti-Polish crime” (Trybuna Robotnicza, 1953b, p. 2). On 27 January, the trial 
“revealed” that “the accused wanted to topple the people’s regime with the aid of Hitlerist- 
American bayonets” (Trybuna Robotnicza, 1953c, p. 2). The accused were sentenced on 28 
January 1953; thus Józef Lelito, Michał Kowalik and Edward Chachalica were sentenced to 
death. Szymanek received a life sentence, Pochopień 8 years, and Rospond 6 years, a 
punishment that “they rightly deserved” (Trybuna Robotnicza, 1953d, p. 1) 
In a similar vein, the trial of Kielce Bishop Kaczmarek was staged. The newspapers 
reported that he “admitted to collaboration with Hitlerist occupant and the secret services of 
the USA” and implicated the participation of the American ambassador Arthur Bliss Lane 
(Trybuna Robotnicza, 1953e, p. 1). Furthermore, the regime’s press reported that Kaczmarek, 
instructed by the Vatican, was planning and “counting on the third war” (Trybuna 
Robotnicza, 1953f, p. 2). The trial of Kaczmarek was recorded on film and included in the 
Polish Film Chronicle, where the Kielce bishop, in the vein of Stalinist show trials, confesses 
all, without any questions from the prosecutor (PKF 53/41). Furthermore, the so- called 
“patriot priests” (priests loyal to the regime) also appeared during the trial denouncing the 
bishop and expressly claiming that “there is no persecution (of the Church) in Poland” like 
priest Kotula or priest Czaja who claimed “the entire Catholic society condemns Bishop 
Kaczmarek’s activities” (PKF 53/42). The sentences in the September trial did not include 
death, but the main accused was to be imprisoned for 12 years (Trybuna Robotnicza, 1953g, 
p. 1) 
 
The hostilities against the Church reached their apex a month after Bishop 
Kaczmarek’s trial. On 23 September 1953, the Politburo decided to arrest the head of 
Catholic Church in Poland – Primate Wyszyński (BN-Polona, Protocol nr. 261, p. 1), who 
was arrested in Primate’s Palace in Warsaw the night of 25/26 October 1953 (Noszczak, 
2009, p. 292). Noszczak claims that after Wyszyński’s arrest, the Ministry of Public Security 
began preparation for his trial, which, however, was not staged (2008, p. 64). Deprived of its 
leader, the Catholic Church in Poland was effectively subjugated; priests were forced to 
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swear an oath of loyalty to the People’s Republic of Poland. Noszczak claims that until 15 
January 1954, 8750 priests complied, with only 630 failing to comply for various reasons 
(2008, p. 97). It is possible to observe that after the arrest of the Primate, the regime 
effectively destroyed the Church’s opposition. The arrest of the head of the Catholic Church 
in Poland triggered voices of protest from the episcopate, which, however, were not able to 
effectively oppose the regime. The destruction of the Church’s autonomy also allowed the 
regime to launch an action, codenamed X-2, during which many female convents were 
removed and their monasteries confiscated by the Church. X-2 was especially targeting 
Silesia, where still many German nuns resided, Noszczak argues, that the X-2 action was an 
attempt to introduce the “Czechoslovak option”, where the Church was completely 
subjugated to the state (2008, p. 226). 
Religion and schools 
 
Another part of the state’s anti-Church policy was the forcible removal of religion as a 
subject taught in schools. Before the war and right until 1949, religion and religious schools 
were an important part of the education system in Poland (Moraczewska, 2010). Every 
classroom had a crucifix and prayer was allowed. However, as T.T. recalls, in 1949 “they 
came at took all the crucifixes, pupils and teachers were no longer allowed to pray. 
Throughout my entire career this process was repeated three times, first in 1950s, then 1960s 
and for the last time in 1980s” (interview on 12.02.2016). This demonstrates that the 
communist regime was anti-religious throughout its existence. In 1949, the regime launched 
an investigation against a Jesuit-run school in Struda near Warsaw (HIA, DSM, sygn. 149, 
scan 543). By 1950, the archbishop of Cracow, Adam Sapieha, attempted to plead to the 
highest authorities. In his letter to Bierut, Sapieha outlined all forms of persecution that the 
Catholic Church had suffered since 1945, amongst them “a procedure of transforming public 
schools into the Association of the Friends of Children [Towarzystwo Przyjaciół Dzieci” that 
was based “only on removal of religion … and following this procedure is caused by the 
struggle against religion in schools, without any legislative action.” Furthermore, Sapieha 
emphasized that Catholic children in kindergartens “were isolated from all aspects of 
religious life and aspirations” ((HIA, DSM, sygn. 149, scan 513). This letter was written in 
September 1950, t several months after the compromise between the Church and state of 
April 1950, which demonstrates that the government used the compromise as a propaganda 
tool and did not intend to follow the agreement. The regime was quite successful in removing 
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religion from schools, especially primary schools; by the school year of 1955/1956, the 
percentage of schools, without religious teaching, across the country was almost complete: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Voivodeship 
(province) 
Percent of schools without religion as a subject (by 30 IX 1955 r.) 
AAN, Ministerstwo Oświaty, sygn. 417, p. 19) 
Białystok 91,9 
Bydgoszcz 92,8 
Gdańsk 67,9 
Katowice 95,4 
Kielce 61,7 
Koszalin 99,1 
Cracow 40,4 
Lublin 84,8 
Łódź (city) 93,0 
Łódź (province) 82,2 
Olsztyn 98,3 
Opole 99,3 
Poznań 99,4 
Rzeszów 40,1 
Szczecin 98,6 
Warsaw (city) 62,4 
Warsaw (province) 85,1 
Wrocław 90,3 
Zielona Góra 94,8 
 
 
Apart from in five provinces, religion was almost completely removed from primary 
schools across the country. The elimination of religion in secondary schools was also nearly 
complete; out of 792 secondary schools, 732 did not offer religion as a subject, and thus 
religion was removed from 92% of secondary schools, (Noszczak, 2008, p. 253). 
There was also the case of the Catholic University of Lublin, established in 1918. 
Initially supported by the regime, by 1949 it underwent constant surveillance by the Secret 
Services - its publications were censored, and new students were forbidden admission to 
certain departments and degree. Nevertheless, the university was never closed down and 
Table 2– Religion in schools 
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remained the only private tertiary education institution in the Soviet Bloc (Gałaszewska- 
Chilczuk, 2013). 
In accordance with their Marxist principles, the Polish communist regime largely 
succeeded in removing religion from the public sphere. Just as the Church was removed from 
the sphere of state rituals by 1949, similarly religion was methodically removed from the 
education system from 1949 onwards. The process, almost complete, was halted and partially 
reversed by the events of 1956.The success of officially removing religion from all aspects of 
public life did not mean that Catholicism was completely subjugated. The public sphere of 
Polish life could not oppose the state openly; privately, however most continued to practice 
their religion and followed Catholic traditions, as will be demonstrated in following section. 
Other religions 
 
It is vital to acknowledge the other religions that were also present in Poland post- 
1945. However, the communist project of ethnic cleansing conducted between 1944 and 1948 
(see Chapter III) warranted that Poland, previously ethically and religiously diverse, 
drastically changed its character. Post-war Poland had 94% ethnic Poles as its citizens 
(Cordell and Dybczynski, 2005, s. 81) and 97.7% of the total population followed 
Catholicism (Noszczak, 2008, p. 39). Hence, the role other religions played, and the 
government attention they received, was considerably smaller than that of the Catholic 
Church. 
There are only three legislative acts concerning the other strains of Christianity in 
Poland. The first one was a Decree on relations with the Methodist Church issued on 16 
October 1945 and granting equal rights with other confessions, self-governance and 
“independence from any foreign authority” (Dz. U. 1945 nr. 46 poz. 259). In a similar vein, 
the amendment to the Presidential Decree on relations with the Evangelical Church of 
Augsburg Confession was issued, changing only the administrative area of the Decree to 
correlate with the new borders of Poland. It also stipulated that all property of the church, 
administered by the Evangelical-Augsburg Church at the time the decree was issued, should 
remain in its possession, whilst all other property was to be nationalised (Dz. U. 1946 nr. 54 
poz. 304). By 1947, yet another amendment has been issued, which merged all protestant 
(Lutheran, Calvinist and Brethren’s Congregation from Herrnhut) churches into one 
administration on the Polish territory (Dz. U. 1947 nr. 52 poz. 272). 
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The smaller Christian churches were used instrumentally as a tool to combat the 
Catholic Church (Brzechczyn, 2008). However, due to their weakness and small number of 
followers, this practice was abandoned by 1949 and these congregations also fell victim of 
state organised persecution (Michalak, 2001). Some minor churches, like Jehovah’s 
Witnesses, were branded a “sect,” and territorial administration organs were ordered to 
engage in “close collaboration in order to combat” their activity (APSz, UWSz, WSP, sygn. 
1290, p. 789) even before the official changes to policies concerning religion in 1949. 
Similarly, a negative attitude was strong towards the Greek Catholic church and 
violent repressions occurred from the very first years of the regime. Such violence is best 
exemplified by the case of Uniate bishop of Przemyśl – Josaphat Kocylovsky. He was first 
arrested on 21 September 1945 and deported to USSR on 16 January 1946; however, he was 
allowed to return five days later (Motyka, 2011, p. 394). His second arrest occurred on 6 June 
1946, when he was forcibly removed and again deported to the USSR, subjected to torture 
and sentenced yo 10 years in gulag, where he died in November 1947 (Smoliy, ed., 2009, p. 
246). By the fall of 1946, the ecclesiastical structures of the Greek Catholic Church in Poland 
was completely destroyed; hence Pope Pius XII equipped Cardinal Hlond with special 
prerogatives to administer the Greek Catholics on 16 December 1946 (Hałagida, 2008, p. 
295). 
 
It is possible to observe various approaches of the communist regime to different 
religions within Poland, from utilitarian to openly hostile. The other religions in the post-war 
Poland, however, constituted only a fraction of the overall population. They neither had the 
resources, nor the numerical and organisational strength of the Catholic Church, and thus 
were not considered an important threat to the regime. They were easily subjugated by the 
authorities by 1949 (Michalak, 2001) using a fraction of resources allocated to fight the 
Catholic Church. Their numerical weakness warranted that when the regime began its attempt 
to subjugate the Church in 1949, they suffered considerably more, in a material sense at least, 
that the Catholic Church (Brzechczyn, 2008). 
Attitudes and responses 
 
The communist regime in Poland allocated considerable resources to 
combatting the Church, yet “the results could not compare to their comrades in other real- 
socialist states” (Eisler, 2004, p. 386). The regime’s failure can be explained by two major 
factors: the ethno-religious structure they had created by 1948 and the unique role that the 
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Catholic Church played in Polish life. The first warranted that the assault on Catholic Church 
would be an assault on values and tradition of the vast majority of the nation, already hostile 
to the communist regime. The second issue arose from the dual identity of most party 
members themselves (see Chapter II) and their surprisingly strong attachment to the Catholic 
tradition. 
The anti-religious policies of the communist regime were greatly undermined by the 
considerable attachment to the Catholic Church by the multitude of party members 
themselves. It appears a rather bizarre fact that Bolesław Bierut, during whose period of 
power the Church suffered the most, married his wife, Janina Górzyńska, on 3 July 1921 in 
the St. John (Cathedral) parish in Lublin (Lublin Roman Catholic Church Books, 1784-1964, 
p. 43), the same year he re-joined the Communist Party of Poland (Eiser, 2014). Even Stalin’s 
allegedly (Esiler, 2014) most avid follower followed the Catholic tradition. However, the top 
party members often did not follow Catholic practices (especially since many top officials 
were of Jewish origin); the lower in the party ranks, the greater the likelihood of finding a 
practicing Catholic. J.K. recalled in the interview, that her uncle was a senior local official in 
Wałbrzych region, yet 
He and his wife Ziuta married in the Red Church (Holy Guardian Angels parish), 
however they had to do it in secret [religious nuptials were forbidden for party 
members]. They also secretly baptised their daughter and she attended her first 
communion with me in Piaskowa Góra [suburb in Wałbrzych], although parents were 
not present during the celebration, as it was forbidden for party officials. (Personal 
communication on 05.02.2016) 
There were instances where Polish Workers’ Party Women Association in Silesia staged The 
Life of St. Genevieve, participated in a mass and received sacraments (Musiał & Szarek,2008, 
p. 25). In 1951, before the Church celebration of recommending Poland to the Virgin Mary, 
in Katowice alone, secret service functionaries spotted 150 party members attending the mass 
(Musiał & Szarek eds. 2008, p. 25). Such instances were numerous; E.H. recalled that Sykus, 
director of Wałbrzych Glassworks, whom she described as “an avid communist,” apparently 
“would never miss a mass on Sunday” (Personal communication on 18.02.2016). 
If even the communist officials were often practicing Catholics, the general 
population en masse continued the Polish Catholic tradition. In Świdnica’s parish church in 
1950s [former Pfarrkirche, now the cathedral], “there were no seated places, people stood 
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wherever they could find a place” (T.T. Personal communication on 13.02.2016). After 
religion was removed from schools, “parents would send them [children] to churches to learn 
after the Sunday mass” (T.T. Personal communication on 13.02.2016). J.K. also remembers 
that “my parents always received the priest after Christmas [popularly known as “the carol - 
kolęda”: it is a tradition of pastoral visits to homes of the members of the parish] and it was 
always a festive event” (Personal communication on 05.02.2016). Thus it is possible to 
observe that although religious practices disappeared from public life, in private many 
practiced and cultivated the Catholic traditions. 
Conclusion 
 
The aim of the regime, as outlined by Jakub Berman, was not about “education or 
eradicating illiteracy, these were only details, but about changing the concept of the country, 
the creation of new Poland, of shape and structure completely dissimilar to the one known 
from history (in Torańska, 1985, p. 599). The removal of religion from the public sphere was 
part of this project. Polish society underwent a process “of subjective secularisation – which 
contrary to objective secularisation, which is a natural consequence of civilizational 
development – was a controlled action” (Noszczak, 2008, p. 234), and forceful in addition. 
Polish national identity was uniquely intertwined with Catholicism, a result of a long 
historical process. The demographic changes effected post-1945 elevated Catholicism to the 
position of “national” religion, as an overwhelming majority identified themselves as 
Catholics, a unity that was found nowhere else in the Soviet Bloc (Babiuch & Luxmoore, 
1999, Noszczak, 2008). The attitude of the episcopate and the faithful was especially praised 
in the Vatican, which expressed its awe for “courage and resolution of the ecclesiastical 
hierarchy in Poland, and also the bravery and attachment to faith on the part of the faithful”, 
further adding “that sad examples of Czechs, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania etc. – 
where there exist ‘national churches’ i.e. psedo-Catholic and severed from Rome – opened 
the eyes of the most, bringing out the different attitude of Polish Catholics” (HIA, DSM, 
sygn. 149, scan 565). 
The strength of the Catholic tradition is illustrated by the fact that many party 
members were practicing Catholics in private, yet followed the official party line in their 
public activity. Noszczak (2008) emphasizes that even the imprisonment of Wyszński in 
1953 did not produce a public outcry; the society was terrorised and largely compliant, the 
episcopate almost completely subjugated. Yet from the evidence presented, it is possible to 
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observe the dichotomous Polish identity – officially everyone accepted (or at least did not 
protest) the official secularisation and the attack on the Church in Poland and privately, Poles 
continued to cultivate their religious traditions, finding a way (teaching of religion in 
churches) to minimise the impact of the forced secularisation on their children. Yet again, the 
private sphere created a difficult obstacle for the regime in its project of re-shaping Polish 
national identity. The initial compromise, and even endorsement, of religion in public life 
was dictated by the powerful position of the Church and weakness of the communists 
(Czwołek, 2011), a tactic of alignement that the regime would often employ when it lost its 
grip on power, as it did in 1956. 
With the changes resulting from Stalin’s, and later Bierut’s, death, the regime, 
plunged into factional struggles that effectively loosened the terror and relaxed its rule, which 
resulted in an unprecedented outburst of popular discontent and effective disobedience, 
shaking the very foundations of the regime (Machcewicz, 2009). The communist project in 
its prior form and methods could continue. Similar to the period of 1944-1948, the regime 
once again endorsed the Church. On 28 October 1956, the regime released Primate 
Wyszyński and allowed him to return to Warsaw to resume all his official duties (Noszczak, 
2008, p. 387). On 3 December 1956, the government annulled its bill On filling of the 
church posts passed in 1953. The Decree on filling of the church posts gave the regime  
powers to remove an uncomfortable Church official, but the  power  to  nominate  and  elect 
bishops and priests was transferred back to the Church (Dz. U. 1957 nr. 1 poz. 6). 
Wyszyński, personally asked by Gomułka, calmed down the situation, complied and after 
his return to Warsaw called for moderation that effectively de-escalated the conflict and 
spared any bloodshed (Noszczak, 2008, p. 388). Even after regaining stability the regime 
resumed its conflict with the Church (Czwołek, 2011), but it was never again as open, 
and the regime never closeto the subjugation the Church. Although it fought Catholicism 
till its very end, the regime had not achieved its goal of eliminating the Church from both 
public and private spheres. The duality of the Polish communist rergime, in this respect, 
manifested itself in the tension between religion and ideology. Even though the regime 
opposed various other Soviet instruments of power and ideology, it embraced the Marxist 
principle of opposition to religion. This contradiction is further emphasized by the fact 
that Catholicism was a central component of the nationalistic idea that the regime 
attempted to reconcile with the communist ideology. Furthermore, the failure to subjugate 
the Church and a subsequent need to reach a compromise with it reinforce the ethno- 
symbolist claim that national identities and their components are a result of a long 
historical process and prove extremely durable. 
 Chapter IX: 
Conclusion 
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Introduction 
 
As I have argued, nationalism and ideology were uneasy bedfellows in the post-war 
communist regime in Poland. In fact, the communist regime was undermined by the tension 
between these two forces, which produced its dual identity. This dual identity explains why 
often contradictory policies of the regime and its delicate balance between seeking legitimacy 
and appeasing itsSoviet masters and its own ideology. The dual identity of the Polish regime 
serves to highlight the strength of nationalism in Poland because the regime found that, in 
order to survive, it had to replace its ideological narrative with a nationalist one. The dual 
identity of the regime enabled it eventually to forge a unique compromise with the USSR. 
Stalin’s death in 1953 was crucial for the communist regimes of Eastern Europe. 
From that point onwards, it was possible to observe the gradual erosion of the communist 
regime in Poland. A crucial role in undermining the regime was played by Józef Światło, one 
of the top ranking officials within the Ministry of Public Security, who defected to the West 
in December 1953. From September 1954 Światło began exposing the most compromising 
secrets of the regime - concerning the methods of torture, economic subservience to the 
USSR, and the wealth and opulence that members of the regime surrounded themselves with 
- through the Polish section of Radio Free Europe (HIA, DSM, sygn. 158, scan 406). To 
salvage its image, the regime dissolved the Ministry of Public Security. Trailed its top 
officials, including the Minister – Stanisław Radkiewicz, as well the Politburo member 
responsible for the repression apparatus – Jakub Berman, who were expressly named by 
Światło as those responsible for the terror and abuses of power. The secret police were placed 
under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior (HIA, DSM, sygn. 158, scan 406). It is 
important to emphasize that the restructuring launched by Światło’s defection severely 
limited the regime’s ability to control society as effectively as it had done hitherto (Eisler, 
2014). Furthermore, in February 1955, the Free Europe Press division of Free Europe 
Committee launched operation “Spotlight” – flying balloons over Poland containing anti- 
regime leaflets –the most important one was Światło’s brochure “Behind the scenes of the 
security force and the party” – which numbered 130 million by February 1955 (HIA, DSM, 
sygn. 73, scan 391) fuelling the discontent of an already rebellious society. 
The ongoing crisis of the regime was further aggravated by Khrushchev’s Secret 
Speech delivered on 28 February 1956 and signalled the de-Stalinisation process across the 
entire Soviet bloc (Czubiński, 1992). Coupled with that was the death of PZPR’s First 
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Secretary, Bolesław Bierut, in Moscow on 12 March 1956, attributed to the shock caused by 
Khrushchev’s Secret Speech by popular opinion in Poland (Eisler, 2014, p. 160). 
Notwithstanding the causes, Bierut’s death and Khrushchev’s speech triggered yet another 
struggle for power within the PZPR. On the 20 March 1956, the VI Plenum of the Central 
Committee of the PZPR assembled to elect the new First Secretary and it was the first 
instance when the Soviet leader personally participated in the Plenum to assure the election of 
his candidate (Eisler, 2014, p. 213). Accordingly, Edward Ochab, a member of the Central 
Committee, was elected as the First Secretary. The struggle for power within the communist 
party was far from over in the spring of 1956, weakening the party and causing “the erosion 
of the existing system of power” (Eisler, 2014, p. 219). There were two groups bidding for 
power “Natolińczycy” (hardliners) and “Puławianie” (reformists) as Jedlicki – one of 
contemporary observers and journalists and effectively member of the regime working for 
State Publication Institute - argues (1963, p. 28). Regardless of their personal convictions 
regarding the communist ideology, the struggle between these two weakened the regimes’s 
grip on power and caused social awakening and a demand for liberalisation (Esiler, 2014) to 
such an extent that even the Sejm - rubber-stamping institution by then – passed the Bill of 
Amnesty on 27 April 1956 pardoning all the political prisoners of the regime (Dz. U. 1956, nr. 
11 poz. 57). 
 
The weakened central authority and the failure of the Six Year Plan (1950-1955) 
encouraged the society to demand reform through strikes and demonstrations. The first such 
strikes occurred in Poznań in June 1956. The regime reacted impulsively and violently in 
quelling the protests. Ten thousand troops equipped with 359 tanks, 31 assault guns and other 
kinds of lethal ammunition (Eilser, 2014, p. 229) caused a further deterioration in the 
situation and increased tensions within the communist party. The only candidate acceptable 
for both groups fighting for power was Gomułka, and his return to power was informally 
proposed as early as summer of 1956 (Esiler, 2008). Amidst the deteriorating domestic 
situation and increasing threat from the Soviet Union, Edward Ochab led the Polish 
delegation on the visit to the People’s Republic of China in September 1956, where he 
implied the possible threat of Soviet intervention in Poland to Zhou Enlai (as cited in 
Torańska, 1985, p. 153). In October, the Central Committee called for the new Plenum to be 
held on 19 October to elect the new First Secretary, presumptively Gomułka. On the morning 
of 19 October 1956, the Soviet delegation headed by Nikita Khrushchev himself arrived 
uninvited in Warsaw. Ochab recalls Khrushchev’s hostile attitude and claimed that “the game 
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was difficult and delicate. Khrushchev found out about it, that’s why he yelled at the airport, 
when he flew to Warsaw during the VIII Plenum: we know who the enemy of the Soviet 
Union is” (as cited in Torańska, 1985, p. 161). Esiler claimed that in October, the Soviet 
invasion had already effectively begun. Soviet troops stationed in West Pomerania and Lower 
Silesia began marching towards Warsaw, Battleship “Zhdanov” forced its way into the 
Gdańsk Bay accompanied by numerous smaller vessels, and Soviet troops in the GDR were 
fully mobilized (2014, pp. 248-249). 
 
Polish communist leaders negotiated with Khrushchev over the impending invasion. 
Roman Zambrowski recalled that, during the talks, Gomułka “lost his head” and began a 
screed in Polish with which, Khrushchev later admitted, “he was greatly impressed … Only a 
man certain of his convictions could have lost his head to such a degree”. Negotiations 
however were not recorded and Zambrowski’s account being the only surviving one was 
rather fragmentary and vague.  (as cited in Eisler, 2008, p. 173). Furthermore, in October 
1956 Zhou Enlai called the Kremlin and “said he will not agree for an intervention in Poland” 
(Ochab in Torańska, 1985, p. 150). The entire Central Committee of the Polish United 
Workers’ Party managed to convince Khrushchev to abandon the intervention scenario. As 
Eisler argues Ochab, that true communist, thought in Polish national terms at the most 
important moment of his life. Together with the others, he concluded that it was of the utmost 
importance to prevent the Soviet intervention, (2014, p. 262). 
 
Gomułka became the First Secretary of the Polish United Workers’ Party on the 21st 
and on 24 October and he made yet another speech, which signalled the primacy of 
nationalism over ideology claiming that “every country needs a full sovereignty and 
independence and the right of every sovereign nation to rule an independent state must be 
fully and mutually respected” (Polskie radio, 24.10.2012). The attitude of Polish communists 
towards the Soviets is probably best summarised by Ochab’s statement that “no one pulled 
off a number on our Soviet friends, before and after, like we did” (as cited in Torańska, 1985, 
p.154). Polish-Soviet relations were formalised on 17 December 1956 through an agreement 
concerning the stationing of the Soviet troops in Poland; under Article 1 of this agreement, 
“the temporary stationing of the Soviet troops cannot in any case infringe the sovereignty of 
the Polish state and it cannot lead to their interference with the domestic affairs of the 
People’s Republic of Poland” (Dz. U. 1957, nr. 29 poz. 127, p. 380). Although Poland was 
not capable of enforcing this treaty, the very fact of its existence made Poland unique in the 
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Soviet Bloc (Esiler, 2014, p. 400) and was testament to Soviet recognition of the strength of 
Polish nationalism. It is possible to link the “Polish October” with the events in Hungary. 
In both cases the nationalist sentiment and the eruption of discontent undermined the 
foundation of the communist regime and forced changes in leadership.  
Although it is vital to acknowledge the fact that the Polish crisis started after Bierut’s death in 
Moscow on 12 March 1956 and lasted until Gomułka’s re-election as the First Secretary on 
21 October 1956, it was effectively resolved by the time the Hungarian Revolution broke out 
on 23 October 1956. These events demonstrate that Poland’s communist leadership was 
much more skillful and flexible in their negotiations, as Soviets effectively acknowledged, 
and approved the new narrative of the regime. Poland was allowed to be nationalist for as 
long as it officially belonged to the Soviet Bloc, which Gomułka never denied, nor did he 
openly ask for the removal of Soviet troops. Instead the Polish leadership moved to 
normalize and formalize the status of Soviet troops. This degree of flexibility, which Nagy 
failed to present, prevented Poland from Soviet intervention. Nagy to some extent got carried 
away by nationalist outburst in Hungary, while Gomułka used the “Polish October” as a 
bargaining tool, while trying to salvage the most elements of the socialist governance    – a 
situation that perfectly illustrates the dual nature of Polish regime’s mindset. 
 
With the signing of the agreement, the Polish communists reverted to their dual identity in 
their dealings with the Soviets: on the one hand praising the Soviet Union and its fraternal 
relations with Poland and, on the other, playing a delicate game of deception and defiance. 
This tension was most apparent in 1956, when the communist leadership went to extreme 
lengths to prevent the Soviet intervention (Esiler, 2014). It is hard not to agree with Jedlicki 
(1963) who argues that 1956 was not the struggle for liberalisation of the regime; the political 
situation post-1957 proves that Polish communists did not push for greater liberalisation, 
although the regime needed to abandon its “omnipotence” (Eisler, 2014, p. 412). The regime 
transformed itself into a nationalist one; as such it was a turning point, the ultimate 
acknowledgement of the power of Polish nationalism. Nationalist transformation 
notwithstanding, the regime never intended to abandon its quasi-totalitarian nature. 
Liberalisation and democratisation lasted for as long as the regime was in crisis. As soon as 
the authority in Warsaw was stabilised, the regime began a crackdown on civil liberties. 
Indeed, the struggle of 1956 was conducted to salvage the appearance of independence and to 
secure even greater autonomy within the Soviet dominated system, a struggle that Polish 
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communists effectively won by signing formalising the status of Soviet troops stationing in 
Poland (Dz. U. 1957, nr. 29 poz. 127, p. 380) and subsequently re-polonising the state and 
army apparatus (Eisler, 2014), which can be viewed in purely nationalist terms. The 
transformation is also confirmed by the regime’s re-instatement of the Church to its previous 
role. Furthermore, it never launched an open attack, as it did between 1950 and 1954, on the 
institutions and clergy ever again. Finally, the Church became a nation-wide platform for the 
opposition and played a crucial role in bringing down the regime in late 1980s. 
The importance of the dual-identity and its impact on the communist project 
 
In order to re-ephasize the importance of the dual identity, it is vital to re-state what 
that duality meant and how it manifested itself. First and foremost, it manifested itself in the 
rejection of the Soviet model. Regardless of Polish communists’ intimate knowledge of the 
Soviet system and their negative experience, they “do it better” (as cited in Torańska, 1985, 
p. 457); however, “it” still refers to the communist project. They sought an accommodation 
and improvement of the ideological framework, not its outright rejection. The regime was 
moderate in its use of terror; however, it still had all the major tarces of a totalitarian state – 
the secret police, a network of prisons and labour camps in which any idividual could be 
placed without trial or any formal accusation. The small number of political prisoners (see 
Chapter III) emphasized only the regime’s moderation in its use of totalitarian methods. The 
examples of the fight with the anti-communist underground and the brutal pacification of 
Poznań illustrate that the regime had an arsenal of coercive and brutal methods and was not 
reluctant to use them, when it deemed it necessary. Furthermore, duality is manifested by 
regime’s (and particularly Gomułka’s) distrust and at times open hostility to the Soviets 
(Prażmowska, 2016). Nevertheless, as Eisler (2014) argues, he deemed an alliance with the 
Soviet Union necessary for the territorial integrity of Poland. In the same vein, the regime 
established complete control over the major branches of economy, while resources 
contributed to establishing control over agricultural production were limited and yielded 
insignificant results. Even the case of the popular discontent and turmoil that spread in 1956 
and nearly brought on a Soviet intervention, displayed charatceristics of regime’s dual 
identity. The Polish politburo and Gomułka persuaded Khruschev not to intervene (and 
indeed went to extreme lengths to achieve that) driven, as Eilser argues, by national 
sentiments (2014). That indeed can be seen as partially correct, bearing in mind the 
importance of nationalism even within the communist regime. But as Prażmowska (2016) 
argues, Polish October was a complex struggle. Its main objective concerned Poland’s right 
to reform and to assert her own version of socialism. Even the phrase “the Polish road” to 
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socialism encapsulated the dual character of the regime – it was Polish, thus nationalist, and 
the road headed to the ideological goal of socialism. In case of Poland, the regime was aware 
of its unpopularity and responded by adjusting socialism to suit Polish circumstances. 
Although all the areas of regime’s activity were never devoid of nationalist elements (as I 
demonstrated), the ultimate goal was always socialism. The goal was to transform Poland 
ethnically, geographically and ideologically. The intensity of Polish nationalism undermined 
the project and forced the regime to deviate form the Soviet model and to attempt to establish 
a Polish national version of socialism. And that attempt – the attempt to fuse socialism and 
nationalism – left the regime vulnerable. In times of crisis or weakness, the regime always 
reinforced the nationalist narrative – as it did between 1944 and 1948. When the crisis of 
1956 threathened the regime’s very existence, it again turned towards openly nationalist 
rhetoric. Gomułka’s return to power was a clear signal that regime would yet again endorse 
and nurture national sentiments – as he did when comrade “Wiesław” (the most popular 
pseudonym for Gomułka) was in power previously. Notwithstanding the change of the 
dominat narrative, Poland remained a socialist state and all reforms for as long as the regime 
could maintain its power, and all activities were conducted and implemented within the 
socialist framework (Eisler, 2014) 
 
I have argued previously that Polish national sentiment was extremely strong, its 
intensity resulting from long and tumultuous history of Poland. I have also emphasized that 
the communists understood the importance and strength of Polish nationalism (see Chapter 
II). It is possible to observe a certain pattern that the regime followed throughout its history – 
whenever it was weak, it embraced nationalism as a dominant ideology. However, the initial 
outburst of nationalist narrative between 1944 and 1948 was a deliberate tactic to provide the 
regime with the legitimacy and the broader support base it lacked (Zaremba, 2002). The 
nationalist narrative, however, was short-lived and soon eclipsed by an ideological narrative. 
The regime, after Gomułka’s fall from power, endorsed the internationalist narrative of the 
communist ideology and effectively began a struggle against Polish nationalism. The regime 
might have officially discouraged the national narrative in favour of the ideological one [ 
however, as all chapters demonstrate, the regime was never fully capable of completely 
abandoning nationalist elements and that inability permeated all levels of government. The 
regime itself had an uneasy relationship with Soviet-inspired communist ideology. Światło 
aptly explained the reasons behind these particular features of the Eastern European 
communist regimes resulted from a fact that communism was not monolithic in Eastern 
Europe and, prior to 1945, was not a mass movement. In order to gain legitimacy and 
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support, the communists enlisted people “still attached to national values,” which effectively 
resulted in a “strong drive for national communism” (HIA, DSM, sygn. 73, scan 420). 
 
In the light of this argument it is impossible to emphasize that the Polish regime was 
unique in attempts to find its own way to socialism. However, “the Polish road had become 
the worst road to socialism” and it ultimately failed to transform Polish society along 
ideological lines (Taras, 1992, p. 82-3). The reason behind this failure lies not only with the 
popular rejection of the regime, but also with the regime itself. It never fully abandoned 
nationalism in favour of ideology; thus the communist project was somewhat sabotaged by 
the very people in charge of implementing it. I have already drawn a distinction between 
nationalist “tactic” and nationalist “thinking” in the introduction. However, it is vital to 
emphasize that the nationalist policies of 1944-1948m serving to popularise the regime, 
namely the resettlements of Germans, Ukrainians and Lemkos, were the most successful 
policies launched by the regime in its formative period. These policies might have been 
backed by the Soviets, but their origin and implementation owed everything to long-
standing Polish national aspirations for an ethnic-based state. Thus, all other major areas of 
the communist project aiming to re-shape post-war Poland had nationalist underpinnings. 
The new set of national symbols and rituals failed to distinctively break with Poland’s pre-
war traditions.  The nation-wide education project was carried out with a clear ideological 
purpose, yet it never entirely broke with the Polish nationalist tradition of struggle for 
independence. The economy was centrally planned, yet the private retail sector was treated 
leniently and agrictultural production remained largely in private hands. Propaganda aimed 
to inspire love and devotion to the regime (and its main ally, the USSR) and hatred of the 
West. Yet it also promoted national pride by popularising the images of the national effort 
to rebuild the country destroyed by war. Socialist secularism pushed the regime towards the 
confrontation with one of the main pillars of Polish national identity – the Catholic Church. 
The struggle can be viewed not only in the terms of ideology but also as a struggle for power. 
Ultimately, even at the height of anti-Church persecutions, many party members found 
themselves still following the Polish tradition – they married with the Church’s blessing, 
baptized their children, attended mass and received pastoral visits. 
 
The regime’s conflicting allegiances and approaches were of serious consequence to 
the communist project in Poland and the dual identity was projected onto the nation itself. In 
the public sphere Poles, did not challenge the regime, while privately they mocked and defied 
it. Of course, public compliance was only reserved for the periods when the regime’s grip on 
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power was strong. The events of 1956 show that Poles almost immediately challenged the 
regime when it was weakened by the internal struggle. Such a scenario would be repeated 
multiple times throughout the regime’s history – in 1968, 1970, 1976 and 1980-1981 (Eilser, 
2008). In this respect, Poland was unique among other Eastern European regimes (Taras, 
1992, p. 81), displaying a consistently strong desire for national liberation. However, this 
sentiment was also shared by some members of the regime, particularly by Władysław 
Gomułka. His case probably best exemplifies the communist experience in Poland in the 
1940s and 1950s. He was known for his strong nationalist sentiment during his rule between 
1944 and 1948 as the party’s First Secretary (de facto ruler of the country), which coincided 
with the most openly nationalist narrative of the regime. By 1948, the communists had 
already eliminated the opposition inside the country and the Soviet Union grounded its 
position in Eastern Europe. Alegitimising nationalist narrative was no longer needed; neither 
was Gomułka, who was toppled and imprisoned. The importance of nationalism within the 
Polish regime was proven by the events of 1956 and Gomułka’s return to power. From that 
point onwards, the regime redefined itself in nationalist terms, while still endorsing socialist 
ideology. Gomułka’s second tenure (1956-1970) is known as the period of “little 
stabilization” (Taras, 1992, p. 81) and that was the period when the regime openly adopted 
nationalism, within a socialist framework, as a dominant narrative (Esiler, 2014). The 
strength of Polish national sentiment, even among the members of the regime, forced the 
Soviets to validate and effectively allow the abandonment of ideology as the dominant 
narrative in favour of nationalism for as long as Poland remained within the Soviet sphere of 
influence. 
 
Analytical Framework 
 
This project has demonstrated how Polish nationalism undermined the communist 
project in Poland between 1944 and 1956. The theoretical perspective adopted by this project 
allows a more accurate explanation for communism’s failure in Poland as early as 1956, since 
from that point, nationalism ascended as the dominant narrative of the regime. Ethno- 
symbolism argues that a nation is not an occurrence but that its development is a long 
historical process in which an ethnic culture (language, values, traditions, myths and 
symbols) is formed. Initially, this ethnic culture is confined to the ruling elites (what Anthony 
Smith called a lateral ethnie, 1991) and as historical developments progress – in the form of 
industrialisation, nationalist philosophy, political climate and military conflict, the set of 
national values began to encompass increasingly wider strata of the society until the ethnic 
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culture is shared by all members of the ethnie. As Smith argued (1991), once the ethnic 
culture encompasses all elements of the society, the national identity is formed; once formed, 
it proves durable and resistant to change. In line of Smith’s argument, it is now possible to 
better understand why even the members of the regime never entirely surrendered to the 
communist ideology. Poland’s history (see Chapter I) was a turbulent one; exposure to 
external factors through military conflicts sharpened the Polish national identity. The period 
of partitions (1795-1918) exposed Poles to foreign domination, language and religion. 
Ironically, a nation that lost its state became intensely aware if its identity and, in effect, 
developed a tendency to resist foreign domination or influences. That explains why the 
regime was widely unpopular and rejected from the very beginning. These circumstances also 
shed additional light on the motives behind the regime’s adamant endorsement of nationalism 
while it was still consolidating its power. Most importantly it illuminates the dual identity 
developed by the members of the regime. Polish national identity proved too strong to 
succumb to the internationalist appeals of the communist ideology, even among those who 
were charged with implementing the communist project in Poland. The intensity and strength 
of Polish national identity proved an obstacle for the regime, which could never fully endorse 
the communist doctrine. Such underlying tensions produced the “Polish road to socialism” 
where nationalism played a dominant role in the regime narrative. The period between 1948 
and 1956, when the regime officially abandoned the nationalist narrative and imposed an 
ideological one (and was thus incompatible with Polish nationalism), ended in a nation-wide 
outcry bordering on rebellion (Machcewicz, 2009), nearly toppling the regime and bringing 
the threat of Soviet intervention. These troubled times and complex reactions cannot be 
explained by a single theory of nationalism; hence my use of synthesis. The ethno-symbolist 
argument emphasizes the durability of a once-established national identity, as I have 
demonstrated previously. It also reinforces the dual identity argument, as the Polish regime 
never entirely freed itself from nationalist sentiments. All the policies analyzed in this thesis 
(ethnic cleansing, national education, propaganda, state symbols and rituals) are frequently 
analysed by modernists as tools of nation building and with similar intentions these policies 
were launched in Poland – to construct a nation along Marxist lines. Ironically they proved to 
strengthen the pre-existing national identity, rather than reinvent it. Dmowski’s argument that 
pre-existing national identity is only disseminated more broadly by the means that modernity 
provides, serves to reinforce my argument. The communists could never be entirely free of 
their national background, a fact which undermined their ideological convictions. These 
factors led to a struggle for Poland’s own version of socialism – one infused with national 
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values. By 1956, the project had to be redefined as the full embrace of Marxist ideology 
caused a nation-wide resistance. In order to maintain power, the regime further moderated its 
ideological stance (as well as the use of totalitarian methods) and more openly endorsed a 
national narrative. Such alteration can further be explained by the undemocratic nature of the 
regime. While in democratic regimes, political power can by transferred to a political party 
offering alternative narratives and policies, in undemocratic regimes such alterations must be 
made by the incumbent authoritarian (or totalitarian) leaders. Hence every transformation or a 
change of narrative occurs after a major crisis of the system. In order to avoid being ousted 
from power, the undemocratic government must transform itself – be it in official narrative 
and policy or personal changes; both could be observed in Poland not only in 1956 alone, but 
in 1970 and 1980 as well, when regime was in crisis. 
 
Research Questions 
 
1. To what extent did the Polish communist party seek accommodation with 
Polish nationalism? 
 
This project demonstrated that attempts to integrate nationalism within the communist 
regime occurred in all areas of regime’s activity. During the period of consolidation of 
power, the communists directly engaged with an openly nationalist discourse. This 
approach culminated in the policies of ethnic cleansing instigated by the regime that 
effectively transformed the ethnic structure of post-war Poland. However, all other 
aspects covered by this project demonstrate nationalist undertones. New national 
symbols reflected past traditions; education aimed to indoctrinate along the lines of 
socialist internationalism but was never entirely devoid of national values and patriotic 
appeals. 
The regime adopted traces of Soviet totalitarianism in the form of propaganda; however, 
this propaganda often inspired national pride and, in many instances, especially 
concerning the Germans, aimed to sharpen the ethnic differentiation. The regime also 
engaged in a struggle with the Catholic Church, one of the central elements of Polish 
nationalism. The regime implemented policies to subjugate the Church as an institution, 
achieved to a large extent between 1950 and 1956, yet the Catholic tradition and 
practices, even among communist party members, remained outside the regime’s control 
and continued to flourish. Additionally, when in crisis, the regime turned again to the 
Church to benefit from its legitimacy. The socialist and totalitarian nature of the regime 
notwithstanding, nationalism was always present to some extent in the regime narrative. 
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2. In what ways did that accommodation produce the dual identity in the 
Polish communist party? 
 
The issue of dual identity is analysed predominantly in Chapter II. The strength of Polish 
national identity and close knowledge of the Soviet model produced a need for moderation 
within the Polish regime. In many cases, the Soviet conquest of Poland produced tensions 
between Poles and the USSR, causing the former to reject certain Soviet solutions – 
namely collectivisation – or more moderate application of some methods like the terror. 
Poland followed a model of strict state control over the industry, but failed to eradicate 
private 
enterprises or agricultural production. In many cases, the regime attempted to minimise the 
impacts of Soviet political interventions or secretly defied orders from Moscow, displaying a 
strong desire to emancipate itself from Soviet control. 
 
3. In what ways did the Polish communist party use their dual identity to shape post-war 
Poland? 
 
This research question is addressed by chapters III through VIII, referring to specific policies 
launched by the regime. The dual identity manifested itself in inconsistency of the Polish 
approach with the Soviet model. Although the Stalinist regime was established in Poland by 
1948, mainly due to pressures from the USSR itself, the regime effectively could not 
establish a coherent narrative, combining elements of nationalism and ideology. These 
policies and the lack of a coherent narrative resulted in negative responses in the society. 
Policies aiming to re-shape Polish society effectively served to strengthen the national 
identity and form of Polish nationalism that developed through history. 
 
4. How did the dual identity impact relations with the USSR and Poles? 
 
The regime’s struggle to balance nationalism and ideology had serious consequences. On one 
side, it led to popular rejection of the regime by the society, although periods of open 
endorsement of nationalism by Gomułka provided the regime (and Gomułka himself) some 
degree of the legitimacy and popularity it sought. Despite that, the regime and its values had 
been largely opposed by society, which resulted in a public/private dichotomy. In public, 
many complied with the regime’s political and ideological line, while in private people 
continued to follow Polish traditions and mocked the regime, its policies and values. The 
uneasy balance and moderated Polish approach caused the USSR and its leaders to be 
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suspicious of the Polish regime’s ideological purity and devotion to the Marxist cause. As 
Taras (1992) argues, for the Soviets, the Polish regime became synonymous with aberration 
of ideology. The dual identity, and policies influenced by it, ensured that Polish communists 
received critique both from the Polish society – for being overly ideological – and the USSR 
– for being overly nationalist and deviating from the ideological model. It seems that the 
Polish regime tried to satisfy both Poles and Soviets by their approach to ideology and 
nationalism; effectively, they failed to satisfy either and ultimately lacked legitimacy in 
the eyes of Poles, who questioned their national affiliation, as well as the Soviets, who 
questioned their ideological convictions. 
5. How did that dual identity impact the communist project in Poland? 
 
The communist project was undermined by nationalism from within since the very beginning 
of the communist experiment in Poland. Effectively, by 1956 the ideological project failed 
and the regime nearly collapsed. With rehabilitation of Gomułka, the regime re-adopted an 
openly nationalist narrative. Ideological solutions were sidelined and the regime lost its 
quasi-totalitarian position. The most compelling evidence of the failure of the communist 
project in Poland in 1956 was Soviet complacence. Khrushchev effectively allowed the 
Polish regime to minimize the role of communist ideology in favor of nationalism, for as 
long as Poland still officially endorsed the alliance with the Soviet Union and its dominant 
role in the region. 
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Information letter 
Appendix A: 
 
 
 
 
 
INFORMATION LETTER TO PARTICPANTS 
 
Polish national identity and communist party policies between 1945 and 1956 
 
 
 
Dear Participant, 
 
We would like to invite you to participate in research investigating how modern Polish 
national identity has been influenced by communist party policies initiated between 1945 and 
1956. It will include span of various policies, from education to resettlement and treatment of 
ethnic minorities in order to assess the degree it influenced the Poles and their self- 
perception. 
 
What does participation involve? 
You will be presented with a set of questions mainly concerning your experience with 
national curriculum in early education and the way national celebrations intended to inspire 
patriotic feelings. These questions serve only to guide my understanding and represent my 
main interests in the field, however your story and personal experiences will receive most of 
my attention. During the interview I will be using a digital voice recorder in order to store 
your recollections, that later will be transcribed, translated and used in my research project. I 
intend to conduct group or individual interviews, depending on your preferences. I 
understand the period in question might bring traumatic or uncomfortable memories, in case 
that occurs you can stop the interview and ask for assistance or counselling, which should be 
subsequently provided. We will meet at a location convenient to you and depending on the 
distance, I will reimburse your travel costs, should that be the case. The interview should take 
at most 1 hour, although I will not constrain or interrupt your talk if the time allocated is 
exceeded. 
 
Voluntary participation and right to withdraw 
Participation in this research project is voluntary and have the right to withdraw from the 
project at any stage during the interview. 
 
What will happen to the information collected and is privacy and confidentiality assured? 
Your name will not be recorded and your identity will not be disclosed at any time unless you 
give your expressed and written approval to disclose your identity. All data collected will be, 
if necessary, anonymous and any information that inadvertently identifies you will be 
removed from the data collected by the researchers. The data will be stored for a minimum 
period of 5 years as required by university protocols. Anonymous summary data will be 
available for secondary research. The findings of the research will be used to assess the 
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effectiveness if communist party policies in creating the modern Polish national identity and 
will be used for professional publications. 
 
Has the research been approved? 
The research has not yet been approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee at Edith 
Cowan University. 
 
 
Who do I contact if I wish to discuss the project further? 
If you would like to discuss any aspect of this study with a member of the research team, 
please contact 
 
Jan Kozdra on +61 4 864 340 (in Australia); + 48 512 973 655 (in Poland) or 
jkozdra@our.ecu.edu.au 
 
 
If you have any concerns about the research project and wish to talk to an independent 
person, you may contact: 
 
Research Ethics Officer 
Edith Cowan University 
Phone: (+61 8) 6304 2170 
Email: research.ethics@ecu.edu.au 
 
This information letter is for you to keep. 
Thank you for your participation. 
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Appendix B 
 
Consent form: 
 
 
 
 
Consent for Participation in Interview Research 
 
I volunteer to participate in a research project conducted by Jan Kozdra from Edith Cowan University. 
I understand that the project is designed to gather information about the impact of communist party 
policies between 1945 and 1956 in creating modern Polish national identity. I will be one of people 
being interviewed for this research. 
 
 
1. My participation in this project is voluntary. I understand that I will not be paid for my 
participation. I may withdraw and discontinue participation at any time without penalty. 
 
2. I understand that if I feel uncomfortable in any way during the interview session, I have the right to 
decline to answer any question or to end the interview. 
 
 
3. Participation involves being interviewed by researchers from Century University. The interview 
will last approximately 60 minutes. Notes will be written during the interview and the conversation 
will be taped. If I don't want to be taped, I will not be able to participate in the study. 
 
 
4. I understand that the researcher will not identify me by name in any reports using information 
obtained from this interview, and that my confidentiality as a participant in this study will remain 
secure. Subsequent uses of records and data will be subject to standard data use policies which 
protect the anonymity of individuals and institutions. 
 
 
5. I understand that this research study has been reviewed and approved by the Human Research 
Ethics Committee at Edith Cowan University. For research problems or questions regarding 
subjects, the Human Research Ethics Committee may be contacted through 
 
 
Research Ethics Officer 
Edith Cowan University 
Phone: (+61 8) 6304 2170 
Email: research.ethics@ecu.edu.au 
 
6. I have read and understand the explanation provided to me. I have had all my questions answered  
to my satisfaction, and I voluntarily agree to participate in this study. 
 
7. I have been given a copy of this consent form. 
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My Signature Date 
 
 
 
 
 
 
My Printed Name Signature of the Researcher 
 
 
For further information, please contact: 
Jan Ryszard Kozdra 
Phone: + 48 512 973 655 (in Poland); +61 4 864 340 (in Australia) 
E-mail: jkozdra@our.ecu.edu.au 
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Appendix C: 
 
 
Interview guideline: 
 
 
1. What does it mean to be Polish, to you? 
 
2. Could you identify any criteria of Polishness? 
 
3. What, do you think, makes Poles different from other European nations? 
 
4. What did you make of the national celebrations, like 1st of May, 9th of May or the 22nd 
of July, as a child? 
5. What kind of feelings were triggered by these celebrations? 
 
6. How different was the attitude towards the state in your family, to the one you 
experienced at school? 
7. To what extent school try to define Polishness? 
 
8. How did your school make you feel about the country you lived in? 
 
9. To what extent did the school try to instil a sense of pride about being Polish? 
 
10. What was the version of history thought? Were there any national heroes? Historic 
foes? What was most emphasized? 
11. To what extent did sport and sport events play a part in creating a feeling of 
belonging/inclusion? 
12. To what extent were patriotic (propaganda) posters visible in everyday life and what 
effect did these have on your self-perception? 
13. Was loyalty to the state stressed at school and how did that make you feel? 
 
14. Could you describe any feelings that you felt towards your country in your childhood? 
167  
Appendix D: 
 
List of abbreviations: 
 
AAN – Archiwum Akt Nowych – Archive of New Files 
 
AP/O/Sz/Wr – Archiwum Państwowe/w Olsztynie/w Szczecinie/we Wrocławiu – State 
Archive/in Olsztyn/in Szczecin/in WrocłaBS – Biblioteka Sejmowa – Library of the Sejm 
CAW – Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe – Cenrtral Military Archive 
 
DVL – Deutsche Volksliste – German National Lists 
 
Dz.U. – Dziennik Ustaw - Legislative Register 
 
GRU - Гла́вное разве́дывательное управле́ние, Glavnoye razvedyvatel'noye upravleniye – 
Central Intelligence Agency 
 
GULag (ГУЛАГ) – Главное управление исправительно-трудовых лагерей и колоний or 
Гла́вное управле́ние лагере́й и мест заключе́ния (Glavnoye Upravleniye istravityelno- 
trudovych lagyieriey i klonyi or Glavnoye Upravleniye lagyieriey i myest zaklutschenya) – 
Central Administration of correctional-labour camps and colonies or Central Administration 
of Camps and places of imprisonment 
 
GUS – Główny Urząd Statystyczny – Central Bureau of Statistics 
 
KC – Komitet Centralny – Central Committee 
 
KOSSz – Kuratorium Okręgu Szkolnego Szczecińskiego – Office of the Education 
Superintendent for Szczecin School District 
KRN – Krajowa Rada Narodowa – National Council of the Homeland 
 
LWP – Ludowe Wojsko Polskie – Polish People’s Army 
 
MAP – Ministerstwo Administracji Publicznej – Ministry of Public Administration 
MBP – Ministerstwo Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego – Ministry of Public Security 
MO – Milicja Obywatelska – Citizen Militia 
MOśw – Ministerstwo Oświaty – Ministry of Education 
 
MZO – Ministerstwo Ziem Odzyskanych – Ministry of Recovered Territories 
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M. P. – Monitor Polski – Polish Monitor – Administrative register for the Council of 
Ministers 
NKVD – Народный комиссариат внутренних дел, Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del 
– People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs 
 
PKF – Polska Kronika Filmowa - Polish Film Chronicle (Newsreel) 
 
PKWN – Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego – Polish Committee of National 
Liberation 
PPR – Polska Partia Robotnicza – Polish Workers’ Party 
 
PZPR – Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza – Polish United Workers’ Party 
 
Stasi – Ministerium für Staatssicherheit – Ministry of State Security 
 
UB – Urząd Bezpieczeństwa – Security Office 
 
UW/O/S/Wr – Urząd Wojewódzki/Olsztyński/Szczeciński/Wrocławski – Voivodeship 
Office of/Olsztyn/Szczecnin/Wrocław 
 
TRJN – Tymczasowy Rząd Jedności Narodowej – Provisional Government of National 
Unity 
WiN – Wolność i Niezawisłość – Liberty and Independence 
 
Złp – Złoty Polski – Polish Zloty (national currency) 
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Appednix E: 
Internal reference concerning archival sources: 
 
 
 
 
 
PKF: 
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Appendix F: 
 
Relating to Chapter II 
 
Backgrounds: 
 
Celina Budzyńska (1907-1993) - In 1927 left for Moscow, where she graduated from 
Communist University of National Minorities of the West, arrested and sentenced for 8 years 
in labour camp in 1937. Released and allowed to return to Poland in 1945. Member of 
Parliament between 1952 and 1956. 
 
Leon Chajn (1910-1983) – communist activist and lawyer, undersecretary in Ministry of 
Justice between 1944 and 1949, vice-chairman of the Supreme Audit Office, 1949-1952, then 
undersecretary in Ministry of Labour and Social Care until 1957. 
 
Stefan Staszewski/Szuster (1906-1989) – member of the Voivodeship Committee of Polish 
Workers’ Party in Katowice (1945-1947) between 1948 and 1949 member of the Central 
Committee, I Secretary of Warsaw Committee between 1955 and 1957. Arrested in 1938 and 
sentenced for 15 years in labour camp of Kolyma, from where he was released in 1945 and 
returned to Poland (BIP/IPN). 
 
Table F1: Ministry of Public Security: Structure (as given by Józef Światło, HIA, DSM, 
sygn. 73, scans 427-429) 
 
 
Jakub Berman (Politburo member responsible for the apparatus of repression) 
 
Minister Stanisław Radkiewicz 
 
Executive Supervisor Soviet General 
Lalin 
 
Deputy Ministers: 
 
Romkowski, Mietkowski, Swietlik, Ptasiński 
 
Department nr. 
 
Purpose/task 
 
Polish director 
 
Soviet director 
 
I 
 
Counterintelligence 
 
Colonel 
Antosiewicz 
 
Colonel Grayevsky 
 
II 
 
Archives. Censorship of 
foreign correspondence, 
technical assistance for 
other departments 
 
- 
 
Colonel Taborysky 
(Belorussian) 
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III 
 
Combatting all 
underground (guerrilla) 
organisations 
 
Leon 
Andrzejewski 
 
Colonel Shaburin 
 
IV 
 
Combatting espionage and 
sabotage in light industry, 
agriculture and banking 
 
- 
 
Colonel 
Goltschevsky 
 
(had Polish 
background) 
 
V 
 
Combatting all foreign 
(except Soviet) influences 
in the party 
 
Julia Brystygier 
 
- 
 
VI 
 
Organisation, supervision 
and maintenance of labour 
camps 
 
- 
 
Colonel Dulyash 
 
VII 
 
Intelligence in the West 
 
Colonel 
Sienkiewicz 
(former Soviet 
officer) 
 
- 
 
VIII 
 
Supervision on transport 
and shipping (land, air and 
maritime) 
 
- 
 
Colonel Zabavsky 
(Belorussian) 
 
IX 
 
Protection of the heavy 
industry 
 
Podpolkovnik 
Górecki 
 
- 
 
X 
 
“counterintelligence within 
the party”, had its own 
investigation department 
 
Colonel Anatol 
Fejgin 
 
- 
 
XI 
 
Combatting the Church 
 
Colonel 
Więckowski 
 
- 
 
Investigation 
 
Investigations in all cases, 
which did not concern 
party members 
 
Colonel Józef 
Różański 
 
- 
 
Human 
Resources 
 
Managing and selecting 
cadres; “department 
composed primarily of 
Russians and 
Belorussians” 
  
Colonel Nikolay 
Orehva 
 
Government 
Protection 
 
Providing security for 
members of the 
government 
 
- 
 
Colonel 
Grzybovsky 
172  
    
Podpolkovnik 
Lahovsky – Head 
of Bierut’s detail 
 
General 
 
Providing weapons for 
functionaries, boarder 
passes 
 
- 
 
Colonel Dovkan 
 
Communications 
 
Surveillance of telephone 
calls, jamming foreign 
broadcasts 
 
- 
 
Colonel Sushek 
 
Training 
 
Training and preparation 
 
Colonel Józef 
Kratko 
 
- 
 
Financial 
 
Managing operational 
funds 
 
- 
 
Colonel Kiselev 
 
Military Office 
 
Mobilisation plans. 
Arresting of oppositionists 
 
Colonel Garbowski 
 
- 
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Appendix G: 
Relating to Chapter IV 
Table G1: Population transfers 1944-199 
 
Ethnic group 
Estimated 
number 
Year of 
expulsion 
Origin Destination 
Germans 593 400 
(Nitschke, 2000, 
p. 162) 
1945 Silesia, Western 
Pomerania, 
Pomerania, 
Masuria 
Soviet 
Occupation Zone 
in Germany; 
 
British 
Occupation Zone 
in Germany 
1 649 088 
(Nitschke, 2000, 
p. 190) 
1946 “ “ 
538 526 (AAN, 
ZC PUR, sygn. 
I/3, p. 4) 
1947 “ “ 
42 740 (AAN, 
ZC PUR, sygn. 
I/3, p. 4) 
1948 “ “ 
61 449 (GUS, 
Rocznik 
Statystyczny, 
1950, p. 22) 
1949 
Ukrainians and Lemkos 482 662 
(Mironowicz, 
2000, p. 59) 
Between 1944 
and 1946 
Poland – Lublin 
and Rzeszow and 
Lesser Poland 
Ukrainian SSR 
“ 
“ 
140 000 
(Mironowicz, 
2000, p. 62) 
1947-1948 Recovered 
Territories in 
Poland 
Belarusians 38 000 
(Mironowicz, 
2000, p. 
Between 1944 
and 1946 
Poland – North 
Eastern provinces 
Belarussian SSR 
Lithuanians 12 000 (Sidor, 
2004, p. 137 
1941 Poland – North 
Eastern provinces 
German occupied 
Lithuania 
18 (Tarka, 2013, 
p. 16-17) 
1944-1945 Lithuanian SSR 
Poles 
 
(GUS, Rocznik 
Statystyczny, 1950, p. 22) 
117 212 1944 RFSSR, 
Lithuanian, 
Belorussian and 
Ukrainian SSRs 
Poland 
723 488 1945 
644 347 1946 
10 801 1947 
7 325 1948 
3 420 1949 
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Poles 
 
(GUS, Rocznik 
Statystyczny, 1950, p. 22) 
1 482 042 Beetween 1945 
and 1949 
Western and 
Southern Europe 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix H: 
 
Relating to Chapter IV 
 
1. Polish national anthem remained unchanged throughout the period of communism 
Text: 
Poland has not yet perished, 
So long as we still live. 
What the alien force has taken from us, 
We shall retrieve with a sabre. 
March, march, Dąbrowski, 
From the Italian land to Poland. 
Under your command 
We shall re-join the nation. 
We'll cross the Vistula and the Warta, 
We shall be Polish. 
Bonaparte has given us the example 
Of how we should prevail. 
March, march... 
Like Czarniecki to Poznań 
After the Swedish occupation, 
To save our homeland, 
We shall return across the sea. 
March, march... 
A father, in tears, 
Says to his Basia 
Listen, our boys are said 
To be beating the tarabans. 
March, march... 
2. “Rota” is a poem written by Maria Konopnicka in early 20th century as a response 
to Kulturkampf 
Text: 
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We won't let our speech be buried. 
We are the Polish nation, the Polish people, 
From the royal line of Piast. 
We won't let the enemy oppress us. 
 
So help us God! 
So help us God! 
 
To the last blood drop in our veins 
We will defend our Spirit 
Till into dust and ash shall fall, 
The Teutonic Order's windstorm. 
Every doorsill shall be a fortress. 
 
So help us God! 
So help us God! 
 
The German won't spit in our face, 
Nor Germanise our children, 
Our host will arise in arms, 
Spirit will lead the way. 
We will go when the golden horn sounds. 
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Figure 5. Coat of arms from 1955 
Figure 4 – Eagle on official state 
documents issued in 1945 (BS/KRN6) 
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Appendix J: 
 
Relating to Chapter VI 
 
 
Figure 1 - Illiteracy rates in Poland (1931) 
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Appendix K: 
 
 
 
Relating to Chapter VII 
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Fig. 13 – Exhibition of the Recovered 
Territories 
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